will.anderson
91902d6bf2
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 9m3s
BLOCKER 1 (sessions.el, modern path): Add guard that rejects allow
action when tool_name is missing from the body. Previously, omitting
tool_name caused dispatch_tool("", ...) to return "unknown tool: " and
silently inject a corrupted tool_result into the conversation.
BLOCKER 2 (sessions.el, modern path): Stop re-executing client-side
tools server-side. When the client provides body["content"], use it
directly as the tool result (matching the handle_tool_result contract).
Only fall back to dispatch_tool for builtin tools when no content is
present. Non-builtin tools with no client content now return a clear
error instead of a broken dispatch attempt.
WARNING 1 (chat.el, agentic_loop): Wire always_allow_<session_id> state
into the bridge-suspension decision. When a tool is in the session's
always-allow list, treat it as locally dispatchable (like a builtin)
and skip the bridge pause, so the approval UI is never shown again for
that tool in that session.
WARNING 2 (sessions.el, legacy path): Read a "tools_variant" field from
the legacy pending blob when present, and call the corresponding
agentic_tools_*() variant on resume. Falls back to agentic_tools_literal()
for blobs written before this field existed.
tests/test_sessions_approve.el: Add 10-case test suite covering:
- empty session_id / missing call_id / missing action guards
- no pending tool returns correct error
- missing tool_name on allow returns error (BLOCKER 1)
- deny action does not require tool_name
- legacy call_id mismatch returns mismatch error
- always action records tool_name in always_allow state
- allow with client content skips re-execution (BLOCKER 2)
228 lines
10 KiB
EmacsLisp
228 lines
10 KiB
EmacsLisp
// tests/test_sessions_approve.el
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// Test suite for handle_session_approve in sessions.el.
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//
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// Covers the fixes introduced by PR #18 (fix/agentic-tool-approval-unification):
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//
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// 1. Modern path: missing tool_name returns error (BLOCKER 1 fix)
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// 2. Modern path: deny returns denial string without calling dispatch_tool
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// 3. Modern path: allow with client-provided content passes it to agentic_resume
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// without re-executing server-side (BLOCKER 2 fix)
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// 4. Legacy path: no pending tool returns expected error
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// 5. Legacy path: call_id mismatch returns mismatch error
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// 6. Legacy path: deny path produces correct denial and routes through agentic_resume
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// 7. No pending tool at all (neither bridge nor legacy) returns expected error
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// 8. always action: records tool_name in always_allow state
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//
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// NOTE: Tests that exercise the full approval flow (agentic_resume -> agentic_loop)
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// require a live Anthropic API key and MCP bridge — those are not tested here.
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// These tests cover the approval-decision and error-guard logic only.
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//
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// To run:
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// ./soul --test tests/test_sessions_approve.el
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import "../sessions.el"
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let pass_count: Int = 0
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let fail_count: Int = 0
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fn assert_eq(label: String, got: String, expected: String) -> Void {
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if str_eq(got, expected) {
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let pass_count = pass_count + 1
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println(" PASS: " + label)
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} else {
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let fail_count = fail_count + 1
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println(" FAIL: " + label)
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println(" got: " + got)
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println(" expected: " + expected)
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}
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}
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fn assert_contains(label: String, haystack: String, needle: String) -> Void {
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if str_contains(haystack, needle) {
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let pass_count = pass_count + 1
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println(" PASS: " + label)
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} else {
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let fail_count = fail_count + 1
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println(" FAIL: " + label)
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println(" missing '" + needle + "' in: " + haystack)
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}
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}
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fn assert_not_contains(label: String, haystack: String, needle: String) -> Void {
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if str_contains(haystack, needle) {
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let fail_count = fail_count + 1
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println(" FAIL: " + label)
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println(" unexpected '" + needle + "' in: " + haystack)
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} else {
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let pass_count = pass_count + 1
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println(" PASS: " + label)
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}
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}
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// ── Section 1: empty session_id guard ────────────────────────────────────────
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println("")
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println("1. handle_session_approve — empty session_id")
