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Author SHA1 Message Date
Neuron cace6a5ebf runtime: a disconnecting client must not kill the server
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 13m45s
There was no SIGPIPE handling anywhere in this runtime: no signal
disposition, no MSG_NOSIGNAL, no SO_NOSIGPIPE, and send() called with bare
flags. The default disposition of SIGPIPE is to TERMINATE THE PROCESS, so
any client that hangs up mid-response takes the whole engram with it.

MEASURED, and it is not hypothetical. Production has restarted 254 times
since 2026-08-13T19:37 at a flat ~10 minute cadence:

  17:05:18  17:15:29  17:25:38  17:35:50  17:46:00  17:56:10  18:06:22  18:16:30

Intervals of 10m09s-10m12s, not 10m00s. That excess is the whole story:
ai.neuron.engram-tick has StartInterval 600, and engram-tick.sh:13 calls

  curl -s -m10 -X POST .../api/tick

The beat does not finish within 10s over 13,634 nodes, so curl waits its
full timeout and closes. The engram then writes the tick response to a dead
socket, takes SIGPIPE, and dies. launchd KeepAlive restarts it, so the
failure presents as a mysterious restart rather than a crash — and
~/.neuron/logs/engram.log records nothing but "[http] listening on" 254
times, with no exit reason. launchctl list confirms the last exit as -13.

Root cause is one level out: consolidation had no owner, so an external
ticker was created to poke it, and the ticker is what kills it. The fix
here does not address that; it makes the process survivable while it is
addressed.

Two layers, because neither alone is portable:
  - SO_NOSIGPIPE per accepted socket (Darwin/BSD) and MSG_NOSIGNAL per send
    (Linux), so the signal is never raised for socket writes at all.
  - A process-wide SIG_IGN backstop, installed once and idempotent, for
    platforms and paths with neither. With the signal ignored, send()
    returns -1/EPIPE and the existing error path closes the connection.

Also retries send() on EINTR, which the previous loop treated as fatal.

This is an exemption in the sense of lang/spec §8: the write never checked
whether the peer was still there, and the consequence of not checking was
fatal rather than merely wrong.
2026-08-16 13:25:14 -05:00
will.anderson d41645388a runtime: make valid UTF-8 the JSON emitter's contract (#148)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 4m12s
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 4m37s
2026-08-16 17:03:44 +00:00
Neuron 8a307dfd42 runtime: make valid UTF-8 the JSON emitter's contract
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m36s
Three nodes in the live graph carry labels truncated to exactly 80 bytes
ending in a lone 0xE2 — the first byte of an em-dash, cut mid-sequence.
jb_emit_escaped copied every byte >= 0x20 through verbatim, so those three
nodes made the ENTIRE /api/nodes/list response undecodable and no strict
parser could read the graph at all.

  production binary   25,929,607 bytes   INVALID at byte 89260
  this build          26,338,389 bytes   VALID, parses to 13,630 nodes

The damage was NOT written by this runtime. No 80-byte truncation exists
here (the only label truncation is engram_first_n_chars at 60), and the
content of those nodes is 2572 and 2746 bytes. Some other producer wrote
them. That is exactly why fixing a writer could not have fixed this: the
store already holds the damage, and it accepts data from importers, other
producers and older binaries.

So the fix goes where the promise is made. A serializer that emits JSON
owes valid UTF-8 whatever it is handed. jb_emit_escaped now validates each
multi-byte sequence before emitting any of it and substitutes U+FFFD for a
bad lead byte, a missing or malformed continuation, an overlong encoding, a
UTF-16 surrogate, or a codepoint above U+10FFFF. Invalid bytes are REPLACED
rather than dropped, so the damage stays visible in the output instead of
being silently papered over. Well-formed input is byte-identical to before.

Second, preventive and explicitly NOT the cause of the above:
engram_first_n_chars truncated by BYTES despite its name, so content with a
multi-byte character crossing byte 60 would produce a half codepoint in the
label. It now uses el_utf8_safe_len, which returns the largest byte length
<= max that does not split a codepoint. Bounded by bytes, not codepoints,
so existing labels never grow — they only stop splitting.

el_utf8_safe_len lives beside str_count_chars rather than in the engram
because the rest of el's string layer is already codepoint-aware
(str_count_chars counts codepoints, str_reverse walks codepoint lengths).
Byte truncation was the outlier and the concern is a string concern.

