Merge pull request 'fix: security hardening from pentest findings' (#6) from fix/pentest-security-hardening into stage

src/main.el

@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ fn config_get(key: String) -> String {
 // function - it serves __html_file__ directly with text/html.
 // This handler covers /api/* and /brand/* routes.
 
-fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
+fn handle_request_inner(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     let src_dir: String = state_get("__src_dir__")
 
     // ── Root — serve El-generated landing page ────────────────────────────────
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
 
     // ── robots.txt ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     if str_eq(path, "/robots.txt") {
-        return "User-agent: *\nAllow: /\nSitemap: https://neurontechnologies.ai/sitemap.xml\n"
+        return "User-agent: *\nAllow: /\n"
     }
 
     // ── About page ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -990,12 +990,18 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
         let ua_safe: String = str_replace(str_replace(attest_ua, "\\", "\\\\"), "\"", "\\\"")
         // Write to Supabase waitlist (attestation in dedicated column)
         waitlist_upsert(attest_email, attest_name, attest_plan, "founding-attestation", attest_text, attest_ua, 0)
-        // Also save to GCS as immutable legal record
+        // Also save to GCS as immutable legal record.
+        // Written to the dedicated attestations bucket (GCS_ATTEST_BUCKET) which
+        // is private and separate from the public-read shares bucket.
         let record: String = "{\"plan\":\"" + attest_plan + "\",\"name\":\"" + n_safe + "\",\"email\":\"" + e_safe + "\",\"timestamp\":\"" + attest_ts + "\",\"attestation\":\"" + t_safe + "\",\"user_agent\":\"" + ua_safe + "\"}"
-        let gcs_bucket: String = env("GCS_SHARE_BUCKET")
-        if !str_eq(gcs_bucket, "") {
-            let attest_key: String = "attestations/" + attest_ts + "-" + attest_email + ".json"
-            let gcs_ok: String = gcs_write(gcs_bucket, attest_key, record)
+        let attest_bucket: String = env("GCS_ATTEST_BUCKET")
+        if str_eq(attest_bucket, "") {
+            // Fall back to share bucket with attestations/ prefix for legacy deploys
+            let attest_bucket = env("GCS_SHARE_BUCKET")
+        }
+        if !str_eq(attest_bucket, "") {
+            let attest_key: String = attest_ts + "-" + attest_email + ".json"
+            let gcs_ok: String = gcs_write(attest_bucket, attest_key, record)
             println("[attest] gcs write " + attest_key + " -> " + gcs_ok)
         }
         // Email notification
@@ -1117,15 +1123,21 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
                 }
                 state_set(rl_key, int_to_str(rl_count + 1) + "|" + int_to_str(today_day))
             }
-            // Turnstile: verify on first message only (tokens are single-use).
-            // Per-message verification breaks chat flow. Forms get full verification.
+            // Turnstile: server-side verification is mandatory on every first
+            // message (tokens are single-use; per-message verification would
+            // break streaming chat flow so only the first message carries one).
+            // Requests without a cf_token are rejected outright — the widget
+            // must execute successfully before the first POST is sent.
             let cf_token: String = json_get(body, "cf_token")
-            if !str_eq(cf_token, "") {
-                let ts_secret: String = "0x4AAAAAADHAZTok46L-l2sa9biSGpgN3GY"
+            let ts_secret: String = state_get("__turnstile_secret_key__")
+            if str_eq(cf_token, "") && !str_eq(ts_secret, "") {
+                return "{\"error\":\"Bot check required. Please complete the challenge.\"}"
+            }
+            if !str_eq(cf_token, "") && !str_eq(ts_secret, "") {
                 let verify_body: String = "secret=" + ts_secret + "&response=" + cf_token
-                let verify_resp: String = http_post("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/siteverify", verify_body)
+                let verify_resp: String = http_post("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v1/siteverify", verify_body)
                 let is_valid: String = json_get(verify_resp, "success")
-                if str_eq(is_valid, "false") {
+                if !str_eq(is_valid, "true") {
                     return "{\"error\":\"Bot check failed. Please try again.\"}"
                 }
             }
@@ -1617,9 +1629,15 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
         } else {
             let share_html = fs_read(src_dir + "/shares/" + id + ".html")
         }
+        // Guard against empty responses and GCS error JSON (e.g. {"error":...}).
+        // A valid share card always starts with "<" (HTML). Anything else is
+        // treated as a missing card to avoid leaking bucket names or GCS details.
         if str_eq(share_html, "") {
             return "{\"__status__\":404,\"error\":\"not found\"}"
         }
+        if !str_starts_with(share_html, "<") {
+            return "{\"__status__\":404,\"error\":\"not found\"}"
+        }
         return share_html
     }
 
