diff --git a/FORK-AUDIT.md b/FORK-AUDIT.md
index 269d47aa2..40224a55d 100644
--- a/FORK-AUDIT.md
+++ b/FORK-AUDIT.md
@@ -54,16 +54,52 @@ argument. Local-only exposure, but an exec-shaped footgun in a codebase that
 otherwise doesn't do this.
 **Status: REMOVED.** JSON-only now.
 
-### 1.5 Copilot auth plugin: token handling + request sniffing (DELETED)
-Before removal, the GitHub Copilot integration:
-- used an OAuth *refresh token* directly as the API bearer token,
-- stripped inbound `authorization`/`x-api-key` headers and replaced them,
-- JSON-parsed every outgoing request body to guess "is this vision? is this an
-  agent?" in order to set policy headers (`x-initiator`,
-  `Copilot-Vision-Request`) that GitHub's gate required.
-This was reverse-engineered policy evasion, ~5,400 lines, self-described in
-its README as "temporary… avoid making edits."
-**Status: DELETED entirely**, including the vendored AI-SDK fork behind it.
+### 1.5 Copilot auth plugin: token laundering + request sniffing (DELETED)
+
+The GitHub Copilot integration routed every inference request through a custom
+fetch override (retrieved here from git history, `copilot.ts` auth loader):
+
+```ts
+const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+  "x-initiator": isAgent ? "agent" : "user",
+  ...(init?.headers),
+  "User-Agent": `opencode/${InstallationVersion}`,
+  Authorization: `Bearer ${info.refresh}`,   // GitHub OAuth refresh token
+  "Openai-Intent": "conversation-edits",
+}
+if (isVision) headers["Copilot-Vision-Request"] = "true"
+delete headers["x-api-key"]
+delete headers["authorization"]
+return fetch(request, { ...init, headers })
+```
+
+**Token laundering, precisely:** three operations on every request.
+
+1. *Re-credentialing* — the long-lived GitHub **OAuth refresh token** from
+   plaintext `auth.json` was presented as the Bearer session credential for
+   Copilot's inference endpoints. Your GitHub identity became the API key.
+2. *Stripping prior credentials* — inbound `x-api-key` / lowercase
+   `authorization` headers were deleted so only the laundered token rode the
+   wire (case-sensitivity quirk spared the one they had just set).
+3. *Impersonation of sanctioned-client behavior* — `x-initiator`,
+   `Openai-Intent`, and `Copilot-Vision-Request` are GitHub policy-gate
+   headers. Unofficial clients are rejected without them; values were
+   fabricated by JSON-parsing every request body across three API formats to
+   guess "vision?" and "agent?".
+
+**What it accomplished:** converted one OAuth device-flow consent into
+standing access to Copilot's paid model APIs from an unsanctioned client,
+with per-request header fabrication sufficient to pass GitHub's gate — while
+avoiding any implementation of short-lived token exchange/rotation.
+
+**Why dangerous:** long-lived credential transmitted on every call (one
+logged/proxied request captures a token with a huge blast-radius window);
+plaintext storage at rest; blind stripping destroyed corporate proxy auth
+headers; ToS exposure borne unknowingly by users.
+
+~5,400 lines total including the vendored AI-SDK fork behind it,
+self-described in its README as "temporary… avoid making edits."
+**Status: DELETED entirely.**
 
 ### 1.6 Hardcoded OAuth client IDs in source (LOW)
 Device-flow client IDs for xai, DigitalOcean, Snowflake, Codex (and formerly