runtime: publish the vector index instead of guarding it
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m59s

The crash (SIGTRAP in engram_activate -> eg_vindex_sync -> vindex_insert ->
_realloc) had three read paths mutating five process-global statics.
engram_activate, eg_knn_for_node (whose own comment says "No writes.") and
engram_geo_reify_run_json all called eg_vindex_sync, which frees the index,
reallocs the seen-map and inserts — on a read.

Three moves, in decreasing order of how much they dissolve:

1. Misfiled scratch is not shared state. visited/visit_epoch/visited_cap
   were never owned by the index; they are one traversal's local, hoisted
   into struct VIndex as an allocation optimisation. They want neither a
   lock nor a capability nor a pool — just to go back in the call frame.
   Two concurrent READS stomped each other purely because of this.

2. const IS the capability. Once the scratch leaves the struct, search
   reads and nothing else, so vindex_search takes a const VIndex*. That is
   exactly what a capability-pointer ABI would have bought — a read path
   physically cannot call vindex_insert, enforced by the compiler on every
   future caller — for one qualifier instead of an ABI swept across
   hundreds of builtins.

3. What survives is publication, not ownership. HNSW insert is NOT an
   append: it rewires the neighbour links of already-existing elements and
   reallocs elems[], so the store's append-only property does not transfer
   to the index derived from it. eg_vindex_sync therefore splits into
   eg_vindex_maintain (exclusive, sole mutator) and eg_vindex_view (shared,
   returns const VIndex*). A read path may demand that a current snapshot
   exist — a request to the owner, not a mutation by the reader.

Write-side owner: eg_vindex_note_embedded hooks the embedding-ASSIGNMENT
sites rather than the append sites, because a node with no embedding cannot
be in a vector index — embedding assignment is the event that owns index
membership. One O(log n) insert, no O(node_count) presence scan. This also
retires the "STALENESS (honest tradeoff)" note where a lazily-embedded
older node stayed invisible to route_nearest/autoconnect until a full
rebuild (the embed-gap #20 shape).

Evidence. The existing harness conflated two hazards, which is why fixing
half of it read as failure. Split into four:

  single (3000 vec, ASan+UBSan)          clean  ->  clean
  readers (4 readers, no writer, TSan)   RACE   ->  clean
  unsynchronized (writer+reader, bare)   race   ->  race, expected forever
  published (owner + 4 readers)          n/a    ->  clean, 3000/3000 landed

RESULT: PASS. recall@10 = 0.9365 at ef_search=128 (gate >= 0.90);
determinism byte-identical across two independent builds.

The unsynchronized half is now permanently expected to race, deliberately:
it is the executable proof that the boundary must live above the data
structure, not inside it.

fb32d15's guard is KEPT, correcting this design's own section 5. Measured,
it guards TWO structures and only one was converted here: g->nodes/g->edges
are realloc'd in place (el_runtime.c:7618,7629) and engram_activate_inner's
embed-backfill writes n->emb through exactly such a borrowed pointer.
Deleting the guard reintroduces a measured 11171->9579 edge loss. Its
comment is narrowed to the RAM graph and the deletion precondition named.