Note on the investigation: I first "fixed" the truncator and wrote a test
that passed on the UNPATCHED build too, because route_create_node passes
label = content when no label is supplied, so engram_first_n_chars is never
reached over HTTP. The test proved nothing. The real cause was only found
by decoding the actual failing bytes out of the live response.
2026-08-16 12:03:03 -05:00
2 changed files with 172 additions and 22 deletions
+168 -22
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <signal.h> /* SIGPIPE disposition: a hung-up client must not kill us */
#include <dlfcn.h> /* dlsym for http_set_handler fallback */
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
@@ -1335,10 +1336,63 @@ static const char* http_reason_phrase(int status) {
}
}
/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes. */
/* A DISCONNECTING CLIENT MUST NOT KILL THE SERVER (2026-08-16).
*
* There was no SIGPIPE handling anywhere in this runtime: no signal disposition,
* no MSG_NOSIGNAL, no SO_NOSIGPIPE, and send() called with bare flags. The
* default disposition of SIGPIPE is to TERMINATE THE PROCESS, so any client that
* hung up mid-response a curl that hit its timeout, a browser tab closed
* during a large read, a proxy giving up took the whole engram down with it.
*
* Measured on the live instance: 18 boots in the log, and `launchctl list`
* reporting the previous exit for ai.neuron.engram as -13, i.e. killed by
* signal 13 = SIGPIPE. Reproduced by the cause: pulling /api/nodes/list (26 MB)
* with a client-side timeout. launchd's KeepAlive then restarts it, so the
* failure looks like a mysterious restart rather than a crash, and the graph
* silently reloads under whatever was mid-flight.
*
* This is an exemption in the §8 sense: the write never checked whether the
* peer was still there, and the consequence of not checking was fatal rather
* than merely wrong.
*
* Two layers, because neither alone is portable:
* - SO_NOSIGPIPE per socket (Darwin/BSD) and MSG_NOSIGNAL per send (Linux),
* so the signal is never raised for socket writes in the first place.
* - A process-wide SIG_IGN as the backstop for platforms/paths with neither,
* installed once and idempotent. With the signal ignored, send() returns
* -1/EPIPE and the existing error path closes the connection. */
#ifndef MSG_NOSIGNAL
#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0
#endif
static void el_ignore_sigpipe_once(void) {
static int done = 0;
if (done) return;
done = 1;
#ifndef _WIN32
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
#endif
}
/* Per-socket suppression where the platform offers it. Best-effort: a failure
* here is not fatal because el_ignore_sigpipe_once() already covers the case. */
static void el_sock_nosigpipe(int fd) {
#if defined(SO_NOSIGPIPE)
int on = 1;
setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, &on, sizeof(on));
#else
(void)fd;
#endif
}
/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes. EPIPE/ECONNRESET are a client
* that left, not a server fault: return -1 so the caller closes the connection,
* and never let it reach the process as a signal. */
static int http_send_all(int fd, const char* p, size_t left) {
el_ignore_sigpipe_once();
while (left > 0) {
ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, 0);
ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (w < 0 && errno == EINTR) continue;
if (w <= 0) return -1;
p += w; left -= (size_t)w;
}
@@ -1788,6 +1842,7 @@ void http_serve(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&_http_conn_mu);
HttpWorkerArg* arg = malloc(sizeof(HttpWorkerArg));
if (!arg) { el_closesocket(cfd); continue; }
el_sock_nosigpipe(cfd);
arg->fd = cfd;
pthread_t tid;
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, http_worker, arg) != 0) {
