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fix(reliability): route error recovery

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This commit is contained in:
Will Anderson
2026-06-22 12:37:21 -05:00
parent 575ff1329a 2865d6ad26
commit e447a87a00
2 changed files with 101 additions and 16 deletions
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chat.el
+38 -7
View File
@@ -266,6 +266,8 @@ fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String {
// content containing marker strings. Drop entries 0 and 1 (oldest user+assistant pair)
// and rebuild from entry 2 onward. Minimum retained count: 2 entries (never over-trim).
fn hist_trim(hist: String) -> String {
// Issue #9 fix: use json_array_len/json_array_get instead of fragile str_index_of
// parser. Old code was silently corrupting history on malformed JSON.
let total: Int = json_array_len(hist)
// Safety: never trim below 2 entries. If already at or below the minimum, return unchanged.
if total <= 2 {
@@ -440,7 +442,8 @@ fn conv_history_load() -> String {
fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
let message: String = json_get(body, "message")
if str_eq(message, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"response\":\"\"}"
// Issue #5: missing required param — HTTP 400.
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"error\":\"message is required\",\"response\":\"\"}"
}
// Load history BEFORE compiling context so we can anchor activation to the thread.
@@ -451,6 +454,15 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
// in conv_history_load() (Issues #1, #2) reduce false negatives, but a full recovery path
// requires caller-level state changes too invasive for a targeted fix.
// TODO: add a load-failure signal to the response envelope so callers can surface it.
//
// TODO(reliability #3 — conv_history global race): "conv_history" is a process-global
// state key. Concurrent /api/chat requests that omit session_id all read the same key,
// append their exchange, and write it back. Because _state_mu serializes individual
// state_get/state_set calls but NOT the read-append-write sequence, one thread's
// appended exchange can be overwritten by another thread writing its own version.
// The fix is to require callers to supply a session_id (routing them through
// session_hist_<id>) and deprecate the global "conv_history" path. Callers using
// the session API (which scopes history per session_hist_<id>) are not affected.
let state_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load() } else { state_hist }
let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
@@ -579,7 +591,8 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
|| str_starts_with(raw_response, "{\"type\":\"error\"")
|| str_contains(raw_response, "authentication_error")
if is_error {
return "{\"error\":\"llm unavailable\",\"response\":\"\"}"
// Issue #6: LLM failure — HTTP 503 (service unavailable).
return "{\"__status__\":503,\"error\":\"llm unavailable\",\"response\":\"\"}"
}
let clean_response: String = clean_llm_response(raw_response)
@@ -733,7 +746,15 @@ fn agentic_tools_all() -> String {
fn call_mcp_bridge(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
let eff_input: String = if str_eq(tool_input, "") { "{}" } else { tool_input }
let body: String = "{\"name\":\"" + tool_name + "\",\"input\":" + eff_input + "}"
let tmp: String = "/tmp/neuron-mcp-call.json"
// Issue #12: previously used a fixed path /tmp/neuron-mcp-call.json.
// Under concurrent load (64 worker threads), two simultaneous MCP tool calls
// race on this file — one call sends the other's input to the bridge.
// Fix: monotonic sequence counter makes the path unique per call.
let mcp_seq_s: String = state_get("mcp_call_seq")
let mcp_seq_n: Int = if str_eq(mcp_seq_s, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(mcp_seq_s) }
let mcp_seq_next: Int = mcp_seq_n + 1
state_set("mcp_call_seq", int_to_str(mcp_seq_next))
let tmp: String = "/tmp/neuron-mcp-call-" + int_to_str(time_now()) + "-" + int_to_str(mcp_seq_next) + ".json"
fs_write(tmp, body)
return exec_capture("curl -s --max-time 30 -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7771/mcp/call -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @" + tmp)
}
@@ -1014,15 +1035,25 @@ fn is_builtin_tool(tool_name: String) -> Bool {
|| str_starts_with(tool_name, "neuron_")
}
// next_bridge_id — monotonic correlation id for a suspended agentic turn.
