feat(engine): plain chat generates at L3 — inside the safety cycle, not around it
Non-agentic /api/chat (the desktop app's default "Tools: Off" mode) returned the
user's own screened text as a bare non-JSON string. Every JSON client failed to
parse it and showed "Couldn't reach Neuron - it may be offline."
Root cause: f52d5bd (2026-06-11) correctly moved the route onto the layer spine
(handle_chat -> layered_cycle), but L3 never got a generator — imprint_respond()
annotates its input and returns it. Two pieces of the architecture were already
waiting for that step: layered_cycle parks a bell directive in the state key
build_system_prompt is written to consume, and build_system_prompt carries a
chat_mode ("no tools") flag with no live caller.
The fix composes rather than replaces. Wiring handle_chat would have removed
safety_screen, the hard-bell short-circuit, the whole stewardship layer and
safety_validate — the only enforcing output gate in the codebase — in exchange
for a working reply (see _engine-websearch-20260804/SAFETY-STOP.md). Instead
layered_cycle keeps every gate, in order, and gains a generation step between
imprint_respond and safety_validate.
L1 screen -> guard -> hard-bell short-circuit -> L2a -> L2b -> L2c
-> L3 imprint_respond (prompt) -> L3b layered_generate (NEW) -> L1 validate
- chat.el: NEW layered_generate (L3 generation, no tools offered),
conv_history_block, conv_history_record.
FIX build_system_prompt never concatenated no_tools_rule into its
return — the "[NO TOOLS THIS TURN]" rule reached no model at all.
handle_chat annotated DO-NOT-WIRE with the reason.
- soul.el: layered_cycle gains L3b + post-validation turn bookkeeping.
- routes.el: NEW plain_chat_envelope; all three /api/chat dispatch sites wrap the
cycle's output. Built OUTSIDE the cycle so safety_validate always sees
raw model text — nothing to unwrap or rebuild on the crisis path.
Emits both `reply` and `response`: the desktop app reads `reply`,
the CLI tools and telegram-gateway read `response`.
Also fixes BUG-PLAINCHAT-1, a pre-existing CRITICAL crash on the crisis path.
elc compiles `let n: Int = pos + str_len(marker)` to el_str_concat() — string
concat on two integers — inside a block-expression initializer, segfaulting the
daemon (SIGSEGV in strlen). Six inline copies of the same " | ts:" parser had it:
two in layered_cycle L2c, two in engram_compile (live on the AGENTIC path too),
two in affective_context_prefix. A distress turn following an earlier affective
turn killed the whole process. Proven pre-existing: an unmodified baseline binary
crashes identically, and the same bad C is in the committed dist/soul.c. Fixed by
hoisting to one top-level function, affective_node_ts(), where the expression
compiles to integer addition — verified in the generated C.
Proof (throwaway HOME/engram, explicit NEURON_PORT, live chain untouched):
- Plain turn returns a JSON envelope with the provider's answer, not an echo.
- Captured request body: no `tools`, no `tool_choice`; system prompt carries the
NO-TOOLS rule. Tools:Off means no tool is offered, structurally.
- Hard bell: canned 988 message, and the provider request count does not move —
the message never reaches a model.
- Soft bell + a 2-char model reply: safety_validate's care phrase is appended to
the MODEL's output. Output gate acting, on this route.
- The L1 bell directive now reaches the model here for the first time (the state
addendum had a producer and no consumer).
- test_layered_cycle PASS; all six El suites byte-identical to baseline.
- verify-soul-contract.sh (bash 5.3): GATE PASS, 27/27, immutability PASS.
- The crash sequence that killed the baseline daemon now returns HTTP 200.
Not proven: no live Anthropic call — the login keychain refuses the key to a
non-interactive process (rc=24 errSecInteractionNotAllowed). Details and the
one-command close-out are in _engine-plainchat-20260805/README.md §7.
Builds on PR #108. dist/soul.c deliberately not regenerated — Will's toolchain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -15,6 +15,40 @@ fn flag_true(body: String, key: String) -> Bool {
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return json_get_bool(body, key) || json_get_int(body, key) > 0
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// plain_chat_envelope — the JSON response contract for a non-agentic ("Tools: Off")
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// chat turn. Every /api/chat dispatch that calls layered_cycle goes through here, so
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// the three call sites cannot drift apart.
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//
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// WHY THE ENVELOPE IS BUILT HERE AND NOT INSIDE layered_cycle:
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// layered_cycle returns the user-facing text AFTER safety_validate has acted on it.
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// Keeping the JSON out of the cycle means the output gate always sees raw model text
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// and never an escaped blob — there is nothing to unwrap and re-wrap on the crisis
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// path, which is exactly the failure mode that made wiring handle_chat unsafe.
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// Escaping is the last thing that happens, strictly after the gate.
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//
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// FIELDS: `reply` and `response` carry the same validated text. Both are required by
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// live clients — the desktop app reads `reply` first (DaemonClient.parseChatResponse),
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// while the CLI tools and the Telegram gateway read `response` (the gateway reads only
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// `response`). Emitting one would break the other.
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//
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// EMPTY MEANS FAILURE, NOT AN EMPTY ANSWER: a hard bell returns the fixed crisis
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// message and a soft bell is padded to non-empty by safety_validate, so the only way
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// an empty string leaves the cycle is a failed model call. It is reported as an error
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// rather than dressed up as a successful blank reply.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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fn plain_chat_envelope(validated: String, model: String) -> String {
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if str_eq(validated, "") {
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return "{\"error\":\"llm unavailable\",\"reply\":\"\",\"response\":\"\",\"agentic\":false,\"tools_used\":[]}"
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}
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let safe: String = json_safe(validated)
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return "{\"reply\":\"" + safe + "\""
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+ ",\"response\":\"" + safe + "\""
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+ ",\"model\":\"" + json_safe(model) + "\""
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+ ",\"agentic\":false"
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+ ",\"tools_used\":[]}"
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Rate limiting — simple in-memory per-IP sliding window counter.
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//
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@@ -243,8 +277,11 @@ fn handle_dharma_recv(body: String) -> String {
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} else if agentic_flag {
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handle_chat_agentic(chat_body)
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} else {
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// Non-agentic ("Tools: Off"): the full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle, which now generates
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// at L3 instead of echoing. Envelope built outside the cycle — see
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// plain_chat_envelope.
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let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
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screened_reply
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plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
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}
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auto_persist(chat_body, reply)
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return reply
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@@ -416,8 +453,9 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
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} else if agentic_flag {
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handle_chat_agentic(body)
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} else {
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// Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — same cycle and same envelope as POST.
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let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg)
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screened_reply
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plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
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}
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auto_persist(body, reply)
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return reply
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@@ -580,8 +618,11 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
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} else if agentic_flag {
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handle_chat_agentic(body)
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} else {
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// Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — the app's DEFAULT mode (AgentMode.NEVER).
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// Full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle with real generation at L3; envelope built
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// outside the cycle so safety_validate always sees raw text.
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let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
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screened_reply
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plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
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}
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auto_persist(body, reply)
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return reply
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