runtime: pair fs_read length hint with its buffer in BOTH runtimes — kill response truncation for good

The binary-safe fs_read length (_tl_fs_read_len) was consumed by the HTTP
response path for ANY body, even when a handler wrapped a smaller file into a
larger reply. Content-Length then lied AND the send stopped short: the
safety-contact (988) routes returned 178 of 208/218 bytes, cut mid-'set_at' —
unparseable JSON. The desktop app read that as failure. On Windows the shipped
brain is an OLD build without even the per-handler workaround, so EVERY reply
truncated: the app can't read confirmations and refuses the new user.

Durable fix: pair the length hint with the exact buffer pointer it describes
(_tl_fs_read_buf). Apply the raw byte count ONLY when the response IS that
buffer (binary file serving stays correct); every wrapped/enveloped/derived
body is measured with strlen. Reset both at request start and in fs_read /
json_get_raw. This also closes the stale-hint heap over-read (a length larger
than a later body would read past it out the socket) that a plain max() leaves
open — so this class of bug dies on every platform, not just where a handler
happened to be patched.

Applied identically to the mainline runtime (lang/el-compiler/runtime) AND the
frozen release runtime (lang/releases/v1.0.0-20260501) the desktop souls
compile against — the release copy still carried the raw leak, which is why the
Windows brain kept truncating. Same proven approach as PR #78 (Tim Lingo),
extended to cover the release runtime and rebased onto current main.

Both runtimes: gcc -fsyntax-only clean.

.gitea/workflows/ci-dev.yaml

@@ -214,9 +214,18 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}
         run: |
+          # Fail loudly: previously this step had no `set -e`, so an auth or
+          # upload failure was swallowed (step exited 0 on the trailing echo)
+          # and the SDK silently never published. Surface failures now.
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${GCP_SA_KEY:-}" ]; then
+            echo "FATAL: GCP_SA_KEY secret is empty — cannot authenticate to publish" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
           echo "${GCP_SA_KEY}" > /tmp/gcp-key.json
           gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=/tmp/gcp-key.json
           gcloud config set project neuron-785695
+          echo "Publishing as active account: $(gcloud config get-value account 2>/dev/null)"
 
           VERSION="${GITHUB_SHA:0:8}"
 
@@ -268,6 +277,12 @@ jobs:
         # Patches ci-base:dev in-place: pulls the existing image (which has all
         # system deps — Node, Go, gcloud, Docker CLI, etc.) and overlays the freshly
         # built El SDK on top. Keeps the full ci-base rebuild fast and incremental.
+        #
+        # continue-on-error: this is a CI-cache optimization, NOT the release
+        # artifact. It runs Docker (pull/build/push ~600MB) on the host-mode GCE
+        # runner where DinD/Docker availability is fragile. A failure here must
+        # never block or redden the job — the SDK publish above is the deliverable.
+        continue-on-error: true
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}

.gitea/workflows/ci-stage.yaml

@@ -212,12 +212,21 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}
         run: |
+          # Fail loudly: previously this step had no `set -e`, so an auth or
+          # upload failure was swallowed (step exited 0 on the trailing echo)
+          # and the SDK silently never published. Surface failures now.
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${GCP_SA_KEY:-}" ]; then
+            echo "FATAL: GCP_SA_KEY secret is empty — cannot authenticate to publish" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
           echo "${GCP_SA_KEY}" > /tmp/gcp-key.json
           apt-get install -y -qq apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl
           echo "deb [trusted=yes] https://packages.cloud.google.com/apt cloud-sdk main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-cloud-sdk.list
           apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y google-cloud-cli
           gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=/tmp/gcp-key.json
           gcloud config set project neuron-785695
+          echo "Publishing as active account: $(gcloud config get-value account 2>/dev/null)"
 
           VERSION="${GITHUB_SHA:0:8}"
 
@@ -253,6 +262,12 @@ jobs:
         # Patches ci-base:stage in-place: pulls the existing image (which has all
         # system deps — Node, Go, gcloud, Docker CLI, etc.) and overlays the freshly
         # built El SDK on top. Keeps the full ci-base rebuild fast and incremental.
+        #
+        # continue-on-error: this is a CI-cache optimization, NOT the release
+        # artifact. It runs Docker (pull/build/push ~600MB) on the host-mode GCE
+        # runner where DinD/Docker availability is fragile. A failure here must
+        # never block or redden the job — the SDK publish above is the deliverable.
+        continue-on-error: true
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}

