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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tim Lingo 071c0eeb9f feat(agentic): scope file/command tools to an agent workspace root
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 5m7s
Confine the agentic file tools (read_file, write_file, list_files, grep)
to a configured workspace subtree via a lexical path check, and run
run_command with its cwd set to that root. Root comes from state key
"agent_workspace_root" or env NEURON_AGENT_ROOT. When no root is set,
behavior is unchanged (unscoped) for backward compatibility.

Defense-in-depth, NOT a hard boundary: the lexical guard does not resolve
symlinks and cannot stop an arbitrary shell command from cd-ing out of the
root. Real confinement needs runtime support (cwd-locked exec / sandbox-exec
/ chroot) in el_runtime.c.

Compile-checked with elc (darwin arm64); not link/run-gated locally
(darwin elb unavailable). Needs a soul build + smoke test before merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-17 23:49:01 -05:00
2 changed files with 102 additions and 15 deletions
+25 -10
View File
@@ -91,29 +91,44 @@ jobs:
echo "El SDK ready"
/opt/el/dist/platform/elc --version || true
- name: Generate ELP master declarations header
run: |
{
printf '/* Auto-generated C forward declarations for ELP cross-module calls */\n'
printf '#pragma once\n'
printf '#include "el_runtime.h"\n'
printf '\n'
grep -h -E '^(el_val_t|void|int|char\*|const char\*)[[:space:]]+[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*\(' dist/*.c 2>/dev/null \
| grep ';$' | sort -u
} > dist/elp-c-decls.h
echo "Generated elp-c-decls.h with $(grep -c ';' dist/elp-c-decls.h 2>/dev/null || echo 0) declarations"
- name: Build neuron soul binary
run: |
ELB=/opt/el/dist/bin/elb
ELC=/opt/el/dist/platform/elc
RUNTIME=/opt/el/runtime
# Compile all El modules to C via elb.
# elb fails at link on Linux (GNU ld rejects duplicate strong symbols that
# macOS ld accepts silently) — that's expected and captured with || true.
# The important output is dist/soul.c: the El compiler inlines all imported
# modules into the entry-point file, so soul.c is a self-contained
# translation unit. We never link the other dist/*.c files — they contain
# the same symbols inlined again, plus capability-violation #error guards
# that fire when compiled outside the cgi entrypoint.
# Compile all El modules to C.
# This step will fail at link on Linux: the El compiler inlines imported
# modules into each module's .c file, producing duplicate strong symbol
# definitions. GNU ld rejects these; macOS ld accepts them silently.
# We capture the link failure and re-link manually below.
$ELB --elc=$ELC --runtime=$RUNTIME/el_runtime.c || true
# Link only soul.c + the runtime. No --allow-multiple-definition needed.
# Re-link with soul.c listed first so its real main() (from the cgi block)
# wins over the stub main()s generated in every other module.
# --allow-multiple-definition tells GNU ld to pick the first definition
# for each duplicate symbol — safe here because all duplicates are identical
# (same El source compiled independently into multiple .c files).
mkdir -p dist
OTHER_C=$(ls dist/*.c | grep -v '/soul\.c$' | sort | tr '\n' ' ')
cc -O2 -DHAVE_CURL \
-I$RUNTIME \
dist/soul.c \
dist/soul.c $OTHER_C \
$RUNTIME/el_runtime.c \
-lssl -lcrypto -lcurl -lpthread -lm \
-Wl,--allow-multiple-definition \
-o dist/neuron
ls -lh dist/neuron
+77 -5
View File
@@ -377,16 +377,78 @@ fn call_neuron_mcp(tool_name: String, args: String) -> String {
return json_safe(result)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Agent workspace scope (defense-in-depth, NOT a hard security boundary).
//
// When a workspace root is configured (state key "agent_workspace_root", else
// env NEURON_AGENT_ROOT), the path-based tools (read_file, write_file,
// list_files, grep) are confined to that subtree by a lexical check, and
// run_command runs with its cwd set to the root. With no root set, behavior is
// unchanged (unscoped) for backward compatibility.
//
// LIMITATION FLAGGED FOR WILL'S REVIEW: this is a lexical guard. It does not
// resolve symlinks and cannot stop an arbitrary shell command from cd-ing out
// of the root. Real confinement needs runtime support (cwd-locked exec /
// sandbox-exec / chroot) in el_runtime.c. This raises the floor; it is not a
// boundary. The default-allow-when-unset policy and the "cd <root> && (...)"
// wrapping are deliberate choices to confirm against the intended design.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn agent_workspace_root() -> String {
let s: String = state_get("agent_workspace_root")
if !str_eq(s, "") {
return s
}
return env("NEURON_AGENT_ROOT")
}
// Allow if path stays under root. Empty root = no sandbox = allow. Rejects
// parent traversal and ~ expansion; absolute paths must live under root.
fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool {
if str_eq(root, "") {
return true
}
if str_contains(path, "..") {
return false
}
if str_starts_with(path, "~") {
return false
}
if str_starts_with(path, "/") {
return str_starts_with(path, root)
}
return true
}
// Resolve a relative tool path against the root so it lands inside the subtree.
fn resolve_in_root(path: String, root: String) -> String {
if str_eq(root, "") {
return path
}
if str_starts_with(path, "/") {
return path
}
return root + "/" + path
}
fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
if str_eq(tool_name, "read_file") {
let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
let content: String = fs_read(path)
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
let content: String = fs_read(resolve_in_root(path, root))
return json_safe(content)
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "write_file") {
let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
let content: String = json_get(tool_input, "content")
fs_write(path, content)
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
fs_write(resolve_in_root(path, root), content)
return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "web_get") {
@@ -401,7 +463,9 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "run_command") {
let cmd: String = json_get(tool_input, "command")
let result: String = exec_capture(cmd)
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
let scoped: String = if str_eq(root, "") { cmd } else { "cd " + root + " && ( " + cmd + " )" }
let result: String = exec_capture(scoped)
return json_safe(result)
}
// MCP connector tools (namespaced mcp__<server>__<tool>) are routed through
@@ -421,13 +485,21 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "list_files") {
let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
let result: String = exec_capture("ls -la " + path + " 2>&1")
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
let result: String = exec_capture("ls -la " + resolve_in_root(path, root) + " 2>&1")
return json_safe(result)
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "grep") {
let pattern: String = json_get(tool_input, "pattern")
let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
let result: String = exec_capture("grep -rn \"" + pattern + "\" " + path + " 2>&1 | head -50")
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
let result: String = exec_capture("grep -rn \"" + pattern + "\" " + resolve_in_root(path, root) + " 2>&1 | head -50")
return json_safe(result)
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "edit_file") {