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Author SHA1 Message Date
will.anderson 47d0e6f985 fix(reliability): llm-retry — empty response detection, configurable max_tokens, connector timeout
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 11m16s
Issue #5: detect empty string from llm_extract_text() as an error in handle_chat,
handle_chat_as_soul, and handle_dharma_room_turn. The C runtime silently returns ""
when the LLM response content array is missing or all blocks fail to parse; without
this guard the empty string passes through to callers as a silent empty reply.

Issue #9: make agentic_loop max_tokens configurable via NEURON_LLM_MAX_TOKENS env
var (default 4096). The hardcoded value is marginal for long tool chains (8 iterations
x 4096 tokens); operators can now set 8192+ for complex multi-step tasks without
rebuilding. Non-agentic path (llm_call_system) still uses the C runtime hardcode —
that fix lives in el_runtime.c (see TODO block added in this commit).

Issue #10: increase connector_tools_json and tool_auto_approved curl --max-time from
2s to 5s to reduce false-empty tool lists when neuron-connectd is under transient
load. Graceful degradation to [] on bridge down is unchanged.

Issues #1/#2/#3/#4/#6/#8: documented as TODO comments in chat.el. These require
targeted C runtime changes in el_runtime.c (llm_provider_request retry loop,
EL_LLM_TIMEOUT_MS separation, HTTP 429 backoff, 5xx retry, EL_HTTP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES
cap). Architectural decisions recorded so they are traceable to root causes.
2026-06-22 11:59:43 -05:00
will.anderson deddb9a18e fix(reliability): safety-resilience — bell augmentation, safe mode, dedup logging, tab escaping, handle_chat coverage 2026-06-22 11:53:07 -05:00
6 changed files with 186 additions and 1046 deletions
+132 -756
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Generated Vendored
+14 -23
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@@ -22313,23 +22313,7 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
// In demo mode: use tighter engram budget and add response length constraint.
let is_demo: Bool = !str_eq(state_get("soul_identity_prefix"), "")
// Issue 7 fix: load history BEFORE building the activation seed so we can
// apply the continuation guard that chat.el uses. The nlg code path previously
// called engram_compile(message) with no thread enrichment at all.
let stored_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
let history_section: String = if hist_len > 0 {
"\n\n[RECENT CONVERSATION — last " + int_to_str(hist_len) + " turns]\n" + stored_hist
} else {
""
}
// Issue 7 fix: build enriched seed using build_activation_seed() adds
// smart continuation detection, prior-user-topic anchoring, multi-turn context,
// and tail-biased snipping (Issues 2-3, 8-10). For demo mode, still use
// engram_compile_demo but with the enriched seed.
let nlg_seed: String = build_activation_seed(message, stored_hist, hist_len)
let ctx: String = if is_demo { engram_compile_demo(nlg_seed) } else { engram_compile(nlg_seed) }
let ctx: String = if is_demo { engram_compile_demo(message) } else { engram_compile(message) }
let node_count_str: String = count_context_nodes(ctx)
let interlocutor: String = json_get(body, "interlocutor")
@@ -22349,6 +22333,18 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
let presence_line = "\n\n[ambient: I see " + interlocutor_name + rel_suffix + " on the camera right now. Address them naturally. Do not describe what they look like or narrate the picture unless asked.]"
}
// Conversation history soul-owned, persisted in process state across turns.
// Format stored in state: JSON array of {"role":"user"|"assistant","content":"..."} objects.
// We load it, inject into the system prompt, then append this exchange after the reply.
// Keep last 20 entries (10 turns) truncate from the front when over limit.
let stored_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
let history_section: String = if hist_len > 0 {
"\n\n[RECENT CONVERSATION — last " + int_to_str(hist_len) + " turns]\n" + stored_hist
} else {
""
}
// Demo constraint: keep responses concise under 150 words. No markdown headers.