.gitea/workflows/sdk-release.yaml

@@ -288,12 +288,21 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}
         run: |
+          # Fail loudly: previously this step had no `set -e`, so an auth or
+          # upload failure was swallowed (step exited 0 on the trailing echo)
+          # and the SDK silently never published. Surface failures now.
+          set -euo pipefail
+          if [ -z "${GCP_SA_KEY:-}" ]; then
+            echo "FATAL: GCP_SA_KEY secret is empty — cannot authenticate to publish" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
           echo "${GCP_SA_KEY}" > /tmp/gcp-key.json
           apt-get install -y -qq apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl
           echo "deb [trusted=yes] https://packages.cloud.google.com/apt cloud-sdk main" > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-cloud-sdk.list
           apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y google-cloud-cli
           gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=/tmp/gcp-key.json
           gcloud config set project neuron-785695
+          echo "Publishing as active account: $(gcloud config get-value account 2>/dev/null)"
 
           VERSION="${GITHUB_SHA:0:8}"
 
@@ -345,6 +354,12 @@ jobs:
         # Patches ci-base:latest in-place: pulls the existing image (which has all
         # system deps — Node, Go, gcloud, Docker CLI, etc.) and overlays the freshly
         # built El SDK on top. Keeps the full ci-base rebuild fast and incremental.
+        #
+        # continue-on-error: this is a CI-cache optimization, NOT the release
+        # artifact. It runs Docker (pull/build/push ~600MB) on the host-mode GCE
+        # runner where DinD/Docker availability is fragile. A failure here must
+        # never block or redden the job — the SDK publish above is the deliverable.
+        continue-on-error: true
         if: github.event_name == 'push'
         env:
           GCP_SA_KEY: ${{ secrets.GCP_SA_KEY }}

epm/src/install.el

@@ -17,6 +17,16 @@
 //   4. Append dep to order after all its transitive deps
 //   5. Deduplicate: skip already-ordered vessels
 
+// ── Cross-module forward declarations ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// Defined in sibling epm modules; resolved at link time. The `extern fn` decls
+// give elc the C prototypes so generated install.c compiles cleanly under strict
+// compilers (gcc>=14 / clang) that reject implicit function declarations.
+extern fn manifest_name(src: String) -> String                        // manifest.el
+extern fn manifest_deps(src: String) -> String                        // manifest.el
+extern fn registry_token() -> String                                  // registry.el
+extern fn registry_find(name: String, version: String) -> String     // registry.el
+extern fn registry_latest_version(name: String) -> String            // registry.el
+
 // ── Install paths ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 // packages_dir returns the root directory for installed vessels.

epm/src/registry.el

@@ -14,6 +14,15 @@
 //   EPM_REGISTRY_ORG — org name that hosts vessel repos (default: neuron-technologies)
 //   EPM_TOKEN      — Gitea personal access token (required for publish)
 
+// ── Cross-module forward declarations ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// These symbols are defined in sibling epm modules or the El runtime and are
+// resolved at link time. The `extern fn` decls give elc the C prototype so the
+// generated registry.c compiles cleanly under strict compilers (gcc>=14 / clang)
+// that reject implicit function declarations. Signature arity must match the
+// definition; return/param types are informational (all lower to el_val_t).
+extern fn config(key: String) -> String          // El runtime builtin
+extern fn read_installed() -> String              // install.el
+
 // ── Config helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 // registry_api_url returns the Gitea API base URL with no trailing slash.

epm/src/update.el

@@ -6,6 +6,15 @@
 // Depends on: registry.el (registry_latest_version, registry_find),
 //             install.el  (read_installed, install_vessel, installed_version)
 
+// ── Cross-module forward declarations ─────────────────────────────────────────
+// Defined in sibling epm modules; resolved at link time. The `extern fn` decls
+// give elc the C prototypes so generated update.c compiles cleanly under strict
+// compilers (gcc>=14 / clang) that reject implicit function declarations.
+extern fn read_installed() -> String                                  // install.el
+extern fn installed_version(name: String) -> String                   // install.el
+extern fn install_vessel(name: String, version: String) -> Bool      // install.el
+extern fn registry_latest_version(name: String) -> String            // registry.el
+
 // ── Semver helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 // semver_part extracts the Nth dot-separated component from a semver string.

