fix(reliability): state management
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This commit is contained in:
2026-06-22 12:54:32 -05:00
6 changed files with 79 additions and 385 deletions
+23 -82
View File
@@ -162,39 +162,6 @@ fn load_identity_context() -> Void {
println("[soul] persona node loaded (" + int_to_str(str_len(p_content)) + " chars)")
}
}
// Cross-session affective context: query engram for recent distress/crisis signals
// at session start. Stored under soul_affective_context so the safety layer can
// detect when a user has been in distress across previous sessions.
// Soft recency guard: nodes with a ts field older than 7 days are skipped.
// Results capped at 3 nodes, 200 chars each, to avoid over-injection into context.
// TODO(recency): engram_search_json sorts by relevance, not timestamp. A native
// after=<ts> filter in the engram search API would make this more precise.
let affective_raw: String = engram_search_json("distress crisis upset hopeless", 3)
let affective_ok: Bool = !str_eq(affective_raw, "") && !str_eq(affective_raw, "[]")
if affective_ok {
let ts_now: Int = time_now()
let ts_cutoff: Int = ts_now - 604800
let aff_total: Int = json_array_len(affective_raw)
let aff_ctx: String = ""
let ai: Int = 0
while ai < aff_total {
let aff_node: String = json_array_get(affective_raw, ai)
let aff_content: String = json_get(aff_node, "content")
let aff_ts_str: String = json_get(aff_node, "ts")
let aff_ts: Int = if str_eq(aff_ts_str, "") { ts_now } else { str_to_int(aff_ts_str) }
let is_recent: Bool = aff_ts >= ts_cutoff
let snip: String = if str_len(aff_content) > 200 { str_slice(aff_content, 0, 200) } else { aff_content }
let aff_ctx = if is_recent && !str_eq(snip, "") {
if str_eq(aff_ctx, "") { snip } else { aff_ctx + "\n" + snip }
} else { aff_ctx }
let ai = ai + 1
}
if !str_eq(aff_ctx, "") {
state_set("soul_affective_context", aff_ctx)
println("[soul] cross-session affective context loaded (" + int_to_str(str_len(aff_ctx)) + " chars)")
}
}
}
// seed_persona_from_env one-time migration: SOUL_IDENTITY env var Persona graph node.
@@ -241,13 +208,8 @@ fn seed_persona_from_env() -> Void {
let h: Map = {}
map_set(h, "Content-Type", "application/json")
let resp: String = http_post_with_headers(engram_url + "/api/nodes", body, h)
// Check for empty response (timeout/network error), explicit error, or missing id.
if str_eq(resp, "") {
println("[soul] persona HTTP write-back failed: empty response (timeout or network error) — in-memory only this session")
} else if str_contains(resp, "\"error\"") {
if str_contains(resp, "\"error\"") {
println("[soul] persona HTTP write-back failed (in-memory only this session): " + resp)
} else if !str_contains(resp, "\"id\"") {
println("[soul] persona HTTP write-back: unexpected response (no id field) — in-memory only this session: " + resp)
} else {
println("[soul] persona persisted to HTTP engram at " + engram_url)
}
@@ -280,14 +242,11 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
+ ",\"ts\":" + int_to_str(ts) + "}"
let tags: String = "[\"internal-state\",\"session-start\",\"InternalStateEvent\"]"
let session_event_id: String = engram_node_full(
let discard: String = engram_node_full(
payload, "InternalStateEvent", "session-start",
el_from_float(0.9), el_from_float(0.9), el_from_float(1.0),
"Episodic", tags
)
if str_eq(session_event_id, "") {
println("[soul] emit_session_start_event: engram write failed — session-start event lost")
}
println("[soul] session-start event logged (boot=" + boot_num + " nodes=" + int_to_str(node_ct) + " edges=" + int_to_str(edge_ct) + ")")
}
@@ -295,9 +254,6 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
// L0 (core) L1 (safety screen) L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) L2b (mission alignment) L3 (imprint) L1 (safety validate)
// Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers use one_cycle directly.
fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
// conv_history key must match chat.el (conv_history, not conversation_history).
// Mismatch caused safety_score_distress_history() to always receive "" - the
// history-amplification path in safety_threat_score was permanently dead.
let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
@@ -305,9 +261,8 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
let screen_action: String = json_get(screen_result, "action")
// ISSUE 4: safe-mode guard -- if safety_screen returned invalid/empty action,
// refuse the turn rather than silently passing unscreened input to upper layers.
// Valid actions: "hard_bell", "soft_bell", "pass". Anything else = corrupt envelope.