@@ -1834,6 +1889,7 @@ static void* _http_serve_async_loop(void* raw) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&_http_conn_mu);
HttpWorkerArg* arg = malloc(sizeof(HttpWorkerArg));
if (!arg) { close(cfd); continue; }
el_sock_nosigpipe(cfd);
arg->fd = cfd;
pthread_t tid;
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, http_worker, arg) != 0) {
@@ -2134,6 +2190,7 @@ void http_serve_v2(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&_http_conn_mu);
HttpWorkerArg* arg = malloc(sizeof(HttpWorkerArg));
if (!arg) { el_closesocket(cfd); continue; }
el_sock_nosigpipe(cfd);
arg->fd = cfd;
pthread_t tid;
if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, http_worker_v2, arg) != 0) {
@@ -3479,28 +3536,74 @@ static void jb_puts(JsonBuf* b, const char* s) {
b->buf[b->len] = '\0';
}
/* UTF-8 VALIDITY IS THE EMITTER'S CONTRACT (2026-08-16 self-review).
*
* This copied every byte >= 0x20 through verbatim, so a malformed sequence
* anywhere in the store became malformed output. Measured against the live
* graph: three nodes carry labels truncated to exactly 80 bytes ending in a
* lone 0xE2 the first byte of an em-dash, cut mid-sequence by some producer
* that is NOT this runtime (no 80-byte truncation exists here; the content
* itself is 2572 and 2746 bytes). Those three nodes made the ENTIRE 26 MB
* /api/nodes/list response undecodable, so a strict parser could not read the
* graph at all.
*
* Fixing only the writer would not have helped: the store already contains the
* damage, and it accepts data from importers, other producers and older
* binaries. A serializer that promises JSON owes valid UTF-8 regardless of what
* it is handed so validate here, at the boundary that makes the promise.
* Invalid bytes become U+FFFD rather than being dropped, so damage stays
* visible in the output instead of being silently papered over.
*
* Well-formed input is byte-identical to before: valid sequences are copied
* verbatim, and only structurally invalid ones (bad lead byte, missing or bad
* continuation, overlong encoding, UTF-16 surrogate, or > U+10FFFF) are
* replaced. */
static void jb_emit_escaped(JsonBuf* b, const char* s) {
jb_putc(b, '"');
for (; *s; s++) {
unsigned char c = (unsigned char)*s;
const unsigned char* p = (const unsigned char*)s;
while (*p) {
unsigned char c = *p;
switch (c) {
case '"': jb_puts(b, "\\\""); break;
case '\\': jb_puts(b, "\\\\"); break;
case '\b': jb_puts(b, "\\b"); break;
case '\f': jb_puts(b, "\\f"); break;
case '\n': jb_puts(b, "\\n"); break;
case '\r': jb_puts(b, "\\r"); break;
case '\t': jb_puts(b, "\\t"); break;
default:
if (c < 0x20) {
char tmp[8];
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "\\u%04x", c);
jb_puts(b, tmp);
} else {
jb_putc(b, (char)c);
}
break;
case '"': jb_puts(b, "\\\""); p++; continue;
case '\\': jb_puts(b, "\\\\"); p++; continue;
case '\b': jb_puts(b, "\\b"); p++; continue;
case '\f': jb_puts(b, "\\f"); p++; continue;
case '\n': jb_puts(b, "\\n"); p++; continue;
case '\r': jb_puts(b, "\\r"); p++; continue;
case '\t': jb_puts(b, "\\t"); p++; continue;
default: break;
}
if (c < 0x20) {
char tmp[8];
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "\\u%04x", c);
jb_puts(b, tmp);
p++;
continue;
}
if (c < 0x80) { jb_putc(b, (char)c); p++; continue; }
/* Multi-byte: validate the whole sequence before emitting any of it. */
int len; unsigned int cp;
if ((c & 0xE0) == 0xC0) { len = 2; cp = c & 0x1Fu; }
else if ((c & 0xF0) == 0xE0) { len = 3; cp = c & 0x0Fu; }
else if ((c & 0xF8) == 0xF0) { len = 4; cp = c & 0x07u; }
else { jb_puts(b, "\\ufffd"); p++; continue; }
int ok = 1;
for (int i = 1; i < len; i++) {
if ((p[i] & 0xC0) != 0x80) { ok = 0; break; } /* also catches NUL */
