The binary-safe fs_read length (_tl_fs_read_len) was consumed by the HTTP
response path for ANY body, even when a handler wrapped a smaller file into a
larger reply. Content-Length then lied AND the send stopped short: the
safety-contact (988) routes returned 178 of 208/218 bytes, cut mid-'set_at' —
unparseable JSON. The desktop app read that as failure. On Windows the shipped
brain is an OLD build without even the per-handler workaround, so EVERY reply
truncated: the app can't read confirmations and refuses the new user.
Durable fix: pair the length hint with the exact buffer pointer it describes
(_tl_fs_read_buf). Apply the raw byte count ONLY when the response IS that
buffer (binary file serving stays correct); every wrapped/enveloped/derived
body is measured with strlen. Reset both at request start and in fs_read /
json_get_raw. This also closes the stale-hint heap over-read (a length larger
than a later body would read past it out the socket) that a plain max() leaves
open — so this class of bug dies on every platform, not just where a handler
happened to be patched.
Applied identically to the mainline runtime (lang/el-compiler/runtime) AND the
frozen release runtime (lang/releases/v1.0.0-20260501) the desktop souls
compile against — the release copy still carried the raw leak, which is why the
Windows brain kept truncating. Same proven approach as PR #78 (Tim Lingo),
extended to cover the release runtime and rebased onto current main.
Both runtimes: gcc -fsyntax-only clean.
engram_load_merge was added to el-compiler/runtime in 35c1897 but never
ported to the released runtime used by Engram and the soul daemon.
awareness.el calls engram_load_merge in its sync refresh cycle; without
this function in lang/releases/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c the soul
daemon fails to compile.
Also adds header declarations for engram_wm_count, engram_wm_avg_weight,
engram_wm_top_json, and engram_load_merge — all four were added as
implementations (da116b2 / 35c1897) but their prototypes were missing from
el_runtime.h, causing implicit-function-declaration warnings and potential
ABI breakage on stricter compilers.
Identified during self-review 2026-06-30.
Port critical WM fixes from self-review 2026-06-26 branch (f7bd99a) that were
never merged to HEAD. Running binary had these fixes; source did not — rebuild
would have silently regressed all three improvements.
1. ENGRAM_BREAKTHROUGH_WEIGHT 0.25→0.10
With 0.25, naturally-promoted nodes (threshold ≥0.15) decayed below the
breakthrough floor within one activation call and lost their WM slot to
fresh breakthrough candidates. All 524/525 WM nodes were at floor = useless.
Invariant: BREAKTHROUGH_WEIGHT < min(type_thresholds = 0.15 Canonical).
2. ENGRAM_WM_CAP=24 with Pass 4 (per-call) + Pass 5 (global) enforcement
Without cap, broad curiosity seeds promote 500+ nodes simultaneously.
wm_avg_weight collapses, goal-bias differentiation is lost. Verified:
"knowledge" query now promotes exactly 24 nodes (was 525). Cowan (2001)
cognitive basis: WM capacity ~4 chunks; 24 allows rich multi-topic context.
3. ISE exclusion from WM (Pass 2 guard)
InternalStateEvent JSON content ("knowledge", "memory", etc.) triggered
lexical seeding → suppression accumulation → breakthrough at floor. ISEs
are observability-only and must never surface in context compilation.
suppression_count cleared so ISEs never build toward breakthrough.
4. route_create_ise importance fix (0.5→0.3)
Corrects mismatch between HTTP route and awareness.el in-process fallback.
Also adds body comment clarifying auth-exempt rationale.
SYNAPSE (arXiv 2601.02744) validates WM cap design and ISE exclusion principle.
Next priority: cosine similarity seeding to complement lexical BFS.