diff --git a/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c b/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c index eeb23a9..214c07c 100644 --- a/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c +++ b/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c @@ -4840,6 +4840,43 @@ el_val_t engram_scan_nodes_json(el_val_t limit, el_val_t offset) { return el_wrap_str(b.buf); } +/* engram_scan_nodes_by_type_json — filter by node_type before paginating. + * Empty / NULL type_v falls back to the unfiltered scan (existing behaviour). + * Result is JSON array, salience-sorted, transparent layers skipped. */ +el_val_t engram_scan_nodes_by_type_json(el_val_t type_v, el_val_t limit, el_val_t offset) { + const char* type_filter = EL_CSTR(type_v); + if (!type_filter || !*type_filter) { + return engram_scan_nodes_json(limit, offset); + } + EngramStore* g = engram_get(); + int64_t lim = (int64_t)limit; if (lim <= 0) lim = 100; + int64_t off = (int64_t)offset; if (off < 0) off = 0; + JsonBuf b; jb_init(&b); + jb_putc(&b, '['); + if (g->node_count == 0) { jb_putc(&b, ']'); return el_wrap_str(b.buf); } + int64_t* idx = malloc((size_t)g->node_count * sizeof(int64_t)); + if (!idx) { jb_putc(&b, ']'); return el_wrap_str(b.buf); } + int64_t live = 0; + for (int64_t i = 0; i < g->node_count; i++) { + if (engram_layer_is_transparent(g->nodes[i].layer_id)) continue; + const char* nt = g->nodes[i].node_type; + if (!nt || strcmp(nt, type_filter) != 0) continue; + idx[live++] = i; + } + engram_sort_indices_by_salience(idx, live, g->nodes); + int64_t end = off + lim; + if (end > live) end = live; + int first = 1; + for (int64_t i = off; i < end; i++) { + if (!first) jb_putc(&b, ','); + engram_emit_node_json(&b, &g->nodes[idx[i]]); + first = 0; + } + free(idx); + jb_putc(&b, ']'); + return el_wrap_str(b.buf); +} + el_val_t engram_neighbors_json(el_val_t node_id, el_val_t max_depth, el_val_t direction) { /* Re-implement here directly so we serialize without going through * the ElList path. Walks BFS to max_depth, emits {node, edge, hops} diff --git a/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.h b/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.h index 014d2ee..4bead7d 100644 --- a/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.h +++ b/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.h @@ -27,10 +27,19 @@ * -lcurl — required for the HTTP client (http_get, http_post, llm_*). * -lpthread — required for the HTTP server (one detached thread per * connection, capped at 64 concurrent). + * -loqs — optional; required only when liboqs is installed and the + * pq_* / sha3_256_hex entry points are needed. Detected at + * compile time via __has_include(). + * -lcrypto — optional; pulled in alongside -loqs. Used for X25519 in + * pq_hybrid_* and HKDF-SHA256 derivation. * * Canonical compile command: * cc -std=c11 -I el-compiler/runtime -lcurl -lpthread \ * -o .c el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c + * + * With liboqs (post-quantum stack): + * cc -std=c11 -I el-compiler/runtime -lcurl -lpthread -loqs -lcrypto \ + * -o .c el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c */ #pragma once @@ -132,14 +141,83 @@ el_val_t http_post_json(el_val_t url, el_val_t json_body); el_val_t http_get_with_headers(el_val_t url, el_val_t headers_map); el_val_t http_post_with_headers(el_val_t url, el_val_t body, el_val_t headers_map); el_val_t http_post_form_auth(el_val_t url, el_val_t form_body, el_val_t auth_header); +el_val_t http_delete(el_val_t url); void http_serve(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler); void http_set_handler(el_val_t name); +/* HTTP server v2 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + * Same dispatch model as http_serve, but the handler signature is widened: + * + * el_val_t handler(method, path, headers_map, body) + * + * `headers_map` is an ElMap from lowercased header name → header value (both + * Strings). Repeated headers are joined with ", " per RFC 7230. + * + * Response value: the handler may return either + * (a) a plain body string — same auto-content-type / 200-OK behaviour as + * http_serve (3-arg) — or + * (b) a response envelope built with `http_response(status, headers_json, + * body)`. The runtime detects the envelope