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@@ -377,78 +377,16 @@ fn call_neuron_mcp(tool_name: String, args: String) -> String {
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return json_safe(result)
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Agent workspace scope (defense-in-depth, NOT a hard security boundary).
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//
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// When a workspace root is configured (state key "agent_workspace_root", else
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// env NEURON_AGENT_ROOT), the path-based tools (read_file, write_file,
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// list_files, grep) are confined to that subtree by a lexical check, and
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// run_command runs with its cwd set to the root. With no root set, behavior is
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// unchanged (unscoped) for backward compatibility.
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//
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// LIMITATION — FLAGGED FOR WILL'S REVIEW: this is a lexical guard. It does not
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// resolve symlinks and cannot stop an arbitrary shell command from cd-ing out
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// of the root. Real confinement needs runtime support (cwd-locked exec /
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// sandbox-exec / chroot) in el_runtime.c. This raises the floor; it is not a
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// boundary. The default-allow-when-unset policy and the "cd <root> && (...)"
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// wrapping are deliberate choices to confirm against the intended design.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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fn agent_workspace_root() -> String {
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let s: String = state_get("agent_workspace_root")
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if !str_eq(s, "") {
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return s
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}
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return env("NEURON_AGENT_ROOT")
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}
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// Allow if path stays under root. Empty root = no sandbox = allow. Rejects
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// parent traversal and ~ expansion; absolute paths must live under root.
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fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool {
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if str_eq(root, "") {
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return true
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}
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if str_contains(path, "..") {
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return false
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}
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if str_starts_with(path, "~") {
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return false
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}
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if str_starts_with(path, "/") {
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return str_starts_with(path, root)
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}
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return true
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}
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// Resolve a relative tool path against the root so it lands inside the subtree.
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fn resolve_in_root(path: String, root: String) -> String {
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if str_eq(root, "") {
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return path
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}
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if str_starts_with(path, "/") {
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return path
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}
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return root + "/" + path
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}
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fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
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if str_eq(tool_name, "read_file") {
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let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
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let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
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if !path_within_root(path, root) {
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return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
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}
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let content: String = fs_read(resolve_in_root(path, root))
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let content: String = fs_read(path)
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return json_safe(content)
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "write_file") {
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let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
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let content: String = json_get(tool_input, "content")
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let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
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if !path_within_root(path, root) {
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return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
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}
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fs_write(resolve_in_root(path, root), content)
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fs_write(path, content)
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return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "web_get") {
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@@ -463,9 +401,7 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "run_command") {
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let cmd: String = json_get(tool_input, "command")
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let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
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let scoped: String = if str_eq(root, "") { cmd } else { "cd " + root + " && ( " + cmd + " )" }
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let result: String = exec_capture(scoped)
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let result: String = exec_capture(cmd)
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return json_safe(result)
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}
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// MCP connector tools (namespaced mcp__<server>__<tool>) are routed through
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@@ -485,21 +421,13 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "list_files") {
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let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
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let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
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if !path_within_root(path, root) {
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return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
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}
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let result: String = exec_capture("ls -la " + resolve_in_root(path, root) + " 2>&1")
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let result: String = exec_capture("ls -la " + path + " 2>&1")
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return json_safe(result)
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "grep") {
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let pattern: String = json_get(tool_input, "pattern")
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let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
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let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
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if !path_within_root(path, root) {
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return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
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}
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let result: String = exec_capture("grep -rn \"" + pattern + "\" " + resolve_in_root(path, root) + " 2>&1 | head -50")
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let result: String = exec_capture("grep -rn \"" + pattern + "\" " + path + " 2>&1 | head -50")
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return json_safe(result)
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}
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if str_eq(tool_name, "edit_file") {
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