A real attacker probed /api/share earlier today with <script>alert(1),
<iframe src=evil>, <img onerror>, <a href="javascript:...">, and a
<form action="/steal"> payload. Nothing executed because the chat
bubble at /share/<id> renders the served HTML inside marked.js's
already-escaped output, but the prior denylist sanitizer was fragile:
- It comment-wrapped dangerous tags ("<!--script>...-->") which a
literal "-->" inside an attacker-supplied attribute value can close
early, re-exposing the original payload.
- It renamed on*= attributes to data-x-on*= which left attack
indicators visible in the served HTML.
- It was a denylist; every new attack vector required a code change.
- It didn't validate <a href> URL schemes properly.
The replacement is a runtime-level state-machine allowlist parser
(foundation/el af480f6: el_html_sanitize). The product just specifies
the JSON allowlist of allowed tags + attributes; the runtime drops
everything else, validates href/src URL schemes (http/https/mailto/
fragment/relative only), and drops whole subtrees of script/style/
iframe/object/embed/form regardless of the allowlist.
Phase 4 of bl-dc55ae07: deletes sanitize_share_html (main.el) and
gal_sanitize_html (gallery.el); replaces 3 call sites with
el_html_sanitize(html, allowlist). Defines default_share_allowlist
in main.el and the identical gallery_share_allowlist in gallery.el
(separate bindings to avoid a forward-reference at build-concat
order — gallery is concatenated before main).
Phase 5: migrations/20260502185500_backfill_resanitize_share_cards.sql
nulls answer_html for any share_cards row older than 1 hour. Applied
via the Supabase Management API; 0 rows in scope (the column was
added today and existing rows pre-date its first write).
Also fixes an orthogonal duplicate-symbol bug: unix_timestamp() was
defined in both dist/web_stubs.c and the runtime (the latter is a
recent runtime addition picked up by the runtime sync). Removed the
stub.
Backlog: bl-dc55ae07
Gallery was reading the plain answer field and HTML-escaping it,
showing literal `<ol>...` text where the actual share page rendered
the markdown. Now selects answer_html alongside, runs it through
the same sanitizer as the share-card render, and falls back to
escaped plaintext for legacy rows.
New Supabase table neuron_config keyed on (key, scope) with jsonb
value column. Web tier reads chat.model via /api/demo with 60s TTL
caching, passes to soul via dharma envelope payload.model. No more
revision-rollout-per-model-swap.
Admin read endpoint at /api/admin/config gated by NEURON_ADMIN_TOKEN.
Write surface and Realtime subscription land in Phase 2.
Backlog: bl-6eb51893
POST /api/docuseal/webhook/<token> validates the path token against
DOCUSEAL_WEBHOOK_TOKEN, persists every event to docuseal_events with
the full payload as jsonb, and emails Will via Resend on form.completed
or form.declined. Token rotates via Secret Manager.
Replaces the broken counter-bump RPC with a per-user share_votes table
(PK share_id+user_id, RLS-enforced ownership). One vote per user per
card, change direction or undo any time. Auth required for write;
read is public. share_cards.upvotes/downvotes/score stay in sync via
recalc trigger. New endpoints: POST /api/vote (auth-gated), GET
/api/vote-state/:id (auth-aware).