lang/el-compiler/runtime/el_runtime.c

@@ -82,8 +82,14 @@ static _Thread_local ElArena _tl_arena = {NULL, 0, 0};
 static _Thread_local int     _tl_arena_active = 0;
 
 /* Binary-safe fs_read length — set by fs_read, consumed by http_send_response.
- * Allows serving PNGs and other binary files without strlen truncation. */
-static _Thread_local size_t  _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;
+ * Allows serving PNGs and other binary files without strlen truncation.
+ * PAIRED with the buffer pointer it describes: the length may only be applied
+ * to the exact buffer fs_read returned. Without the pairing, any handler that
+ * fs_read a file and then WRAPPED it into a larger response had that response
+ * truncated to the file's length (Content-Length lied AND the send stopped
+ * short) — the safety-contact onboarding trap, 2026-07-17. */
+static _Thread_local size_t      _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;
+static _Thread_local const char* _tl_fs_read_buf  = NULL;
 
 static void el_arena_track(char* p) {
     if (!_tl_arena_active || !p) return;
@@ -101,6 +107,8 @@ static void el_arena_track(char* p) {
 void el_request_start(void) {
     _tl_arena.count  = 0;
     _tl_arena_active = 1;
+    _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;     /* never let a previous request's file length */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf  = NULL;  /* leak into this response's byte accounting  */
 }
 
 /* Called by http_worker after the El handler returns and the response is sent.
@@ -1484,11 +1492,14 @@ static void http_send_response(int fd, const char* body) {
     }
 
     const char* eff_body = is_envelope ? env_body : body;
-    /* Use the real byte count from fs_read if available (handles binary files
-     * with embedded null bytes — PNG, WOFF2, etc.). Fall back to strlen for
-     * normal text/JSON responses where _tl_fs_read_len is 0. */
-    size_t blen = (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) ? _tl_fs_read_len : strlen(eff_body);
+    /* Use the real byte count from fs_read ONLY when this body IS the exact
+     * buffer fs_read returned (binary files with embedded null bytes — PNG,
+     * WOFF2, etc.). Any other body — wrapped, enveloped, or derived — must be
+     * measured with strlen, or it is truncated/over-read to the file's size. */
+    size_t blen = (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && eff_body == _tl_fs_read_buf)
+                      ? _tl_fs_read_len : strlen(eff_body);
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;  /* consume — one-shot per response */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     int head_only = _tl_http_head_only;
 