discriminator + * `"el_http_response":1` at the start of the returned string and + * unpacks status / headers / body before sending. + * + * The 3-arg http_serve(port, handler) remains supported unchanged for + * existing handlers (e.g. products/web/server.el): it dispatches with + * (method, path, body), hardcodes 200 OK, and auto-detects content type. */ +void http_serve_v2(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler); +void http_set_handler_v2(el_val_t name); + +/* Build an HTTP response envelope. `headers_json` should be a JSON object + * literal like `{"WWW-Authenticate":"Basic"}` (or "" / "{}" for none). The + * returned string carries the discriminator `{"el_http_response":1,...}` + * which the runtime's send-path detects and unpacks. Detection happens + * uniformly inside http_send_response, so a 3-arg handler may also return + * an envelope. The 3-arg variant remains documented as a fixed 200-OK + * auto-content-type contract for legacy handlers that return plain bodies. */ +el_val_t http_response(el_val_t status, el_val_t headers_json, el_val_t body); + +/* HTTP timeout — every libcurl request honors EL_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS (default + * 60000ms). Read lazily on first use, so setting the env var any time before + * the first http_* call is sufficient. */ + +/* Streaming variants — write the response body straight to a file via + * libcurl's CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION = fwrite. These bypass the el_val_t string + * wrapper entirely, so binary payloads (audio/mpeg, image/png, etc.) survive + * embedded NUL bytes that would truncate a strlen()-based code path. + * + * Both honor EL_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS, follow redirects, and accept the same + * `headers_map` shape as http_post_with_headers (ElMap of String→String). + * + * Return value: 1 on success (file fully written), 0 on any failure + * (network, file open, partial write). On failure the output file is removed + * so callers cannot mistake a partially-written file for a valid one. */ +el_val_t http_post_to_file(el_val_t url, el_val_t body, el_val_t headers_map, el_val_t output_path); +el_val_t http_get_to_file(el_val_t url, el_val_t headers_map, el_val_t output_path); + +/* ── URL encoding ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ + +el_val_t url_encode(el_val_t s); /* RFC 3986 unreserved set */ +el_val_t url_decode(el_val_t s); /* '+' → space, %XX → byte */ + /* ── Filesystem ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ el_val_t fs_read(el_val_t path); el_val_t fs_write(el_val_t path, el_val_t content); el_val_t fs_list(el_val_t path); +el_val_t fs_exists(el_val_t path); +el_val_t fs_mkdir(el_val_t path); /* mkdir -p, mode 0755 */ + +/* Length-explicit binary write. `length` is an Int (el_val_t holding the + * byte count). The caller knows the length from context — typically because + * `bytes` came from base64_decode (which produces a magic-tagged binary + * buffer with embedded NULs possible) and the caller already tracks the + * decoded length, OR because the bytes came from a fixed-size source + * (sha256_bytes = 32, hmac_sha256_bytes = 32). Bypasses strlen entirely. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure (invalid path, can't open, partial + * write, negative length). On partial-write failure, the file is removed + * so callers cannot read back a truncated artefact. */ +el_val_t fs_write_bytes(el_val_t path, el_val_t bytes, el_val_t length); /* ── JSON ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ @@ -153,6 +231,8 @@ el_val_t json_get_bool(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t key); el_val_t json_get_raw(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t key); el_val_t json_set(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t key, el_val_t value); el_val_t json_array_len(el_val_t json_str); +el_val_t json_array_get(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t index); +el_val_t json_array_get_string(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t index); /* ── Time ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ @@ -223,9 +303,14 @@ el_val_t list_range(el_val_t start, el_val_t end); el_val_t bool_to_str(el_val_t b); +/* ── Numeric