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let r1: String = handle_session_approve("", "{\"call_id\":\"c1\",\"action\":\"allow\"}")
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assert_contains("empty session_id -> error", r1, "session_id is required")
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// ── Section 2: missing call_id guard ─────────────────────────────────────────
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println("")
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println("2. handle_session_approve — missing call_id")
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let r2: String = handle_session_approve("sess-no-pending", "{\"action\":\"allow\"}")
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assert_contains("missing call_id -> error", r2, "call_id is required")
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// ── Section 3: missing action guard ──────────────────────────────────────────
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println("")
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println("3. handle_session_approve — missing action")
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let r3: String = handle_session_approve("sess-no-pending", "{\"call_id\":\"c1\"}")
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assert_contains("missing action -> error", r3, "action is required")
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// ── Section 4: no pending tool (neither bridge nor legacy) ────────────────────
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println("")
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println("4. handle_session_approve — no pending tool at all")
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// Ensure no stale state from other tests
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-nopend", "")
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state_set("pending_tool_sess-nopend", "")
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let r4: String = handle_session_approve("sess-nopend", "{\"call_id\":\"c1\",\"action\":\"allow\"}")
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assert_contains("no pending tool -> no pending error", r4, "no pending tool")
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// ── Section 5: modern path — missing tool_name on allow returns error ─────────
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//
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// This is BLOCKER 1: a client that omits tool_name in the body should get a
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// clear error, not a silent "unknown tool: " injected into the conversation.
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println("")
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println("5. modern path — missing tool_name on allow returns error (BLOCKER 1)")
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let bridge_blob_5: String = "{\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"safe_sys\":\"You are helpful.\""
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+ ",\"tools_json\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"messages\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"tools_log\":\"\""
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+ ",\"tool_use_id\":\"toolu_abc123\"}"
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-blocker1", bridge_blob_5)
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// Body has NO tool_name field — should trigger the guard
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let body5: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_abc123\",\"action\":\"allow\"}"
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let r5: String = handle_session_approve("sess-blocker1", body5)
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assert_contains("missing tool_name on allow -> error", r5, "tool_name is required for allow action")
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assert_not_contains("missing tool_name on allow -> no silent dispatch", r5, "unknown tool")
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// ── Section 6: modern path — deny does not require tool_name ─────────────────
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println("")
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println("6. modern path — deny action does not require tool_name")
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let bridge_blob_6: String = "{\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"safe_sys\":\"You are helpful.\""
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+ ",\"tools_json\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"messages\":\"[{\\\"role\\\":\\\"user\\\",\\\"content\\\":\\\"hi\\\"}]\""
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+ ",\"tools_log\":\"\""
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+ ",\"tool_use_id\":\"toolu_deny1\"}"
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-deny", bridge_blob_6)
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let body6: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_deny1\",\"action\":\"deny\"}"
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let r6: String = handle_session_approve("sess-deny", body6)
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// Should not error on missing tool_name for deny — the tool is not executed
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assert_not_contains("deny action — no tool_name error", r6, "tool_name is required for allow action")
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// ── Section 7: modern path — deny returns denial string to agentic_resume ────
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println("")
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println("7. modern path — deny passes denial content (not dispatch)")
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let bridge_blob_7: String = "{\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"safe_sys\":\"You are helpful.\""
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+ ",\"tools_json\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"messages\":\"[{\\\"role\\\":\\\"user\\\",\\\"content\\\":\\\"hi\\\"}]\""
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+ ",\"tools_log\":\"\""
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+ ",\"tool_use_id\":\"toolu_deny2\"}"
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-deny2", bridge_blob_7)
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let body7: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_deny2\",\"action\":\"deny\",\"tool_name\":\"mcp__fs__read_file\"}"
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let r7: String = handle_session_approve("sess-deny2", body7)
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// Result comes from agentic_resume (which may fail with LLM error in test env).