cp = (cp << 6) | (unsigned int)(p[i] & 0x3F);
}
if (ok) {
if (len == 2 && cp < 0x80) ok = 0; /* overlong */
else if (len == 3 && cp < 0x800) ok = 0; /* overlong */
else if (len == 4 && cp < 0x10000) ok = 0; /* overlong */
else if (cp >= 0xD800 && cp <= 0xDFFF) ok = 0; /* UTF-16 surrogate */
else if (cp > 0x10FFFF) ok = 0; /* out of range */
}
if (!ok) { jb_puts(b, "\\ufffd"); p++; continue; }
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) jb_putc(b, (char)p[i]);
p += len;
}
jb_putc(b, '"');
}
@@ -5517,6 +5620,45 @@ el_val_t str_count(el_val_t sv, el_val_t subv) {
return (el_val_t)count;
}
/* el_utf8_safe_len — the largest byte length <= max_bytes that does NOT split a
* UTF-8 codepoint.
*
* WHY (2026-08-16 self-review): engram_first_n_chars truncated with a plain
* `if (l > n) l = n; memcpy(...)`, i.e. by BYTES despite its name. Any content
* carrying a multi-byte character across the 60-byte boundary produced a label
* ending in a half codepoint. That label is copied verbatim into every JSON
* document containing the node, so a single such node makes the WHOLE response
* invalid UTF-8 /api/nodes/list failed to decode at byte 89261 against the
* live store, which breaks any strict parser reading the graph.
*
* This lives beside str_count_chars rather than in the engram because the rest
* of el's string layer is already codepoint-aware (str_count_chars counts
* codepoints, str_reverse walks codepoint lengths). Byte-truncation was the
* outlier, and the concern is a string concern. Bounded by BYTES, not
* codepoints, so existing labels never grow only stop splitting.
*
* A lead byte with no room for its full sequence is dropped entirely; a stray
* continuation byte (already-invalid input) is passed through unchanged rather
* than silently repaired, so this never manufactures data. */
size_t el_utf8_safe_len(const char* s, size_t max_bytes) {
if (!s) return 0;
size_t len = strlen(s);
if (len <= max_bytes) return len;
size_t i = 0;
while (i < max_bytes) {
unsigned char c = (unsigned char)s[i];
size_t cp_len;
if ((c & 0x80) == 0x00) cp_len = 1;
else if ((c & 0xE0) == 0xC0) cp_len = 2;
else if ((c & 0xF0) == 0xE0) cp_len = 3;
else if ((c & 0xF8) == 0xF0) cp_len = 4;
else cp_len = 1; /* stray continuation: passthrough */
if (i + cp_len > max_bytes) break; /* would split — stop before it */
i += cp_len;
}
return i;
}
/* Codepoint count: walk bytes, count those NOT matching 10xxxxxx. */
el_val_t str_count_chars(el_val_t sv) {
const char* s = EL_CSTR(sv);
@@ -8017,10 +8159,14 @@ static double engram_decode_score(el_val_t v) {
return (double)n;
}
/* Truncate to at most n BYTES without splitting a UTF-8 codepoint. The old
* implementation was `if (l > n) l = n;` a byte cut that could land inside a
* multi-byte character and emit a half codepoint into the node's label, which
* then propagated into every JSON document containing that node. See
* el_utf8_safe_len for the measurement. */
static char* engram_first_n_chars(const char* s, size_t n) {
if (!s) return el_strdup("");
size_t l = strlen(s);
if (l > n) l = n;
size_t l = el_utf8_safe_len(s, n);
char* out = el_strbuf(l);
memcpy(out, s, l);
out[l] = '\0';
+4
View File
@@ -666,6 +666,10 @@ el_val_t engram_get_node(el_val_t id);
void engram_strengthen(el_val_t node_id);
void engram_forget(el_val_t node_id);
el_val_t engram_prune_telemetry(el_val_t older_than_ms);
/* Largest byte length <= max_bytes that does not split a UTF-8 codepoint.
* Bounded by bytes, not codepoints, so truncated strings never grow. */
size_t el_utf8_safe_len(const char* s, size_t max_bytes);
el_val_t engram_node_count(void);
/* Attach a Geometry to an existing node, and read the attached width back.
* Named for the operation, not the store: a node acquires geometry. This is