     JsonBuf hdrs; jb_init(&hdrs);
@@ -1568,11 +1579,22 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
             const char* rs = EL_CSTR(r);
             /* Copy response out BEFORE arena teardown.
              * For binary files, _tl_fs_read_len holds the real byte count —
-             * use memcpy instead of strdup so null bytes are preserved. */
-            size_t rlen = _tl_fs_read_len > 0 ? _tl_fs_read_len : (rs ? strlen(rs) : 0);
+             * use memcpy instead of strdup so null bytes are preserved.
+             * The stored length applies ONLY when the response IS the exact
+             * fs_read buffer; a wrapped/derived response must use strlen or
+             * it gets truncated (or over-read) to the file's length. */
+            size_t rlen;
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && rs && rs == _tl_fs_read_buf) {
+                rlen = _tl_fs_read_len;   /* raw file bytes — binary-safe */
+            } else {
+                rlen = rs ? strlen(rs) : 0;
+                _tl_fs_read_len = 0;      /* hint doesn't describe this body */
+                _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
+            }
             response = malloc(rlen + 1);
             if (response && rs) { memcpy(response, rs, rlen); response[rlen] = '\0'; }
             else if (response) { response[0] = '\0'; }
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) _tl_fs_read_buf = response; /* hint follows the copy */
         } else {
             response = el_strdup_persist("el-runtime: no http handler registered");
         }
@@ -1822,10 +1844,20 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
             el_val_t hmap = http_build_headers_map(hdr_block ? hdr_block : "");
             el_val_t r = h(EL_STR(dispatch_method), EL_STR(path), hmap, EL_STR(body));
             const char* rs = EL_CSTR(r);
-            size_t rlen = _tl_fs_read_len > 0 ? _tl_fs_read_len : (rs ? strlen(rs) : 0);
+            /* Same pairing rule as the v1 worker: the fs_read length is only
+             * trustworthy for the exact buffer fs_read returned. */
+            size_t rlen;
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && rs && rs == _tl_fs_read_buf) {
+                rlen = _tl_fs_read_len;   /* raw file bytes — binary-safe */
+            } else {
+                rlen = rs ? strlen(rs) : 0;
+                _tl_fs_read_len = 0;      /* hint doesn't describe this body */
+                _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
+            }
             response = malloc(rlen + 1);
             if (response && rs) { memcpy(response, rs, rlen); response[rlen] = '\0'; }
             else if (response) { response[0] = '\0'; }
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) _tl_fs_read_buf = response; /* hint follows the copy */
             el_release(hmap);
         } else {
             response = el_strdup_persist(
@@ -2024,6 +2056,7 @@ el_val_t http_response(el_val_t status, el_val_t headers_json, el_val_t body) {
 el_val_t fs_read(el_val_t pathv) {
     const char* path = EL_CSTR(pathv);
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     if (!path) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
     FILE* f = fopen(path, "rb");
     if (!f) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
@@ -2035,6 +2068,7 @@ el_val_t fs_read(el_val_t pathv) {
     size_t got = fread(buf, 1, (size_t)sz, f);
     buf[got] = '\0';
     _tl_fs_read_len = got;   /* store real byte count for binary-safe send */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = buf;   /* ...valid ONLY for this exact buffer */
     fclose(f);
     return el_wrap_str(buf);
 }
@@ -3577,8 +3611,10 @@ el_val_t json_get_raw(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t key) {
     const char* k    = EL_CSTR(key);
     const char* p = json_find_key(json, k);
     /* Clear fs_read binary-length hint — result is a fresh null-terminated
-     * string, not the raw file bytes, so Content-Length must use strlen. */
+     * string, not the raw file bytes, so Content-Length must use strlen.
+     * (Kept although the pointer pairing now makes this redundant.) */
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     if (!p) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
     const char* end = json_skip_value(p);
     size_t n = (size_t)(end - p);

lang/releases/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c

@@ -71,8 +71,14 @@ static _Thread_local ElArena _tl_arena = {NULL, 0, 0};
 static _Thread_local int     _tl_arena_active = 0;
 
 /* Binary-safe fs_read length — set by fs_read, consumed by http_send_response.
- * Allows serving PNGs and other binary files without strlen truncation. */
-static _Thread_local size_t  _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;
+ * Allows serving PNGs and other binary files without strlen truncation.
+ * PAIRED with the buffer pointer it describes: the length may only be applied
+ * to the exact buffer fs_read returned. Without the pairing, any handler that
+ * fs_read a file and then WRAPPED it into a larger response had that response
+ * truncated to the file's length (Content-Length lied AND the send stopped
+ * short) — the safety-contact onboarding trap, 2026-07-17. */
+static _Thread_local size_t      _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;
+static _Thread_local const char* _tl_fs_read_buf  = NULL;
 
 static void el_arena_track(char* p) {
     if (!_tl_arena_active || !p) return;
@@ -90,6 +96,8 @@ static void el_arena_track(char* p) {
 void el_request_start(void) {
     _tl_arena.count  = 0;
     _tl_arena_active = 1;
+    _tl_fs_read_len  = 0;     /* never let a previous request's file length */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf  = NULL;  /* leak into this response's byte accounting  */
 }
 
 /* Called by http_worker after the El handler returns and the response is sent.
@@ -1362,11 +1370,14 @@ static void http_send_response(int fd, const char* body) {
     }
 
     const char* eff_body = is_envelope ? env_body : body;
-    /* Use the real byte count from fs_read if available (handles binary files
-     * with embedded null bytes — PNG, WOFF2, etc.). Fall back to strlen for
-     * normal text/JSON responses where _tl_fs_read_len is 0. */
-    size_t blen = (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) ? _tl_fs_read_len : strlen(eff_body);
+    /* Use the real byte count from fs_read ONLY when this body IS the exact
+     * buffer fs_read returned (binary files with embedded null bytes — PNG,
+     * WOFF2, etc.). Any other body — wrapped, enveloped, or derived — must be
+     * measured with strlen, or it is truncated/over-read to the file's size. */
+    size_t blen = (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && eff_body == _tl_fs_read_buf)
+                      ? _tl_fs_read_len : strlen(eff_body);
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;  /* consume — one-shot per response */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     int head_only = _tl_http_head_only;
 
