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Author SHA1 Message Date
Tim Lingo 70646f867c fix(chat): agent write_file/edit_file no longer return false success receipts (BUG-29)
Root cause: dispatch_tool's write_file returned {"ok":true} without checking
fs_write's result, and edit_file returned ok:true even when old_text was absent
(str_replace silently no-ops) and its fs_write was also unchecked. Any failed
or no-op write fed the model a false success receipt, which it then repeated
to the user as fact.

The change (Receipt Contract rule 1 — a tool result must reflect what actually
happened):
- write_file: check fs_write's return (1 = all bytes written, 0 = fail);
  on failure return {"error":"write failed"} in the handler's existing
  error-JSON shape.
- edit_file: reject empty old_text, verify old_text is actually present
  (str_contains) before replacing, and check the fs_write result the same way.
- Verification is by operation result, NOT an fs_read read-back: fs_read arms
  the runtime's one-shot binary send length, the exact mechanism that truncated
  the safety-contact response (#96). Same honest-write pattern as that fix.

E2E evidence (sandboxed elb build, dispatch_tool driven directly):
- unpatched: write_file into a chmod-000 dir -> {"ok":true} (lie);
  edit_file with absent old_text -> {"ok":true} (lie, file untouched)
- patched:   same calls -> {"error":"write failed"} /
  {"error":"old_text not found in file"}; happy paths still ok:true
- scripts/verify-soul-contract.sh on the patched soul: GATE PASS (27/27
  presence + immutability)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 16:19:09 -05:00
will.anderson b784750f69 Merge pull request 'Fix truncated /api/safety-contact response (988 crisis-line)' (#96) from fix/safety-contact-truncation into hotfix/elc-source-typos 2026-07-21 17:16:13 +00:00
will.anderson a45a3ca379 Fix truncated POST/GET /api/safety-contact response
Saving the 988 crisis-line contact returned truncated, unparseable JSON —
cut mid-"set_at" at the file's byte length (e.g. 178 of a 218-byte
response). The contact written to disk was complete; only the HTTP response
was clipped, so a real customer's crisis-contact save came back corrupt.

Root cause is in the el runtime's response writer, not a handler buffer:
fs_read stores the file's byte count in a thread-local (_tl_fs_read_len)
for binary-safe file serving, and the response writer uses that length when
non-zero instead of strlen(body) (el_runtime.c:1409). Both safety-contact
handlers call fs_read (the POST read-back verify; the GET file read) and
then return a LONGER wrapped JSON string, so the response is capped to the
file size.

Soul-source fix (no runtime change needed):
- POST: verify persistence via fs_write's return (1 = all bytes written)
  instead of an fs_read read-back — removes the fs_read, so nothing caps the
  response.
- GET: fs_read is required, so reset the thread-local after it with a no-op
  fs_read("") (fs_read zeroes the length before it opens a path) so the
  wrapped response is sent in full.

Verified: POST (crisis-line + custom) and GET now return complete, valid
JSON (parses cleanly, full contact incl. set_at). Regenerated dist/soul.c +
dist/safety.c (3GB RSS watchdog, release el_runtime v1.0.0-20260501).
Full suite still green: verify-soul-contract GATE PASS (PRESENCE +
IMMUTABILITY), genesis boot survives (/health 200, no segfault), bounded-
persona floor still compiled in.