// This keeps inference cheap and responses readable in the chat widget.
let demo_constraint: String = if is_demo {
@@ -22509,12 +22505,7 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
req_model
}
// Issue 7 fix: load history and use build_activation_seed() for the agentic
// nlg path no continuation guard existed here before (Issues 2-3, 8-10).
let nlg_ag_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
let nlg_ag_hist_len: Int = if str_eq(nlg_ag_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(nlg_ag_hist) }
let nlg_ag_seed: String = build_activation_seed(message, nlg_ag_hist, nlg_ag_hist_len)
let ctx: String = engram_compile(nlg_ag_seed)
let ctx: String = engram_compile(message)
let system: String = "You are Neuron — a thinking process running inside the Neuron daemon on Will Anderson's machine. "
+ "You are speaking with Will, your principal. "
+7 -107
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@@ -7,65 +7,6 @@ import "neuron-api.el"
import "sessions.el"
import "soul.elh"
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Rate limiting simple in-memory per-IP sliding window counter.
//
// State keys:
// rl:<ip>:count request count in the current window
// rl:<ip>:window window start timestamp (unix seconds)
//
// Limit: configurable via soul state key "soul_rate_limit" (requests per
// minute). Falls back to 60 req/min if not set. The /health endpoint is
// exempt so monitoring does not consume quota.
//
// State growth: each unique source IP accumulates exactly 2 state keys
// (count + window) for the lifetime of the process. Per-IP storage is
// bounded and constant; values reset on window expiry. In aggregate, state
// grows linearly with distinct IPs typical for a trusted-client service.
// EL has no state_delete builtin, so keys from inactive IPs persist.
// TODO: add state_delete sweep when the EL runtime exposes that primitive.
//
// Returns "" when the request is allowed, or a 429 JSON body when rejected.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
fn rate_limit_check(ip: String, path: String) -> String {
// Health checks are exempt they must never be blocked.
if str_eq(path, "/health") {
return ""
}
let limit_str: String = state_get("soul_rate_limit")
let limit: Int = if str_eq(limit_str, "") { 60 } else { str_to_int(limit_str) }
let now: Int = time_now()
let window_key: String = "rl:" + ip + ":window"
let count_key: String = "rl:" + ip + ":count"
let win_str: String = state_get(window_key)
let win_start: Int = if str_eq(win_str, "") { now } else { str_to_int(win_str) }
// New window every 60 seconds.
let elapsed: Int = now - win_start
let in_window: Bool = elapsed < 60
let prev_count_str: String = state_get(count_key)
let prev_count: Int = if str_eq(prev_count_str, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(prev_count_str) }
// Reset window if expired.
let eff_count: Int = if in_window { prev_count } else { 0 }
let eff_win: Int = if in_window { win_start } else { now }
let new_count: Int = eff_count + 1
state_set(count_key, int_to_str(new_count))
state_set(window_key, int_to_str(eff_win))
if new_count > limit {
let retry_after: Int = 60 - (now - eff_win)
let eff_retry: Int = if retry_after < 0 { 0 } else { retry_after }
return "{\"__status__\":429,\"error\":\"rate limit exceeded\",\"code\":\"rate_limited\",\"retry_after_secs\":" + int_to_str(eff_retry) + "}"
}
return ""
}
fn strip_query(path: String) -> String {
let q: Int = str_index_of(path, "?")
if q < 0 {
@@ -75,11 +16,11 @@ fn strip_query(path: String) -> String {
}
fn err_404(path: String) -> String {
return "{\"error\":\"not found\",\"code\":\"not_found\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
return "{\"error\":\"not found\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
}
fn err_405(method: String, path: String) -> String {
return "{\"error\":\"method not allowed\",\"code\":\"method_not_allowed\",\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
return "{\"error\":\"method not allowed\",\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"path\":\"" + path + "\"}"
}
fn route_health() -> String {
@@ -90,35 +31,12 @@ fn route_health() -> String {
let edge_ct: Int = engram_edge_count()
let pulse: String = state_get("soul.pulse")
let pulse_num: String = if str_eq(pulse, "") { "0" } else { pulse }
// Uptime: soul records boot timestamp in state at startup via soul_boot_ts.
// Compute elapsed seconds; fall back to -1 if not yet set.
let boot_ts_str: String = state_get("soul_boot_ts")
let uptime_secs: Int = if str_eq(boot_ts_str, "") {
-1
} else {
time_now() - str_to_int(boot_ts_str)
}
// LLM connectivity: probe with a minimal call. Any non-error reply = ok.