@@ -1827,6 +1845,52 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     return "{\"__status__\":404,\"error\":\"not found\"}"
 }
 
+// ── Security header wrapper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Injects mandatory security headers on every response.  Called by
+// handle_request which is the actual http_set_handler target; the inner
+// dispatcher (handle_request_inner) returns plain bodies so all the existing
+// route code is unchanged.
+//
+// Headers applied:
+//   Strict-Transport-Security  — forces HTTPS for 2 years + preload
+//   X-Content-Type-Options     — no MIME sniffing
+//   X-Frame-Options            — no framing except same origin
+//   Referrer-Policy            — full URL within origin, origin-only cross-site
+//   Permissions-Policy         — deny geo/mic/camera
+//   Content-Security-Policy    — allow self + trusted CDNs used by the app
+
+fn sec_headers_json() -> String {
+    "{\"Strict-Transport-Security\":\"max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload\","
+    + "\"X-Content-Type-Options\":\"nosniff\","
+    + "\"X-Frame-Options\":\"SAMEORIGIN\","
+    + "\"Referrer-Policy\":\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\","
+    + "\"Permissions-Policy\":\"geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()\","
+    + "\"Content-Security-Policy\":\"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://challenges.cloudflare.com https://cdn.jsdelivr.net https://www.googletagmanager.com https://www.google-analytics.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; frame-src https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' https://api.stripe.com https://*.supabase.co; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:\"}"
+}
+
+fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
+    let inner_resp: String = handle_request_inner(method, path, body)
+    // Detect envelope already set by inner handler (starts with
+    // {"el_http_response":1).  If so, let it pass through unmodified —
+    // the status code it carries takes precedence and we must not
+    // double-wrap. (Currently inner never returns an envelope, but guard
+    // defensively so a future route returning http_response(...) still works.)
+    if str_starts_with(inner_resp, "{\"el_http_response\":1") {
+        return inner_resp
+    }
+    // Detect the __status__ convention used by many routes so we can forward
+    // the correct HTTP status code while still injecting security headers.
+    let status_code: Int = 200
+    if str_starts_with(inner_resp, "{\"__status__\":") {
+        let status_str: String = json_get(inner_resp, "__status__")
+        if !str_eq(status_str, "") {
+            let status_code = str_to_int(status_str)
+        }
+    }
+    http_response(status_code, sec_headers_json(), inner_resp)
+}
+
 // ── Startup ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 //
 // Order matters:
@@ -1856,6 +1920,7 @@ let resend_api_key: String = env("RESEND_API_KEY")
 let supabase_anon_key: String = env("SUPABASE_ANON_KEY")
 let supabase_service_key: String = env("SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY")
 let supabase_project_url: String = "https://ocojsghaonltunidkzpw.supabase.co"
+let turnstile_secret_key: String = env("TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY")
 
 // Origin — drives Stripe redirect URLs; never hardcoded to localhost.
 let neuron_origin_env: String = env("NEURON_ORIGIN")
@@ -1903,6 +1968,7 @@ state_set("__origin__",                      neuron_origin)
 state_set("__founding_sold_file__",          sold_file)
 state_set("__founding_sold__",               int_to_str(real_sold))
 state_set("__founding_total__",              int_to_str(FOUNDING_TOTAL))
+state_set("__turnstile_secret_key__",        turnstile_secret_key)
 persist_founding_count(real_sold)
 
 println(color_bold("Neuron") + " - " + neuron_origin)

src/styles.el

@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ fn page_open() -> String {
     button[disabled] { opacity: 0.6; cursor: not-allowed; }
 
   </style>
-  <script src=\"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked/marked.min.js\"></script>
+  <script src=\"https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked/marked.min.js\" integrity=\"sha384-948ahk4ZmxYVYOc+rxN1H2gM1EJ2Duhp7uHtZ4WSLkV4Vtx5MUqnV+l7u9B+jFv+\" crossorigin=\"anonymous\"></script>
   <script src=\"https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/api.js\" async defer></script>
   <noscript><style>.reveal { opacity: 1 !important; transform: none !important; }</style></noscript>