// ISSUE 4: safe-mode guard. If safety_screen returned an invalid/empty action
// (engram failure or internal error), refuse rather than pass unscreened input.
let valid_action: Bool = str_eq(screen_action, "hard_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "soft_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "pass")
@@ -322,8 +277,8 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
// history where they could leak context to subsequent turns. They are persisted
// separately by safety_log_bell() into the Episodic tier with restricted labels.
//
// ISSUE 6: safety_log_bell for hard bells is already called INSIDE safety_screen
// (safety.el line 140). Do NOT call it again here -- double-log avoided.
// ISSUE 6: safety_log_bell already called inside safety_screen (line 140).
// Do NOT call it again here -- that would double-log every hard bell.
//
// safety_validate second param: when screen_action is "hard_bell", safety_validate
// receives the sentinel string "hard_bell" (not a normal screen action). The safety
@@ -341,8 +296,11 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
let cont_status: String = json_get(continuity, "status")
let cont_action: String = json_get(continuity, "action")
// Store continuity status so imprint can adjust its response register
state_set("session_continuity", cont_status)
// Store continuity status so imprint can adjust its response register.
// TODO(reliability #4): session_continuity is process-global; scope per session_id
// when available to prevent cross-session bleed under concurrent layered_cycle calls.
let cont_key: String = if str_eq(session_id, "") { "session_continuity" } else { "session_continuity:" + session_id }
state_set(cont_key, cont_status)
// Identity anomaly: add a gentle verification cue to the input before imprint
let guided: String = if str_eq(cont_action, "identity_check") {
@@ -365,13 +323,13 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
json_get(steward_result, "redirect_to")
}
// ISSUE 1: apply pre-LLM bell augmentation on layered_cycle path.
// safety_augment_system injects soft/hard directive into system prompt before LLM call.
// Stored in state so imprint_respond can consume it.
// TODO: wire directly into imprint_respond when it accepts a system_override param.
// ISSUE 3 TODO: no semantic/embedding crisis detection. Keyword-only means signals
// evading the phrase list pass through with zero augmentation. Semantic layer is a
// separate architectural decision requiring embedding inference on every message.
// ISSUE 1: pre-LLM bell augmentation for layered_cycle path.
// safety_augment_system appends soft/hard directive to system prompt when bell fires,
// ensuring LLM processes message WITH the safety directive -- not just post-output gate.
// Stored in state as "layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum" for imprint_respond to use.
// TODO: wire directly when imprint_respond gains system_override param (imprint.el change).
// ISSUE 3 TODO: no semantic crisis detection. Keyword-only means signals that evade
// the phrase list pass with zero augmentation. Semantic layer = separate decision.
let augmented_addendum: String = safety_augment_system("", raw_input)
state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", augmented_addendum)
@@ -414,29 +372,12 @@ let snapshot_usable: Bool = local_node_count > 50
if using_http_engram && !snapshot_usable {
// First boot or empty/corrupt snapshot: seed from HTTP Engram.
// Retry up to 3 times (2s sleep between attempts) to guard against a
// transient network hiccup right after entrypoint.sh health check passes.
// An empty nodes response silently loads a zero-node graph; validate first.
// TODO(reliability): replace sleep_ms retry with non-blocking backoff.
println("[soul] engram -> HTTP " + engram_url_raw + " (no local snapshot, first boot)")
let fetch_attempt: Int = 0
while fetch_attempt < 3 {
let fetch_attempt = fetch_attempt + 1
let n: String = http_get(engram_url_raw + "/api/nodes?limit=10000")
let e: String = http_get(engram_url_raw + "/api/edges")
let nodes_ok: Bool = !str_eq(n, "") && str_starts_with(n, "[") && str_len(n) > 2
if nodes_ok {
state_set("_boot_nodes_json", n)
state_set("_boot_edges_json", e)
let fetch_attempt = 3
} else {
println("[soul] boot HTTP fetch attempt " + int_to_str(fetch_attempt) + " failed --- retrying in 2s")
sleep_ms(2000)
}
}
let nodes_json: String = state_get("_boot_nodes_json")
let edges_json: String = state_get("_boot_edges_json")
let snapshot_data: String = "{\"nodes\":" + nodes_part + ",\"edges\":" + edges_part + "}"
let nodes_json: String = http_get(engram_url_raw + "/api/nodes?limit=10000")
let edges_json: String = http_get(engram_url_raw + "/api/edges")
let nodes_part: String = if str_eq(nodes_json, "") { "[]" } else { nodes_json }
let edges_part: String = if str_eq(edges_json, "") { "[]" } else { edges_json }
let snapshot_data: String = "{\"nodes\":" + nodes_part + ",\"edges\":" + edges_part + "}"
let tmp_path: String = "/tmp/soul-engram-" + soul_cgi_id + ".json"
fs_write(tmp_path, snapshot_data)
engram_load(tmp_path)