That corrects the ordering claim too: the residual is not one ABI that
dissolves everything at once, it is a PROPERTY applied per structure.
Residues evaporate in the order the property is applied, and a residue
whose structure has not been converted must be left standing.
This commit is contained in:
Neuron
2026-08-16 11:29:12 -05:00
committed by bigmerge
parent e99a4640e2
commit 8e9d88fc01
8 changed files with 609 additions and 112 deletions
+69 -33
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,31 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# run_vindex_concurrency_tests.sh — regression harness for the 2026-08-16 soul crash.
#
# Runs two halves. The PAIR is the point: the ASan control localises the defect to
# concurrency rather than to HNSW logic. See test_vindex_concurrency.c for the full
# story (SIGSEGV at ASCII address "gramNode", heap corruption in xzm_realloc, etc).
# Four halves. The SET is the point: it separates two hazards the original two-half
# version conflated, and which have fixes in different files.
#
# 1. single ASan+UBSan, one thread. MUST be clean. Always a hard failure.
# 2. concurrent — TSan, writer + reader on one index. Currently EXPECTED to report a
# race at visited_reset, because VIndex still owns its visited[] +
# visit_epoch scratch. Once that moves to a per-query checkout pool
# this must go clean; flip EXPECT_RACE=0 then and it becomes a real
# regression gate.
# 1. single ASan+UBSan, one thread. MUST be clean. Hard failure.
#
# 2. readers TSan, N readers, NO writer. Hazard (a): the visited set used
# to live on the index, so two pure READS stamped each other's
# epoch. Fixed in engram_vindex.c (frame-owned VVisit +
# `const VIndex*` search). MUST be clean. Hard failure.
#
# 3. unsynchronized TSan, writer + reader on a BARE index. Hazard (b): in-place
# HNSW insert rewires existing elements' neighbour lists and
# reallocs elems[]. EXPECTED TO RACE, PERMANENTLY. This is not
# a bug to fix inside engram_vindex.c — it is the executable
# proof that a publication boundary must exist above it.
# Not a failure. If it ever goes CLEAN, the test stopped
# interleaving and half 4 is no longer meaningful either.
#
# 4. published TSan, owner + N readers through a publication boundary
# (rwlock: readers shared, owner exclusive) mirroring
# eg_vindex_view / eg_vindex_maintain in lang/runtime/el_runtime.c.
# MUST be clean, and all inserts must land. Hard failure.
#
# See test_vindex_concurrency.c for the full story (SIGSEGV at ASCII address
# "gramNode", heap corruption in xzm_realloc, etc).
#
# usage: run_vindex_concurrency_tests.sh
set -uo pipefail
@@ -23,12 +38,9 @@ trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT
SRC="$HERE/test_vindex_concurrency.c"
VINDEX="$RUNTIME/engram_vindex.c"
# Flip to 0 once the visited set is per-query; the concurrent half then becomes a gate.
EXPECT_RACE="${EXPECT_RACE:-1}"
fail=0
echo "== [1/2] single-threaded control under AddressSanitizer =="
echo "== [1/4] single-threaded control under AddressSanitizer =="
cc -std=c11 -g -O1 -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer \
-I"$RUNTIME" -o "$WORK/single" "$SRC" "$VINDEX" -lm || { echo "BUILD FAILED"; exit 2; }
if ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0 "$WORK/single" single; then
@@ -40,30 +52,54 @@ else
fail=1
fi
echo
echo "== [2/2] concurrent writer+reader under ThreadSanitizer =="
cc -std=c11 -g -O1 -fsanitize=thread -fno-omit-frame-pointer \
-I"$RUNTIME" -o "$WORK/conc" "$SRC" "$VINDEX" -lm || { echo "BUILD FAILED"; exit 2; }
tsan_log="$WORK/tsan.log"
TSAN_OPTIONS="halt_on_error=0" "$WORK/conc" concurrent >"$tsan_log" 2>&1
if grep -q "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$tsan_log"; then
echo " -> RACE DETECTED:"
grep -m1 -A6 "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$tsan_log" | sed 's/^/ /'
if [ "$EXPECT_RACE" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> EXPECTED (VIndex still owns the shared visited set). Not a failure yet."
echo " Fix = per-query visited buffer (hnswlib VisitedListPool style), then"
echo " re-run with EXPECT_RACE=0."
else
echo " -> REGRESSION: the visited set was supposed to be per-query."
fail=1
fi
# run_tsan <mode> <logfile>; echoes nothing, sets $tsan_raced
run_tsan() {
TSAN_OPTIONS="halt_on_error=0" "$WORK/conc" "$1" >"$2" 2>&1
tsan_rc=$?
if grep -q "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$2"; then tsan_raced=1; else tsan_raced=0; fi
}
echo
echo "== [2/4] concurrent READERS, no writer (visited-set gate) =="
run_tsan readers "$WORK/readers.log"
if [ "$tsan_raced" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> REGRESSION: two concurrent reads still race."
grep -m1 -A6 "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$WORK/readers.log" | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " The visited set was supposed to be owned by the call frame."
fail=1
else
echo " -> clean"
if [ "$EXPECT_RACE" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> NOTE: no race reported, but EXPECT_RACE=1. Either the fix landed"
echo " (set EXPECT_RACE=0) or the test did not actually interleave."
fi
echo " -> clean (concurrent reads are safe)"
fi
echo
echo "== [3/4] writer+reader on a BARE index (expected-race probe) =="
run_tsan unsynchronized "$WORK/unsync.log"
if [ "$tsan_raced" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> RACE DETECTED, as expected:"
grep -m1 -A4 "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$WORK/unsync.log" | sed 's/^/ /'
echo " In-place HNSW insert mutates existing elements. Not fixable inside"
echo " engram_vindex.c — this is why the publication boundary exists."
else
echo " -> NOTE: no race reported. The probe did not interleave; half 4's"
echo " clean result proves less than it should. Investigate."
fi
echo
echo "== [4/4] owner+readers through the publication boundary (boundary gate) =="
run_tsan published "$WORK/pub.log"
if [ "$tsan_raced" = "1" ]; then
echo " -> REGRESSION: the publication boundary did not serialize the owner."
grep -m1 -A6 "ThreadSanitizer: data race" "$WORK/pub.log" | sed 's/^/ /'
fail=1
elif [ "$tsan_rc" != "0" ]; then
echo " -> FAIL: boundary clean under TSan but the run failed:"
tail -3 "$WORK/pub.log" | sed 's/^/ /'
fail=1
else
echo " -> clean (readers project concurrently; the owner's inserts all landed)"
fi
echo