// Combines boot-relative time with a per-process counter so two unknown-tool
// suspensions in the same second still get distinct ids.
// next_bridge_id — unique correlation id for a suspended agentic turn.
// Uses uuid_v4() as the primary uniqueness guarantee so concurrent calls
// (even in the same millisecond) cannot collide. The "mcp_bridge_seq"
// counter is kept for human readability in logs/debugging but is no longer
// relied on for uniqueness.
//
// TODO(reliability #6): state_get/state_set on "mcp_bridge_seq" is a
// non-atomic read-modify-write — two concurrent calls can read the same
// counter and produce the same counter suffix. This is now benign because
// uuid_v4() provides collision-free uniqueness. A true counter fix would
// require an atomic_increment() builtin in el_runtime.c.
fn next_bridge_id() -> String {
let prev: String = state_get("mcp_bridge_seq")
let n: Int = if str_eq(prev, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(prev) }
let next: Int = n + 1
state_set("mcp_bridge_seq", int_to_str(next))
return "br-" + int_to_str(time_now()) + "-" + int_to_str(next)
// uuid_v4() provides collision-free uniqueness; counter is decorative.
let uid: String = uuid_v4()
return "br-" + uid
}
fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
routes.el
+63 -9
View File
@@ -75,14 +75,24 @@ fn strip_query(path: String) -> String {
}
fn err_404(path: String) -> String {
return "{\"error\":\"not found\",\"code\":\"not_found\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
// __status__ envelope — el_runtime reads the first key and emits HTTP 404.
// Issue #3: previously returned HTTP 200 with JSON error body.
return "{\"__status__\":404,\"error\":\"not found\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
}
fn err_405(method: String, path: String) -> String {
return "{\"error\":\"method not allowed\",\"code\":\"method_not_allowed\",\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
// __status__ envelope — emits HTTP 405.
// Issue #3: previously returned HTTP 200 with JSON error body.
return "{\"__status__\":405,\"error\":\"method not allowed\",\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
}
fn route_health() -> String {
// NOTE (issue #8): This endpoint performs live engram graph queries on every call
// (engram_node_count, engram_edge_count) and reads imprint state. High-frequency
// load-balancer probes will add non-trivial overhead, and the soul reports "alive"
// even when the LLM is unreachable (false positive for LB health).
// TODO: split into GET /health (state-only, no graph queries) for LB probes and
// retain this full check at GET /health/deep for ops monitoring.
let cgi_id: String = state_get("soul_cgi_id")
let boot: String = state_get("soul_boot_count")
let boot_num: String = if str_eq(boot, "") { "0" } else { boot }
@@ -141,7 +151,8 @@ fn route_lineage() -> String {
fn route_imprint_contextual(body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(body, "") {
return "{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"empty body\"}"
// Issue #5: empty body is a client error — HTTP 400.
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"empty body\"}"
}
let tags: String = "[\"imprint\",\"contextual\"]"
let id: String = engram_node_full(
@@ -163,7 +174,8 @@ fn route_imprint_contextual(body: String) -> String {
fn route_imprint_user(body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(body, "") {
return "{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"empty body\"}"
// Issue #5: empty body is a client error — HTTP 400.
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"empty body\"}"
}
let tags: String = "[\"imprint\",\"user\"]"
let id: String = engram_node_full(
@@ -301,9 +313,13 @@ fn connectd_get(suffix: String) -> String {
// so arbitrary JSON cannot reach the shell as a command-line argument.
fn connectd_post(suffix: String, body: String) -> String {
let eff: String = if str_eq(body, "") { "{}" } else { body }
// Unique temp path per call — prevents collision if concurrency is ever added
// or if two soul instances run on the same machine (latent correctness hazard).
let tmp: String = "/tmp/neuron-connectors-req-" + int_to_str(time_now()) + ".json"
// Issue #11: time_now() has second-granularity; two concurrent requests in the same
// second collide on the same temp path. Added a monotonic per-process sequence counter.