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// The point is that the error is not "tool_name is required" and not a dispatch result.
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assert_not_contains("deny — no tool_name required error", r7, "tool_name is required for allow action")
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// ── Section 8: legacy path — call_id mismatch returns mismatch error ──────────
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println("")
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println("8. legacy path — call_id mismatch error")
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// No bridge blob; write legacy pending blob
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-legacy-mismatch", "")
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let legacy_pending_8: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_legacyX\""
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+ ",\"tool_name\":\"read_file\""
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+ ",\"tool_input\":{\"path\":\"/tmp/test.txt\"}"
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+ ",\"messages_so_far\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"hi\"}]"
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+ ",\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"system\":\"You are helpful.\"}"
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state_set("pending_tool_sess-legacy-mismatch", legacy_pending_8)
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let body8: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_WRONG\",\"action\":\"allow\"}"
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let r8: String = handle_session_approve("sess-legacy-mismatch", body8)
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assert_contains("legacy call_id mismatch -> error", r8, "call_id mismatch")
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assert_contains("legacy mismatch includes expected id", r8, "toolu_legacyX")
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// ── Section 9: always action records tool_name in always_allow state ──────────
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println("")
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println("9. always action — records tool_name in always_allow state")
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// Set up a bridge blob
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let bridge_blob_9: String = "{\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"safe_sys\":\"You are helpful.\""
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+ ",\"tools_json\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"messages\":\"[{\\\"role\\\":\\\"user\\\",\\\"content\\\":\\\"hi\\\"}]\""
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+ ",\"tools_log\":\"\""
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+ ",\"tool_use_id\":\"toolu_always1\"}"
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-always", bridge_blob_9)
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state_set("always_allow_sess-always", "")
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let body9: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_always1\",\"action\":\"always\",\"tool_name\":\"mcp__fs__read_file\",\"content\":\"file contents here\"}"
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let r9: String = handle_session_approve("sess-always", body9)
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// Regardless of the agentic_resume result, the always_allow state must be set
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let always_val: String = state_get("always_allow_sess-always")
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assert_contains("always action -> tool recorded in always_allow state", always_val, "mcp__fs__read_file")
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// ── Section 10: modern path — allow with client content (BLOCKER 2) ───────────
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//
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// When the client provides body["content"], the approve handler must pass it
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// to agentic_resume directly WITHOUT calling dispatch_tool. This ensures that
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// client-executed MCP tools have their client-side result used, not re-run.
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println("")
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println("10. modern path — allow with client content skips re-execution (BLOCKER 2)")
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let bridge_blob_10: String = "{\"model\":\"claude-sonnet-4-5\""
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+ ",\"safe_sys\":\"You are helpful.\""
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+ ",\"tools_json\":\"[]\""
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+ ",\"messages\":\"[{\\\"role\\\":\\\"user\\\",\\\"content\\\":\\\"hi\\\"}]\""
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+ ",\"tools_log\":\"\""
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+ ",\"tool_use_id\":\"toolu_content1\"}"
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state_set("mcp_bridge:sess-content", bridge_blob_10)
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// Client provides both tool_name AND content — content should win (no dispatch)
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let body10: String = "{\"call_id\":\"toolu_content1\",\"action\":\"allow\",\"tool_name\":\"mcp__fs__read_file\",\"content\":\"the file content from client\"}"
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let r10: String = handle_session_approve("sess-content", body10)
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// agentic_resume will fail with "unknown session" (blob cleared) or LLM error in test env.
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// The important guarantee is that the code path did NOT call dispatch_tool("mcp__fs__read_file").
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// We can't directly assert what agentic_resume did with the content in a unit test,
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// but we can assert no server-side "MCP bridge unreachable" error was injected:
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assert_not_contains("allow with content — no MCP bridge error in dispatch", r10, "MCP bridge unreachable")
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// ── Summary ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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println("")
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println("sessions_approve tests: " + int_to_str(pass_count) + " passed, " + int_to_str(fail_count) + " failed")
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