     JsonBuf hdrs; jb_init(&hdrs);
@@ -1438,11 +1449,22 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
             const char* rs = EL_CSTR(r);
             /* Copy response out BEFORE arena teardown.
              * For binary files, _tl_fs_read_len holds the real byte count —
-             * use memcpy instead of strdup so null bytes are preserved. */
-            size_t rlen = _tl_fs_read_len > 0 ? _tl_fs_read_len : (rs ? strlen(rs) : 0);
+             * use memcpy instead of strdup so null bytes are preserved.
+             * The stored length applies ONLY when the response IS the exact
+             * fs_read buffer; a wrapped/derived response must use strlen or
+             * it gets truncated (or over-read) to the file's length. */
+            size_t rlen;
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && rs && rs == _tl_fs_read_buf) {
+                rlen = _tl_fs_read_len;   /* raw file bytes — binary-safe */
+            } else {
+                rlen = rs ? strlen(rs) : 0;
+                _tl_fs_read_len = 0;      /* hint doesn't describe this body */
+                _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
+            }
             response = malloc(rlen + 1);
             if (response && rs) { memcpy(response, rs, rlen); response[rlen] = '\0'; }
             else if (response) { response[0] = '\0'; }
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) _tl_fs_read_buf = response; /* hint follows the copy */
         } else {
             response = el_strdup_persist("el-runtime: no http handler registered");
         }
@@ -1684,10 +1706,20 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
             el_val_t hmap = http_build_headers_map(hdr_block ? hdr_block : "");
             el_val_t r = h(EL_STR(dispatch_method), EL_STR(path), hmap, EL_STR(body));
             const char* rs = EL_CSTR(r);
-            size_t rlen = _tl_fs_read_len > 0 ? _tl_fs_read_len : (rs ? strlen(rs) : 0);
+            /* Same pairing rule as the v1 worker: the fs_read length is only
+             * trustworthy for the exact buffer fs_read returned. */
+            size_t rlen;
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0 && rs && rs == _tl_fs_read_buf) {
+                rlen = _tl_fs_read_len;   /* raw file bytes — binary-safe */
+            } else {
+                rlen = rs ? strlen(rs) : 0;
+                _tl_fs_read_len = 0;      /* hint doesn't describe this body */
+                _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
+            }
             response = malloc(rlen + 1);
             if (response && rs) { memcpy(response, rs, rlen); response[rlen] = '\0'; }
             else if (response) { response[0] = '\0'; }
+            if (_tl_fs_read_len > 0) _tl_fs_read_buf = response; /* hint follows the copy */
             el_release(hmap);
         } else {
             response = el_strdup_persist(
@@ -1803,6 +1835,7 @@ el_val_t http_response(el_val_t status, el_val_t headers_json, el_val_t body) {
 el_val_t fs_read(el_val_t pathv) {
     const char* path = EL_CSTR(pathv);
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     if (!path) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
     FILE* f = fopen(path, "rb");
     if (!f) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
@@ -1814,6 +1847,7 @@ el_val_t fs_read(el_val_t pathv) {
     size_t got = fread(buf, 1, (size_t)sz, f);
     buf[got] = '\0';
     _tl_fs_read_len = got;   /* store real byte count for binary-safe send */
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = buf;   /* ...valid ONLY for this exact buffer */
     fclose(f);
     return el_wrap_str(buf);
 }
@@ -3184,8 +3218,10 @@ el_val_t json_get_raw(el_val_t json_str, el_val_t key) {
     const char* k    = EL_CSTR(key);
     const char* p = json_find_key(json, k);
     /* Clear fs_read binary-length hint — result is a fresh null-terminated
-     * string, not the raw file bytes, so Content-Length must use strlen. */
+     * string, not the raw file bytes, so Content-Length must use strlen.
+     * (Kept although the pointer pairing now makes this redundant.) */
     _tl_fs_read_len = 0;
+    _tl_fs_read_buf = NULL;
     if (!p) return el_wrap_str(el_strdup(""));
     const char* end = json_skip_value(p);
     size_t n = (size_t)(end - p);