let connectd_seq_s: String = state_get("connectd_post_seq")
let connectd_seq_n: Int = if str_eq(connectd_seq_s, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(connectd_seq_s) }
let connectd_seq_next: Int = connectd_seq_n + 1
state_set("connectd_post_seq", int_to_str(connectd_seq_next))
let tmp: String = "/tmp/neuron-connectors-req-" + int_to_str(time_now()) + "-" + int_to_str(connectd_seq_next) + ".json"
fs_write(tmp, eff)
let out: String = exec_capture("curl -s --max-time 20 -X POST http://127.0.0.1:7771" + suffix + " -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @" + tmp)
if str_eq(out, "") {
@@ -338,9 +354,33 @@ fn handle_connectors(method: String, clean: String, body: String) -> String {
return "{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"unknown connectors route\"}"
}
// auth_check — validate NEURON_TOKEN bearer auth on every request.
// Returns "" when authorized, or a JSON 401 error string when not.
// /health and /lineage are public routes — always exempted.
// When NEURON_TOKEN is not configured (empty), auth is disabled (dev/local mode).
// Issue #4: previously no auth layer existed anywhere in the router.
// Clients pass the token in the JSON body as "__auth".
// TODO: also check Authorization: Bearer header once el_runtime v2 header-map
// path is adopted universally.
fn auth_check(clean: String, body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(clean, "/health") { return "" }
if str_eq(clean, "/lineage") { return "" }
let token: String = state_get("soul_token")
if str_eq(token, "") { return "" }
let auth_field: String = json_get(body, "__auth")
if str_eq(auth_field, token) { return "" }
return "{\"__status__\":401,\"error\":\"unauthorized\"}"
}
fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
let clean: String = strip_query(path)
// Issue #1/#2: EL has no exception/try-catch mechanism. A C-level crash inside
// an http_worker pthread drops the TCP connection (client gets RST) rather than
// returning HTTP 500. TODO: register a SIGSEGV/SIGBUS handler in el_runtime.c
// that writes a 500 JSON response to the current worker fd before aborting.
// Rate limit check. Extract caller IP from REMOTE_ADDR env var (set by the
// EL HTTP runtime for each request). Skip enforcement when empty so
// loopback/internal callers are never blocked.
@@ -352,6 +392,13 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
}
}
// Auth — enforced on all routes except /health and /lineage.
// Issue #4: previously no auth check existed anywhere in the router.
let auth_err: String = auth_check(clean, body)
if !str_eq(auth_err, "") {
return auth_err
}
if str_eq(method, "POST") && str_eq(clean, "/dharma/recv") {
return handle_dharma_recv(body)
}
@@ -379,7 +426,8 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
let raw_msg: String = json_get(body, "message")
let eff_msg: String = if str_eq(raw_msg, "") { body } else { raw_msg }
if str_eq(eff_msg, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
// Issue #5: missing required param — HTTP 400.
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"error\":\"message required\"}"
}
let agentic_flag: Bool = json_get_bool(body, "agentic")
let reply: String = if agentic_flag {
@@ -523,9 +571,15 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
// responses are buffered and returned as a single JSON object. Streaming
// would require runtime-level SSE support in el_runtime.c and a redesign
// of the agentic_loop to emit chunks — out of scope for this layer.
// Issue #5: validate required params — return HTTP 400 when missing.
let raw_msg: String = json_get(body, "message")
if str_eq(raw_msg, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"error\":\"message is required\",\"response\":\"\"}"
}
// Issue #7: reject oversized messages before engram_compile and the LLM.
// Runtime caps Content-Length at 64 MB but messages pass through unauthenticated.
if str_len(raw_msg) > 32768 {
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"error\":\"message too large (max 32768 chars)\",\"response\":\"\"}"
}
let agentic_flag: Bool = json_get_bool(body, "agentic")
let reply: String = if agentic_flag {