NOTE: the underlying runtime leak (any handler that fs_reads then returns a
longer string) is worth a proper fix in el_runtime.c (use the max of
strlen and _tl_fs_read_len) so this class can't recur.
2026-07-21 12:13:58 -05:00
will.anderson 9387c57c3b Merge pull request 'Fix #150: fresh-install genesis boot SIGSEGV in mem_save' (#95) from fix/genesis-boot-crash into hotfix/elc-source-typos 2026-07-21 16:53:52 +00:00
4 changed files with 45 additions and 12 deletions
+26 -2
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@@ -1706,7 +1706,17 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
fs_write(resolve_in_root(path, root), content)
// BUG-29 (Receipt Contract rule 1): fs_write's result was ignored, so a
// failed write (missing/unwritable dir, disk full) still returned
// {"ok":true} a false receipt fed straight to the model. Check the
// return (1 = all bytes written, 0 = fail), the same honest-write pattern
// as the safety-contact fix. A read-back via fs_read is deliberately NOT
// used here: fs_read arms the runtime's one-shot binary send length,
// which truncated longer HTTP responses (the #96 failure mode).
let write_ok: Int = fs_write(resolve_in_root(path, root), content)
if write_ok == 0 {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"write failed\"}")
}
return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "web_get") {
@@ -1784,8 +1794,22 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
if str_eq(content, "") {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"file not found\"}")
}
// BUG-29 (Receipt Contract rule 1): when old_text was absent (or empty),
// str_replace was a silent no-op and the handler still claimed ok:true
// a false receipt. Verify the text is actually present before replacing.
if str_eq(old_text, "") {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"old_text is required\"}")
}
if !str_contains(content, old_text) {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"old_text not found in file\"}")
}
let updated: String = str_replace(content, old_text, new_text)
fs_write(resolved, updated)
// BUG-29: the fs_write result was also unchecked a failed write still
// returned ok:true. Same honest-write check as write_file above.
let write_ok: Int = fs_write(resolved, updated)
if write_ok == 0 {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"write failed\"}")
}
return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "remember") {
Generated Vendored
+3 -3
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@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ el_val_t handle_safety_contact_get(void) {
if (str_eq(raw, EL_STR(""))) {
return EL_STR("{\"configured\":false}");
}
el_val_t _reset = fs_read(EL_STR(""));
return el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":"), raw), EL_STR("}"));
return 0;
}
@@ -359,9 +360,8 @@ el_val_t handle_safety_contact_post(el_val_t body) {
el_val_t crisis_str = ({ el_val_t _if_result_51 = 0; if (is_crisis) { _if_result_51 = (EL_STR("true")); } else { _if_result_51 = (EL_STR("false")); } _if_result_51; });
el_val_t now = time_format(time_now(), EL_STR("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"));
el_val_t contact_json = el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"name\":\""), json_safe(name)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"contact_method\":\"")), json_safe(method)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"contact_value\":\"")), json_safe(value)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"relationship\":\"")), json_safe(rel)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"confirmed\":true")), EL_STR(",\"is_crisis_line\":")), crisis_str), EL_STR(",\"set_at\":\"")), now), EL_STR("\"}"));
fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json);
el_val_t check = fs_read(safety_contact_path());
if (str_eq(check, EL_STR(""))) {
el_val_t write_ok = fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json);
if (write_ok == 0) {
return EL_STR("{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"write_failed\"}");
}
return el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":"), contact_json), EL_STR(",\"ok\":true}"));
Generated Vendored
+3 -3
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@@ -25754,6 +25754,7 @@ el_val_t handle_safety_contact_get(void) {
if (str_eq(raw, EL_STR(""))) {
return EL_STR("{\"configured\":false}");
}
el_val_t _reset = fs_read(EL_STR(""));
return el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":"), raw), EL_STR("}"));
return 0;
}
@@ -25773,9 +25774,8 @@ el_val_t handle_safety_contact_post(el_val_t body) {
el_val_t crisis_str = ({ el_val_t _if_result_51 = 0; if (is_crisis) { _if_result_51 = (EL_STR("true")); } else { _if_result_51 = (EL_STR("false")); } _if_result_51; });
el_val_t now = time_format(time_now(), EL_STR("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"));
el_val_t contact_json = el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"name\":\""), json_safe(name)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"contact_method\":\"")), json_safe(method)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"contact_value\":\"")), json_safe(value)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"relationship\":\"")), json_safe(rel)), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"confirmed\":true")), EL_STR(",\"is_crisis_line\":")), crisis_str), EL_STR(",\"set_at\":\"")), now), EL_STR("\"}"));
fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json);
el_val_t check = fs_read(safety_contact_path());
if (str_eq(check, EL_STR(""))) {
el_val_t write_ok = fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json);
if (write_ok == 0) {
return EL_STR("{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"write_failed\"}");
}
return el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":"), contact_json), EL_STR(",\"ok\":true}"));
+13 -4
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@@ -438,6 +438,12 @@ fn safety_contact_path() -> String {
fn handle_safety_contact_get() -> String {
let raw: String = fs_read(safety_contact_path())
if str_eq(raw, "") { return "{\"configured\":false}" }
// fs_read set the runtime's binary-safe send length to len(raw); the HTTP
// response writer uses that length when non-zero, which would TRUNCATE this
// wrapped (longer) response to len(raw). Reset it with a no-op read of a
// missing path (fs_read zeroes the length before it opens) so the full
// response is sent.
let _reset: String = fs_read("")
return "{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":" + raw + "}"
}
@@ -463,9 +469,12 @@ fn handle_safety_contact_post(body: String) -> String {
+ ",\"confirmed\":true"
+ ",\"is_crisis_line\":" + crisis_str
+ ",\"set_at\":\"" + now + "\"}"
fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json)
// Read-back verify the write actually persisted.
let check: String = fs_read(safety_contact_path())
if str_eq(check, "") { return "{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"write_failed\"}" }
// Verify persistence via fs_write's return (1 = all bytes written, 0 = fail).
// The previous fs_read read-back set the runtime's binary-safe send length to
// the file size, which then TRUNCATED this longer JSON response to that size
// (the safety-contact 988 response was cut mid-"set_at"). Checking the write
// return avoids the fs_read entirely, so the full response is sent.
let write_ok: Int = fs_write(safety_contact_path(), contact_json)
if write_ok == 0 { return "{\"ok\":false,\"error\":\"write_failed\"}" }
return "{\"configured\":true,\"contact\":" + contact_json + ",\"ok\":true}"
}