// Use a short, fixed prompt so this never counts against conversation history.
let model: String = state_get("soul_model")
let eff_model: String = if str_eq(model, "") { "claude-sonnet-4-5" } else { model }
let llm_probe: String = llm_call_system(eff_model, "You are a health probe. Reply with the single word: ok", "ping")
let llm_ok: Bool = !str_eq(llm_probe, "")
&& !str_starts_with(llm_probe, "{\"error\"")
&& !str_starts_with(llm_probe, "{\"type\":\"error\"")
&& !str_contains(llm_probe, "authentication_error")
let llm_status: String = if llm_ok { "ok" } else { "unreachable" }
return "{\"status\":\"alive\""
+ ",\"cgi_id\":\"" + cgi_id + "\""
+ ",\"boot\":" + boot_num
+ ",\"uptime_secs\":" + int_to_str(uptime_secs)
+ ",\"node_count\":" + int_to_str(node_ct)
+ ",\"edge_count\":" + int_to_str(edge_ct)
+ ",\"pulse\":" + pulse_num
+ ",\"llm\":\"" + llm_status + "\""
+ ",\"layers\":{\"l0\":\"core\",\"l1\":\"safety\",\"l2\":\"stewardship\",\"l3\":\"" + imprint_current() + "\"}}"
}
@@ -185,15 +103,15 @@ fn route_imprint_user(body: String) -> String {
fn route_synthesize(body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(body, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"body is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
return "{\"mechanism\":\"did not engage\"}"
}
let parent_a: String = json_get(body, "parent_a")
let parent_b: String = json_get(body, "parent_b")
if str_eq(parent_a, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"parent_a is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
return "{\"mechanism\":\"did not engage\"}"
}
if str_eq(parent_b, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"parent_b is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
return "{\"mechanism\":\"did not engage\"}"
}
let req: String = "synthesize " + parent_a + " " + parent_b
let tags: String = "[\"soul-inbox-pending\",\"synthesis-request\"]"
@@ -341,17 +259,6 @@ fn handle_connectors(method: String, clean: String, body: String) -> String {
fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
let clean: String = strip_query(path)
// Rate limit check. Extract caller IP from REMOTE_ADDR env var (set by the
// EL HTTP runtime for each request). Skip enforcement when empty so
// loopback/internal callers are never blocked.
let ip: String = env("REMOTE_ADDR")
if !str_eq(ip, "") {
let rl_result: String = rate_limit_check(ip, clean)
if !str_eq(rl_result, "") {
return rl_result
}
}
if str_eq(method, "POST") && str_eq(clean, "/dharma/recv") {
return handle_dharma_recv(body)
}
@@ -379,7 +286,7 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
let raw_msg: String = json_get(body, "message")
let eff_msg: String = if str_eq(raw_msg, "") { body } else { raw_msg }
if str_eq(eff_msg, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
return "{\"error\":\"message required\"}"
}
let agentic_flag: Bool = json_get_bool(body, "agentic")
let reply: String = if agentic_flag {
@@ -519,15 +426,8 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
return handle_elp_chat(body)
}
if str_eq(clean, "/api/chat") {
// NOTE: streaming (SSE / chunked transfer) is not implemented. All chat
// responses are buffered and returned as a single JSON object. Streaming
// would require runtime-level SSE support in el_runtime.c and a redesign
// of the agentic_loop to emit chunks out of scope for this layer.
let raw_msg: String = json_get(body, "message")
if str_eq(raw_msg, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"code\":\"missing_param\"}"
}
let agentic_flag: Bool = json_get_bool(body, "agentic")
let raw_msg: String = json_get(body, "message")
let reply: String = if agentic_flag {
handle_chat_agentic(body)
} else {
+19 -8
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@@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ fn safety_screen(input: String, history: String) -> String {
if score >= soft {
let summary: String = str_slice(input, 0, 80)
let discard: String = safety_log_bell("soft", "wellbeing check needed", summary)
// ISSUE 7: also escape tab chars to prevent JSON envelope corruption.
// ISSUE 7 fix: escape tab chars in addition to backslash/quote/newline/CR.
// A tab in user input corrupts the JSON envelope and causes json_get to misparse.
let e1: String = str_replace(input, "\\", "\\\\")
let e2: String = str_replace(e1, "\"", "\\\"")
let e3: String = str_replace(e2, "\n", "\\n")
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ fn safety_screen(input: String, history: String) -> String {
return "{\"action\":\"soft_bell\",\"reason\":\"wellbeing check needed\",\"content\":\"" + safe_input + "\"}"
}
// ISSUE 7: also escape tab chars (see soft_bell branch above).
// ISSUE 7 fix: escape tab chars (see soft_bell branch above for rationale).
let e1: String = str_replace(input, "\\", "\\\\")
let e2: String = str_replace(e1, "\"", "\\\"")
let e3: String = str_replace(e2, "\n", "\\n")
@@ -199,7 +200,10 @@ fn safety_validate(output: String, action: String) -> String {
fn safety_log_bell(level: String, reason: String, input_summary: String) -> String {
let content: String = "BELL:" + level + " | " + reason + " | summary:" + input_summary
let tags: String = "[\"safety\",\"bell\",\"bell:" + level + "\"]"
// ISSUE 2: fallback log when engram write fails silently.
// ISSUE 2 fix: if engram_node_full returns empty the write silently failed.
// Emit a fallback println so the bell event leaves at least a log trace even
// when engram is degraded. This does not replace engram persistence -- it is a
// last-resort audit trail when the primary write cannot be confirmed.
let node_id: String = engram_node_full(
content,
"BellEvent",
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ fn safety_log_bell(level: String, reason: String, input_summary: String) -> Stri
tags
)
if str_eq(node_id, "") {
println("[safety] WARN: bell engram write failed -- " + content)
println("[safety] WARN: bell event engram write failed -- fallback log: " + content)
}
return ""
}
@@ -240,13 +244,20 @@ fn safety_general_hard_phrases() -> String {
}
fn safety_soft_phrases() -> String {
return "[\"stressed\",\"overwhelmed\",\"can't cope\",\"cannot cope\",\"struggling\",\"anxious\",\"anxiety\",\"depressed\",\"depression\",\"lonely\",\"isolated\",\"hopeless\",\"hopelessness\",\"exhausted\",\"burnt out\",\"burned out\",\"burnout\",\"panic\",\"panicking\",\"falling apart\",\"breaking down\",\"can't handle\",\"cannot handle\",\"losing it\",\"nothing matters\",\"don't care anymore\",\"given up\",\"giving up\",\"helpless\",\"worthless\",\"useless\",\"hate myself\",\"no one cares\",\"nobody cares\",\"no one understands\",\"nobody understands\",\"empty inside\",\"can't stop crying\",\"breaking point\",\"at my limit\",\"having a breakdown\",\"highest structure\",\"tallest building\",\"tallest structure\",\"highest building\",\"bridge near me\",\"overpass near\",\"rooftop near\"]"
return "[\"stressed\",\"overwhelmed\",\"can't cope\",\"cannot cope\",\"struggling\",\"anxious\",\"anxiety\",\"depressed\",\"depression\",\"lonely\",\"isolated\",\"hopeless\",\"hopelessness\",\"exhausted\",\"burnt out\",\"burned out\",\"burnout\",\"panic\",\"panicking\",\"falling apart\",\"breaking down\",\"can't handle\",\"cannot handle\",\"losing it\",\"nothing matters\",\"don't care anymore\",\"given up\",\"giving up\",\"helpless\",\"worthless\",\"useless\",\"hate myself\",\"no one cares\",\"nobody cares\",\"no one understands\",\"nobody understands\",\"empty inside\",\"can't stop crying\",\"breaking point\",\"at my limit\",\"having a breakdown\"]"
}
// ISSUE 5 TODO: phrase lists are rebuilt from JSON literals on every call.
// json_array_len of malformed input returns 0, silently skipping all checks.
// Caching requires language-level static const arrays -- not in current EL.
// Migrate to const arrays when EL gains that feature.
// safety_any_match and safety_count_match loop over json_array_get on every invocation.
// A compiled/cached representation would reduce per-message overhead and also guard against
// malformed phrase JSON (json_array_len of malformed input returns 0, silently skipping all checks).
// Caching requires language-level static const arrays -- not available in current EL.
// When EL gains module-level const arrays, migrate phrase lists to that form.
//
// ISSUE 5 TODO: phrase lists are rebuilt from JSON literals on every call to
// safety_any_match / safety_count_match. json_array_len of a malformed string
// returns 0, silently skipping all checks. Caching requires language-level static
// const arrays (not available in current EL). Migrate when EL gains that feature.
// Matching helpers (single loops only el escapes while-body mutation via
// top-level let rebinds; nested loops would not advance) ────────────────────
+1 -139
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@@ -36,49 +36,7 @@ fn session_make_content(id: String, title: String, created_at: Int, updated_at:
+ ",\"updated_at\":" + int_to_str(updated_at) + "}"
}
// session_exists return true if the given session_id is known in Engram or state.
// Used by chat.el to validate a session_id before processing a chat message.
// Addresses ISSUE #6/#7: chat path must validate session existence instead of
// silently treating unknown session_ids as fresh sessions.
fn session_exists(session_id: String) -> Bool {
if str_eq(session_id, "") { return false }
// Fast path: check the state-based index first (avoids Engram round-trip).
let idx: String = state_get("session_index")
if !str_eq(idx, "") && !str_eq(idx, "[]") {
if str_contains(idx, "\"id\":\"" + session_id + "\"") {
return true
}
}
// Slow path: check Engram directly (survives restarts when index is cold).
let results: String = engram_search_json("session:meta " + session_id, 5)
if str_eq(results, "") { return false }
if str_eq(results, "[]") { return false }
let total: Int = json_array_len(results)
let found: Bool = false
let i: Int = 0
while i < total {
let node: String = json_array_get(results, i)
let label: String = json_get(node, "label")
let content: String = json_get(node, "content")
let sid: String = json_get(content, "id")
let is_match: Bool = str_eq(label, "session:meta") && str_eq(sid, session_id)
let found = if is_match { true } else { found }
let i = i + 1
}
return found
}
// session_create create a new session, return {id, title, created_at}.
//
// ISSUE #1: Ghost sessions on failed first message.
// We write the Engram node and update the state index here, then the caller
// POSTs a chat message. If that chat call fails (LLM unavailable, network
// error, etc.) the session is stranded with no messages. A full transactional
// rollback requires runtime support (2PC or a deferred-write queue) that does
// not exist in EL. Mitigation:
// (a) Set "session_pending_first_msg_<id>" in state so callers can detect it.
// (b) Provide session_create_cleanup() for callers that detect a failure.
// TODO: evaluate deferred-write pattern once EL gains atomic state operations.
fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
let ts: Int = time_now()
let id: String = uuid_v4()
@@ -97,13 +55,8 @@ fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
}
// Store the engram node_id mapping so we can look up the node for this session
state_set("session_node_" + id, node_id)
// Mark as pending first message so stale ghost sessions can be identified
// (e.g. if the caller\'s subsequent chat POST fails).
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + id, "1")
// Maintain a state-based index for fast listing within this daemon run.
// Newest sessions first (prepend).
// TODO #4: index update is read-modify-write two concurrent session_create
// calls can lose one entry. EL has no CAS primitive; fix requires runtime support.
let existing_idx: String = state_get("session_index")
let idx_entry: String = "{\"id\":\"" + id + "\",\"title\":\"" + json_safe(title) + "\",\"folder\":\"" + json_safe(folder) + "\",\"created_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + ",\"updated_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + ",\"last_message\":\"\"}"
let new_idx: String = if str_eq(existing_idx, "") {
@@ -120,20 +73,6 @@ fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
+ ",\"created_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + "}"
}
// session_create_cleanup undo a session_create when the caller\'s first chat
// fails. Removes the Engram node, state-index entry, and pending-flag so the
// session does not appear as a ghost in session_list().
// Addresses ISSUE #1: cleanup path for ghost sessions.
fn session_create_cleanup(session_id: String) -> String {
if str_eq(session_id, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"session_id is required\"}"
}
// Clear pending flag first so partial cleanup is still detectable.
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
// Delegate to session_delete which handles Engram + state index teardown.
return session_delete(session_id)
}
// session_list list all sessions. Returns [{id, title, last_message, created_at, updated_at}].
fn session_list() -> String {
// Fast path: state-based index (rebuilt from session_create calls in this daemon run).
@@ -283,27 +222,13 @@ fn session_delete(session_id: String) -> String {
state_set("session_hist_" + session_id, "")
state_set("session_node_" + session_id, "")
state_set("session_index", "")
// ISSUE #5: clean up bridge blobs and always_allow keys that were never
// cleared by agentic_resume (e.g. client abandoned a pending tool call).
// Without this, stranded bridge blobs accumulate indefinitely in state.
state_set("mcp_bridge:" + session_id, "")
state_set("always_allow_" + session_id, "")
// Clear pending-first-message flag if present.
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
return "{\"ok\":true,\"session_id\":\"" + session_id + "\""
+ ",\"deleted_meta\":" + int_to_str(deleted_meta)
+ ",\"deleted_msgs\":" + int_to_str(deleted_msgs) + "}"
}
// session_update_patch update a session\'s title and/or folder via PATCH body.
// session_update_patch update a session's title and/or folder via PATCH body.
// Body may contain "title", "folder", or both. Preserves unmentioned fields.
//
// ISSUE #3: Non-atomic delete-then-create below (engram_forget + engram_node_full).
// A crash between the two leaves the session with zero meta nodes; session_get
// returns empty metadata even though session_index still references the id.
// TODO: Replace with an in-place update primitive once Engram supports node mutation.
// Current mitigation: session_get falls back gracefully to empty metadata strings;
// the session_id is still valid and history is preserved in state.
fn session_update_patch(session_id: String, body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(session_id, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"session_id is required\"}"
@@ -424,9 +349,6 @@ fn session_hist_load(session_id: String) -> String {
// session_hist_save persist message history for a session to state and engram.
fn session_hist_save(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void {
state_set("session_hist_" + session_id, hist)
// Clear pending-first-message flag: once history is saved, the session
// is no longer in the ghost/pending state (ISSUE #1 mitigation).
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
// Delete old history node and write fresh one
let old_results: String = engram_search_json("session:messages:" + session_id, 3)
let o_total: Int = if str_eq(old_results, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(old_results) }
@@ -446,61 +368,9 @@ fn session_hist_save(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void {
el_from_float(0.6), el_from_float(0.6), el_from_float(0.9),
"Episodic", tags
)
// Session boundary emotional summary written once per session the first time
// a bell event has fired. The summary node is findable by future sessions via
// broad affective queries ("session:emotional-summary" or "bell distress session").
// It is NOT rewritten on every save the state flag prevents duplicate nodes.
let summary_written_key: String = "session_bell_summary_written:" + session_id
let already_written: String = state_get(summary_written_key)
if str_eq(already_written, "") {
let bell_count_key: String = "session_bell_count:" + session_id
let bell_count_raw: String = state_get(bell_count_key)
let bell_count: Int = if str_eq(bell_count_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(bell_count_raw) }
if bell_count > 0 {
let bell_level_key: String = "session_bell_level:" + session_id
let bell_signal_key: String = "session_bell_signal:" + session_id
let dominant_level: String = state_get(bell_level_key)
let last_signal: String = state_get(bell_signal_key)
let eff_level: String = if str_eq(dominant_level, "") { "soft" } else { dominant_level }
let eff_signal: String = if str_eq(last_signal, "") { "(no signal captured)" } else { last_signal }
let ts_now: Int = time_now()
let summary_content: String = "session:emotional-summary"
+ " | session:" + session_id
+ " | bell_count:" + int_to_str(bell_count)
+ " | dominant_level:" + eff_level
+ " | last_signal:" + eff_signal
+ " | ts:" + int_to_str(ts_now)
let summary_tags: String = "[\"session-emotional-summary\",\"affective\",\"bell:" + eff_level + "\",\"BellEvent\"]"
let summary_sal: String = if str_eq(eff_level, "hard") { el_from_float(0.95) } else { el_from_float(0.85) }
let sum_discard: String = engram_node_full(
summary_content,
"BellEvent",
"session:emotional-summary",
summary_sal,
summary_sal,
el_from_float(1.0),
"Episodic",
summary_tags
)
// Mark written so we do not create duplicate summary nodes as the
// session continues accumulating more turns.
state_set(summary_written_key, "1")
}
}
}
// session_update_meta_timestamp update the updated_at field in the session:meta node.
//
// ISSUE #2: No TTL / idle expiry mechanism. Sessions accumulate indefinitely.
// A sweep job (e.g. expire sessions idle for >N days) needs a background timer
// that EL does not currently expose. Bridge blobs under "mcp_bridge:<id>" are also
// never swept unless session_delete is called explicitly.
// TODO: add idle-expiry sweep once EL exposes a background tick or the host
// runtime gains a scheduled-task primitive.
//
// ISSUE #3 applies here too: delete-then-create is non-atomic. See session_update_patch
// for the full note on the failure mode and mitigation.
fn session_update_meta_timestamp(session_id: String) -> Void {
let results: String = engram_search_json("session:meta " + session_id, 10)
let total: Int = if str_eq(results, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(results) }
@@ -594,14 +464,6 @@ fn session_auto_title(session_id: String, first_message: String) -> Void {
// action: "allow" | "deny" | "always"
// Resumes the agentic loop from where it was paused.
//
// ISSUE #8: Reconnect/duplicate resume race. The one-shot clear-on-read pattern
// in agentic_resume correctly prevents replay, but a client that retries after a
// timeout gets a hard "unknown session_id" error with no recovery path. The
// conversation is permanently stuck in that case. Full idempotency (e.g. caching
// the last reply keyed by call_id) requires a new state structure.
// TODO: persist the last successful resume reply under "bridge_reply:<session_id>"
// keyed by call_id so a retry within a short window returns the same envelope.
//
// Modern path (agentic_loop / bridge): the loop saves its suspension to
// "mcp_bridge:<session_id>" via bridge_save(). On approval we dispatch_tool()
// if allowed (or build a denial string), then hand the result to agentic_resume()
+13 -13
View File
@@ -254,15 +254,16 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
// L0 (core) L1 (safety screen) L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) L2b (mission alignment) L3 (imprint) L1 (safety validate)
// Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers use one_cycle directly.
fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
let history: String = state_get("conversation_history")
let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
// L1 in: safety screen
let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
let screen_action: String = json_get(screen_result, "action")
// ISSUE 4: safe-mode guard. If safety_screen returned an invalid/empty action
// (engram failure or internal error), refuse rather than pass unscreened input.
// ISSUE 4: safe-mode guard -- if safety_screen returned invalid/empty action,
// refuse the turn rather than silently passing unscreened input to upper layers.
// Valid actions: "hard_bell", "soft_bell", "pass". Anything else = corrupt envelope.
let valid_action: Bool = str_eq(screen_action, "hard_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "soft_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "pass")
@@ -277,8 +278,8 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
// history where they could leak context to subsequent turns. They are persisted
// separately by safety_log_bell() into the Episodic tier with restricted labels.
//
// ISSUE 6: safety_log_bell already called inside safety_screen (line 140).
// Do NOT call it again here -- that would double-log every hard bell.
// ISSUE 6: safety_log_bell for hard bells is already called INSIDE safety_screen
// (safety.el line 140). Do NOT call it again here -- double-log avoided.
//
// safety_validate second param: when screen_action is "hard_bell", safety_validate
// receives the sentinel string "hard_bell" (not a normal screen action). The safety
@@ -320,13 +321,13 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
json_get(steward_result, "redirect_to")
}
// ISSUE 1: pre-LLM bell augmentation for layered_cycle path.
// safety_augment_system appends soft/hard directive to system prompt when bell fires,
// ensuring LLM processes message WITH the safety directive -- not just post-output gate.
// Stored in state as "layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum" for imprint_respond to use.
// TODO: wire directly when imprint_respond gains system_override param (imprint.el change).
// ISSUE 3 TODO: no semantic crisis detection. Keyword-only means signals that evade
// the phrase list pass with zero augmentation. Semantic layer = separate decision.
// ISSUE 1: apply pre-LLM bell augmentation on layered_cycle path.
// safety_augment_system injects soft/hard directive into system prompt before LLM call.
// Stored in state so imprint_respond can consume it.
// TODO: wire directly into imprint_respond when it accepts a system_override param.
// ISSUE 3 TODO: no semantic/embedding crisis detection. Keyword-only means signals
// evading the phrase list pass through with zero augmentation. Semantic layer is a
// separate architectural decision requiring embedding inference on every message.
let augmented_addendum: String = safety_augment_system("", raw_input)
state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", augmented_addendum)
@@ -387,7 +388,6 @@ load_identity_context()
seed_persona_from_env()
let boot_num: Int = mem_boot_count_inc()
state_set("soul_boot_count", int_to_str(boot_num))
state_set("soul_boot_ts", int_to_str(time_now()))
println("[soul] boot #" + int_to_str(boot_num))
emit_session_start_event()