parsing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ + +el_val_t parse_int(el_val_t s, el_val_t default_val); + /* ── Process ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */ void exit_program(el_val_t code); +el_val_t getpid_now(void); /* ── CGI identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── * Called at the start of main() in CGI programs (those with a `cgi {}` block). @@ -279,6 +364,19 @@ el_val_t engram_node(el_val_t content, el_val_t node_type, el_val_t salience); el_val_t engram_node_full(el_val_t content, el_val_t node_type, el_val_t label, el_val_t salience, el_val_t importance, el_val_t confidence, el_val_t tier, el_val_t tags); +/* Layered consciousness — see el_runtime.c for the layered architecture + * design notes (search "Layered consciousness architecture"). The five + * canonical layers (safety / core-identity / domain-knowledge / imprint / + * suit) are seeded automatically; engram_add_layer extends the registry + * with imprint or suit overlays at runtime. Nodes default to layer 1 + * (core-identity) when created via engram_node / engram_node_full. */ +el_val_t engram_node_layered(el_val_t content, el_val_t node_type, el_val_t label, + el_val_t salience, el_val_t certainty, el_val_t confidence, + el_val_t status, el_val_t tags, el_val_t layer_id); +el_val_t engram_add_layer(el_val_t name, el_val_t priority, el_val_t suppressible, + el_val_t transparent, el_val_t injectable); +el_val_t engram_remove_layer(el_val_t layer_id); +el_val_t engram_list_layers(void); el_val_t engram_get_node(el_val_t id); void engram_strengthen(el_val_t node_id); void engram_forget(el_val_t node_id); @@ -290,6 +388,8 @@ el_val_t engram_edge_between(el_val_t from_id, el_val_t to_id); el_val_t engram_neighbors(el_val_t node_id); el_val_t engram_neighbors_filtered(el_val_t node_id, el_val_t max_depth, el_val_t direction); el_val_t engram_edge_count(void); +/* Three-pass activation: background fan-out → working-memory promotion → + * Layer 0 override. See "Three-pass activation" in el_runtime.c. */ el_val_t engram_activate(el_val_t query, el_val_t depth); el_val_t engram_save(el_val_t path); el_val_t engram_load(el_val_t path); @@ -300,9 +400,16 @@ el_val_t engram_load(el_val_t path); el_val_t engram_get_node_json(el_val_t id); el_val_t engram_search_json(el_val_t query, el_val_t limit); el_val_t engram_scan_nodes_json(el_val_t limit, el_val_t offset); +el_val_t engram_scan_nodes_by_type_json(el_val_t node_type, el_val_t limit, el_val_t offset); el_val_t engram_neighbors_json(el_val_t node_id, el_val_t max_depth, el_val_t direction); el_val_t engram_activate_json(el_val_t query, el_val_t depth); el_val_t engram_stats_json(void); +el_val_t engram_list_layers_json(void); +/* engram_compile_layered_json — produce a prompt-ready text block split + * into "[LAYER 0 — STRUCTURAL]" (non-suppressible layers, sacred fire) + * and "[ENGRAM CONTEXT]" (standard suppressible layers). Returns "" if + * no nodes promoted to working memory. */ +el_val_t engram_compile_layered_json(el_val_t intent, el_val_t depth); /* ── LLM (Anthropic API client) ───────────────────────────────────────────── * All functions call https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages with the API key @@ -329,6 +436,83 @@ void llm_register_tool(el_val_t name, el_val_t handler_fn_name); el_val_t args(void); void el_runtime_init_args(int argc, char** argv); +/* ── Crypto primitives ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── + * SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-256, and base64 (standard + URL-safe). + * Self-contained — no OpenSSL/libcrypto dependency. The implementations are + * adapted from public-domain reference code (Brad Conte / RFC 4648). + * + * Bytes-returning variants (sha256_bytes, hmac_sha256_bytes) return a string + * value whose contents are raw binary; callers usually feed these into + * base64_encode. Note that el_val_t strings are NUL-terminated by convention, + * so the binary payload may contain embedded NULs — pass it directly into + * base64_encode (which uses an explicit length) rather than treating it as + * a printable C string. + * + * The "base64" variants emit/accept RFC 4648 standard alphabet with padding. + * The "base64url" variants use URL-safe alphabet (`-`/`_`) with no padding, + * as used in JWTs. */ + +el_val_t sha256_hex(el_val_t input); +el_val_t sha256_bytes(el_val_t input); +el_val_t hmac_sha256_hex(el_val_t key, el_val_t message); +el_val_t hmac_sha256_bytes(el_val_t key, el_val_t message); +el_val_t base64_encode(el_val_t input); +el_val_t base64_decode(el_val_t input); +el_val_t base64url_encode(el_val_t input); +el_val_t base64url_decode(el_val_t input); + +/* Length-aware variants (internal — exposed for the rare caller that already + * has a known-length binary buffer and doesn't want to round-trip through + * a NUL-terminated el_val_t string). Sha256_bytes and hmac_sha256_bytes feed + * these implicitly. */ +el_val_t el_sha256_bytes_n(const unsigned char* data, size_t len); +el_val_t el_base64_encode_n(const unsigned char* data, size_t len, int url_safe); + +/* ── Post-quantum primitives (liboqs-backed) ──────────────────────────────── + * All inputs/outputs hex-encoded. Algorithm choices: + * Signature: CRYSTALS-Dilithium-3 (NIST level 3, balanced) + * KEM: CRYSTALS-Kyber-768 (NIST level 3) + * Hash: SHA3-256 (Keccak) (PQ-aware protocols favour SHA3 over SHA2) + * + * If liboqs is not linked (detected via __has_include() at compile + * time), the pq_* entry points return a JSON-shaped error string so callers + * fail loudly rather than silently fall back to classical schemes: + * {"error":"liboqs not linked, post-quantum primitives unavailable"} + * + * The hybrid handshake pairs X25519 with Kyber-768 per NIST PQ guidance and + * CNSA 2.0. Combined shared secret is HKDF-SHA256(x25519_ss || kyber_ss). + * Even if Kyber falls, X25519 holds; if X25519 falls under quantum attack, + * Kyber holds. SHA3-256 also remains usable independent of liboqs (the + * Keccak permutation is PQ-OK as a primitive). */ + +el_val_t pq_keygen_signature(void); +el_val_t pq_sign(el_val_t secret_key_hex, el_val_t message); +el_val_t pq_verify(el_val_t public_key_hex, el_val_t message, el_val_t signature_hex); + +el_val_t pq_kem_keygen(void); +el_val_t pq_kem_encaps(el_val_t public_key_hex); +el_val_t pq_kem_decaps(el_val_t secret_key_hex, el_val_t ciphertext_hex); + +el_val_t pq_hybrid_keygen(void); +el_val_t pq_hybrid_handshake(el_val_t remote_pub_combined); + +el_val_t sha3_256_hex(el_val_t input); + +/* ── AEAD: AES-256-GCM (libcrypto-backed) ─────────────────────────────────── + * Symmetric authenticated encryption used to wrap envelopes after a KEM + * handshake. Caller MUST supply a 32-byte key (64 hex chars) — typically the + * Kyber-768 / hybrid shared_secret, optionally normalized via SHA3-256. + * + * aead_encrypt returns a JSON map {"nonce":"...","ciphertext":"..."} where + * ciphertext is the AES-256-GCM output with the 16-byte auth tag appended. + * Nonce is a fresh 12-byte CSPRNG draw — callers never pick the nonce, which + * structurally rules out the GCM nonce-reuse footgun. + * + * aead_decrypt returns the plaintext String, or "" on any failure (including + * auth-tag mismatch). Callers MUST check for "" before trusting the result. */ +el_val_t aead_encrypt(el_val_t key_hex, el_val_t plaintext); +el_val_t aead_decrypt(el_val_t key_hex, el_val_t nonce_hex, el_val_t ciphertext_hex); + /* ── Native VM builtin aliases (for compiled El source) ───────────────────── * These match the El VM's native_* builtins so that El source compiled * to C can call the same names without modification. */ @@ -355,6 +539,16 @@ el_val_t get(el_val_t list, el_val_t index); /* el_list_get */ el_val_t map_get(el_val_t map, el_val_t key); /* el_map_get */ el_val_t map_set(el_val_t map, el_val_t key, el_val_t value); /* el_map_set */ +/* ── OTLP/HTTP Observability ─────────────────────────────────────────────── */ +/* See bottom of el_runtime.c for the implementation. + * Configured by env vars OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION. + * No-op when OTLP_ENDPOINT is unset. Drop-on-failure semantics. */ +el_val_t emit_log(el_val_t level, el_val_t msg, el_val_t fields_json); +el_val_t emit_metric(el_val_t name, el_val_t value, el_val_t tags_json); +el_val_t trace_span_start(el_val_t name); +el_val_t trace_span_end(el_val_t span_handle); +el_val_t emit_event(el_val_t name, el_val_t duration_ms); + #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif