fix(engine): excise the receipt, do not truncate at it — a leading receipt was erasing whole answers

CAUGHT BY A/B, AND ONLY BY A/B. The previous commit's receipt_strip assumed the receipt is
always TERMINAL and cut everything from the marker onward. It is not always terminal: once
receipt_rule told the model what [[RECEIPT ...]] means, the model sometimes LED with one and
wrote the answer underneath. Cutting at the marker then deleted the entire answer and the
turn returned {"error":"no response"}.

MEASURED, same prompt (two web searches, cited prose), fresh session each run:
    round-7 brain   4 / 4 answered   (471, 473, 473, 544 chars)
    round-8 brain   2 / 7 answered   (five {"error":"no response"})
This looked exactly like a flaky model. It was not — it was mine. Running the two brains
side by side on the same prompt is the only reason it was found, and it is the reason the
A/B is now part of how this class gets tested.

AFTER THE FIX, same protocol:
    round-7 brain   4 / 4   (473, 473, 473, 544)
    round-8 brain   4 / 4   (657, 657, 657, 673)

THE FIX: remove the [[...]] span and keep BOTH sides, instead of truncating at the marker.
An unterminated marker at position 0 is left completely alone — no rule about receipts is
worth erasing an answer over. Bounded four-pass loop rather than a conditional exit, because
rebinding the counter inside an if-expression is the block-expression shape that miscompiles
integer arithmetic under this elc (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1). Verified in the generated C:
    str_slice(rest, (e + 2), str_len(rest))   <- integer addition, correct
    el_str_concat(head, tail)                 <- string concat, correct
and zero el_str_concat(<ident>, str_len(...)) sites across all 49 modules.

SEAM PROOF (FIX C) rides on the same runs — a real two-search cited answer, inspected byte
by byte, in BOTH failure directions:
  missing separator (the round-7 "to.Good", bytes 77 2e 47): 0 hits. Sentence boundaries
    measure 2e 20 4d — "." SPACE "M".
  over-separation (a cited sentence shattered across paragraphs): 0 hits. The answer is one
    continuous paragraph with its sentences intact, which is the direction a blanket
    separator would have broken.

BUILT: sha256 77115f2733e794c5bc4ad1f55b1acaf658f8f4a91cccd423a2d633d94a726cbc

Refs neuron#109

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

chat.elh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// auto-generated by elc --emit-header — do not edit
+// auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn chat_default_model() -> String
 extern fn engram_numeric_valid(s: String) -> Bool
 extern fn parse_float_x100(s: String) -> Int
@@ -16,18 +16,35 @@ extern fn engram_nodes_merge(a: String, b: String) -> String
 extern fn id_in_seen(node_id: String, seen: String) -> Bool
 extern fn add_to_seen(seen: String, node_id: String) -> String
 extern fn engram_extract_ids(nodes_json: String) -> String
+extern fn affective_node_ts(node_json: String) -> Int
 extern fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String
 extern fn distill_transcript(transcript: String) -> String
 extern fn json_safe(s: String) -> String
 extern fn current_engine_note(model: String) -> String
+extern fn bounded_persona_floor() -> String
+extern fn operator_identity_block() -> String
 extern fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String
 extern fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_key(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_label(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn is_utility_request(body: String, session_id: String) -> Bool
+extern fn provenance_scan_urls(arr: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_add_sources(block: String, btype: String, has_cit: Bool, cit_raw: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_names(tools_used: String) -> String
+extern fn text_join_sep(accumulated: String, incoming: String, after_interruption: Bool) -> String
+extern fn receipt_rule() -> String
+extern fn receipt_strip(s: String) -> String
+extern fn tool_receipt(tools_used: String, sources: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim_with_bell_guard(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn clean_llm_response(s: String) -> String
-extern fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void
-extern fn conv_history_load() -> String
+extern fn conv_history_persist(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_load(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_history_record(session_id: String, user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String, receipt: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_block(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String, session_id: String) -> String
 extern fn session_preload_bullets(nodes: String, max_bullets: Int, snip_len: Int) -> String
+extern fn affective_context_prefix() -> String
 extern fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String
 extern fn handle_see(body: String) -> String
 extern fn studio_tools_json() -> String
@@ -37,6 +54,8 @@ extern fn llm_wire_format() -> String
 extern fn json_escape(s: String) -> String
 extern fn openai_chat_complete(model: String, base_url: String, api_key: String, safe_sys: String, messages_json: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_literal() -> String
+extern fn web_search_tool_json() -> String
+extern fn strip_client_web_search(tools_inner: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_with_web() -> String
 extern fn connector_tools_json() -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_all() -> String
@@ -46,6 +65,10 @@ extern fn call_neuron_mcp(tool_name: String, args: String) -> String
 extern fn agent_workspace_root() -> String
 extern fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool
 extern fn resolve_in_root(path: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn run_command_is_readonly(cmd: String) -> Bool
+extern fn cmd_abs_escape_at(cmd: String, root: String, needle: String) -> Bool
+extern fn run_command_guard(cmd: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn classify_tool_risk(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn is_builtin_tool(tool_name: String) -> Bool
 extern fn next_bridge_id() -> String

dist/elp-c-decls.h

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ el_val_t add_punct(el_val_t s, el_val_t intent);
 el_val_t add_to_seen(el_val_t seen, el_val_t node_id);
 el_val_t aff_try_slot(el_val_t slot_json, el_val_t aff_7d_ts, el_val_t acc_key);
 el_val_t affective_context_prefix(void);
+el_val_t is_utility_request(el_val_t body, el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t operator_identity_block(void);
+el_val_t provenance_add_sources(el_val_t block, el_val_t btype, el_val_t has_cit, el_val_t cit_raw, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t provenance_names(el_val_t tools_used);
+el_val_t provenance_scan_urls(el_val_t arr, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t text_join_sep(el_val_t accumulated, el_val_t incoming, el_val_t after_interruption);
+el_val_t receipt_rule(void);
+el_val_t receipt_strip(el_val_t s);
+el_val_t tool_receipt(el_val_t tools_used, el_val_t sources);
 el_val_t agent_number(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_person(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_workspace_root(void);
@@ -151,8 +160,12 @@ el_val_t cmd_abs_escape_at(el_val_t cmd, el_val_t root, el_val_t needle);
 el_val_t connectd_get(el_val_t suffix);
 el_val_t connectd_post(el_val_t suffix, el_val_t body);
 el_val_t connector_tools_json(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_load(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_hist_key(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_hist_label(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_block(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_load(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_history_record(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t user_msg, el_val_t assistant_msg, el_val_t receipt);
 el_val_t cop_article(el_val_t gender, el_val_t number, el_val_t definite);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_future(el_val_t prefix);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_perfect(el_val_t prefix);
@@ -782,7 +795,8 @@ el_val_t lang_profile_uga(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile_zh(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile(el_val_t code, el_val_t word_order, el_val_t morph_type, el_val_t has_case, el_val_t has_gender, el_val_t script_dir, el_val_t agreement, el_val_t null_subject);
 el_val_t lang_word_order(el_val_t profile);
-el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input);
+el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input, el_val_t session_id, el_val_t utility);
+el_val_t layered_generate(el_val_t prompt, el_val_t imprint_id, el_val_t session_id);
 el_val_t lex_class(el_val_t entry);
 el_val_t lex_form(el_val_t entry, el_val_t idx);
 el_val_t lex_pos(el_val_t entry);

dist/soul-with-nlg.el

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+// ╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+// ║ STALE BUNDLE — DO NOT BUILD. UNSAFE CHAT PATH.                           ║
+// ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
+// This concatenated bundle is a snapshot, not a source of truth, and it is stale in
+// a way that matters for safety: it wires /api/chat straight to handle_chat and
+// contains NO layered_cycle at all (verified: zero occurrences in the bundled code —
+// the only textual hit in this file is this banner). A binary built from
+// this file would run chat with no enforcing input gate (no safety_screen, no
+// hard-bell short-circuit) and no enforcing output gate (no safety_validate).
+//
+// Build from the .el sources via manifest.el (entry soul.el), or from dist/soul.c.
+// Nothing in the repo references this file. It is kept only as a historical artifact
+// and should be deleted once Will confirms nothing external depends on it.
+// (Flagged 2026-08-04 in _engine-websearch-20260804/SAFETY-STOP.md; banner added
+// 2026-08-05 with the plain-chat generation fix.)
 // language-profile.el - Language profile data and accessors.
 //
 // A language profile is a slot map ([String] key-value list) describing the

dist/soul.c

@@ -28170,7 +28170,7 @@ el_val_t agentic_loop(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t model, el_val_t safe_sys, el
     state_set(el_str_concat(EL_STR("run_progress_"), session_id), EL_STR(""));
   }
   while (keep_going && (iteration < 8)) {
-    el_val_t req_body = el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"model\":\""), model), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"max_tokens\":4096")), EL_STR(",\"system\":\"")), safe_sys), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"tools\":")), tools_json), EL_STR(",\"messages\":")), messages), EL_STR("}"));
+    el_val_t req_body = el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(el_str_concat(EL_STR("{\"model\":\""), model), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"max_tokens\":4096,\"tool_choice\":{\"type\":\"auto\",\"disable_parallel_tool_use\":true}")), EL_STR(",\"system\":\"")), safe_sys), EL_STR("\"")), EL_STR(",\"tools\":")), tools_json), EL_STR(",\"messages\":")), messages), EL_STR("}"));
     el_val_t raw_resp = http_post_with_headers(api_url, req_body, h);
     el_val_t is_error = ((str_starts_with(raw_resp, EL_STR("{\"error\"")) || str_starts_with(raw_resp, EL_STR("{\"type\":\"error\""))) || str_contains(raw_resp, EL_STR("authentication_error")));
     if (is_error) {

routes.el

@@ -15,6 +15,40 @@ fn flag_true(body: String, key: String) -> Bool {
     return json_get_bool(body, key) || json_get_int(body, key) > 0
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// plain_chat_envelope — the JSON response contract for a non-agentic ("Tools: Off")
+// chat turn. Every /api/chat dispatch that calls layered_cycle goes through here, so
+// the three call sites cannot drift apart.
+//
+// WHY THE ENVELOPE IS BUILT HERE AND NOT INSIDE layered_cycle:
+// layered_cycle returns the user-facing text AFTER safety_validate has acted on it.
+// Keeping the JSON out of the cycle means the output gate always sees raw model text
+// and never an escaped blob — there is nothing to unwrap and re-wrap on the crisis
+// path, which is exactly the failure mode that made wiring handle_chat unsafe.
+// Escaping is the last thing that happens, strictly after the gate.
+//
+// FIELDS: `reply` and `response` carry the same validated text. Both are required by
+// live clients — the desktop app reads `reply` first (DaemonClient.parseChatResponse),
+// while the CLI tools and the Telegram gateway read `response` (the gateway reads only
+// `response`). Emitting one would break the other.
+//
+// EMPTY MEANS FAILURE, NOT AN EMPTY ANSWER: a hard bell returns the fixed crisis
+// message and a soft bell is padded to non-empty by safety_validate, so the only way
+// an empty string leaves the cycle is a failed model call. It is reported as an error
+// rather than dressed up as a successful blank reply.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+fn plain_chat_envelope(validated: String, model: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(validated, "") {
+        return "{\"error\":\"llm unavailable\",\"reply\":\"\",\"response\":\"\",\"agentic\":false,\"tools_used\":[]}"
+    }
+    let safe: String = json_safe(validated)
+    return "{\"reply\":\"" + safe + "\""
+        + ",\"response\":\"" + safe + "\""
+        + ",\"model\":\"" + json_safe(model) + "\""
+        + ",\"agentic\":false"
+        + ",\"tools_used\":[]}"
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Rate limiting — simple in-memory per-IP sliding window counter.
 //
@@ -243,8 +277,14 @@ fn handle_dharma_recv(body: String) -> String {
         } else if agentic_flag {
             handle_chat_agentic(chat_body)
         } else {
-            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
-            screened_reply
+            // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off"): the full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle, which now generates
+            // at L3 instead of echoing. Envelope built outside the cycle — see
+            // plain_chat_envelope.
+            // FIX B/E1 (2026-08-05): the cycle is told which conversation it is in, and
+            // whether this generation is conversation at all. Same two arguments at all
+            // three dispatch sites.
+            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(chat_body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(chat_body, json_get(chat_body, "session_id")))
+            plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
         }
         auto_persist(chat_body, reply)
         return reply
@@ -416,8 +456,11 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
             } else if agentic_flag {
                 handle_chat_agentic(body)
             } else {
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg)
-                screened_reply
+                // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — same cycle and same envelope as POST.
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. A GET probe usually carries no session_id, which
+                // resolves to the anonymous window — the documented behaviour for this door.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
+                plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)
             return reply
@@ -580,8 +623,13 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
             } else if agentic_flag {
                 handle_chat_agentic(body)
             } else {
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
-                screened_reply
+                // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — the app's DEFAULT mode (AgentMode.NEVER).
+                // Full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle with real generation at L3; envelope built
+                // outside the cycle so safety_validate always sees raw text.
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. This is the app's main plain-chat door, so this
+                // is the site that ends the blank stare in practice.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
+                plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)
             return reply

soul.el

@@ -379,9 +379,23 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
 // layered_cycle — routes user-facing requests through the 4-layer consciousness stack.
 // L0 (core) → L1 (safety screen) → L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) → L2b (mission alignment) → L3 (imprint) → L1 (safety validate)
 // Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers — use one_cycle directly.
-fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
-    let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
+//
+// FIX B (2026-08-05) — the cycle now knows which conversation it is in.
+//
+// session_id: the caller's session, threaded from the route. Was previously read from the
+// state key "current_session_id", which is read HERE and written NOWHERE in the entire
+// source — verified across every .el file. So this value was unconditionally "", and every
+// downstream consumer of it silently fell back to a process-global bucket: conversation
+// history, and the steward's continuity tracking (TODO reliability #4, below, describes the
+// cross-session bleed this caused; threading the real id closes it). The plain path's blank
+// stare and the agentic path's scoped history were the same defect seen from two sides.
+//
+// utility: true when the generation is not part of the user's conversation — the app's
+// title and insight passes. Answered normally, never recorded. See is_utility_request.
+fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String {
+    // Safety-screen history amplification now reads the SAME window the turn will be
+    // recorded into, so a session's own escalation pattern is what gets scored.
+    let history: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(session_id))
 
     // L1 in: safety screen
     let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
@@ -423,8 +437,10 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     let cont_action: String = json_get(continuity, "action")
 
     // Store continuity status so imprint can adjust its response register.
-    // TODO(reliability #4): session_continuity is process-global; scope per session_id
-    // when available to prevent cross-session bleed under concurrent layered_cycle calls.
+    // TODO(reliability #4) CLOSED 2026-08-05: this line was already written to scope per
+    // session — it just never received a session id, because the only source was a state key
+    // nothing wrote. It is now threaded from the route, so named sessions genuinely get their
+    // own continuity state and only anonymous callers share the global one.
     let cont_key: String = if str_eq(session_id, "") { "session_continuity" } else { "session_continuity:" + session_id }
     state_set(cont_key, cont_status)
 
@@ -453,40 +469,24 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     let lc_aff_cutoff: Int = time_now() - 259200
     let lc_bell_nodes: String = engram_search_json("bell:soft bell:hard BellEvent affective", 2)
     let lc_has_bell: Bool = !str_eq(lc_bell_nodes, "") && !str_eq(lc_bell_nodes, "[]")
+    // CRASH FIX 2026-08-05 (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1): the " | ts:" parser used to be inline here.
+    // Inside this block-expression initializer elc compiled `lbmp + str_len(lbm)` to
+    // el_str_concat() on two integers, which segfaulted the whole daemon the moment a
+    // distress turn followed an earlier affective turn — i.e. exactly on the crisis path.
+    // Verified against the unmodified baseline binary AND present in the committed
+    // dist/soul.c. affective_node_ts() is a top-level function, where the same expression
+    // compiles to integer addition. Do not inline it back.
     let lc_bell_note: String = if lc_has_bell {
         let lb0: String = json_array_get(lc_bell_nodes, 0)
-        let lb_c: String = json_get(lb0, "content")
-        let lbm: String = " | ts:"
-        let lbmp: Int = str_index_of(lb_c, lbm)
-        let lb_ts_raw: String = if lbmp >= 0 {
-            let lbs: Int = lbmp + str_len(lbm)
-            let lbr: String = str_slice(lb_c, lbs, str_len(lb_c))
-            let lbn: Int = str_index_of(lbr, " | ")
-            if lbn < 0 { lbr } else { str_slice(lbr, 0, lbn) }
-        } else {
-            let lbca: String = json_get(lb0, "created_at")
-            if str_eq(lbca, "") { json_get(lb0, "updated_at") } else { lbca }
-        }
-        let lb_ts: Int = if str_eq(lb_ts_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(lb_ts_raw) }
+        let lb_ts: Int = affective_node_ts(lb0)
         if lb_ts > lc_aff_cutoff { "[AFFECTIVE NOTE: User was in distress in a recent session.]" } else { "" }
     } else { "" }
     let lc_pos_nodes: String = engram_search_json("PositiveEvent joy:high joy:low affective", 2)
     let lc_has_pos: Bool = !str_eq(lc_pos_nodes, "") && !str_eq(lc_pos_nodes, "[]")
+    // Same crash fix as the bell note above (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1).
     let lc_pos_note: String = if lc_has_pos && str_eq(lc_bell_note, "") {
         let lp0: String = json_array_get(lc_pos_nodes, 0)
-        let lp_c: String = json_get(lp0, "content")
-        let lpm: String = " | ts:"
-        let lpmp: Int = str_index_of(lp_c, lpm)
-        let lp_ts_raw: String = if lpmp >= 0 {
-            let lps: Int = lpmp + str_len(lpm)
-            let lpr: String = str_slice(lp_c, lps, str_len(lp_c))
-            let lpn: Int = str_index_of(lpr, " | ")
-            if lpn < 0 { lpr } else { str_slice(lpr, 0, lpn) }
-        } else {
-            let lpca: String = json_get(lp0, "created_at")
-            if str_eq(lpca, "") { json_get(lp0, "updated_at") } else { lpca }
-        }
-        let lp_ts: Int = if str_eq(lp_ts_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(lp_ts_raw) }
+        let lp_ts: Int = affective_node_ts(lp0)
         if lp_ts > lc_aff_cutoff { "[AFFECTIVE NOTE: User shared positive news in a recent session.]" } else { "" }
     } else { "" }
     let lc_affective_note: String = if !str_eq(lc_bell_note, "") { lc_bell_note } else { lc_pos_note }
@@ -498,11 +498,47 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     }
     state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", augmented_addendum)
 
-    // L3: imprint responds
-    let output: String = imprint_respond(aligned, imprint_id)
+    // L3: imprint responds — applies the active imprint's voice/domain annotation to the
+    // steward-aligned input. This produces the PROMPT, not the answer.
+    let prompt: String = imprint_respond(aligned, imprint_id)
 
-    // L1 out: validate output before delivery
-    return safety_validate(output, screen_action)
+    // L3b: the imprint SPEAKS (added 2026-08-05).
+    //
+    // Until now the cycle stopped at the annotation above, so /api/chat with agentic:false
+    // handed the user's own screened text back as the "reply" — every gate ran, but nothing
+    // ever generated. The generation is placed HERE, inside the cycle, rather than by
+    // pointing the route at handle_chat(): handle_chat has no enforcing input gate and no
+    // enforcing output gate, so calling it instead of this cycle would have traded the whole
+    // safety pipeline for a working reply. Composing keeps both.
+    //
+    // Order is deliberate and must not be rearranged: this call sits strictly AFTER the L1
+    // screen, the safe-mode guard, the hard-bell short-circuit and the L2 stewardship layers,
+    // and strictly BEFORE the L1 output gate. A hard bell never reaches a model — the branch
+    // above returns first. Tools are not offered on this turn; see layered_generate.
+    let output: String = layered_generate(prompt, imprint_id, session_id)
+
+    // L1 out: validate output before delivery. Still the terminal gate — nothing below this
+    // line can change the string this function returns.
+    let validated: String = safety_validate(output, screen_action)
+
+    // Turn bookkeeping. Records the VALIDATED text, never the raw model output, and is only
+    // reachable on the non-bell path: both bell branches above return before this point, so
+    // bell turns still never enter conversation history. Pure state side effect — it cannot
+    // alter what is returned.
+    //
+    // FIX A: the receipt is unconditional and always negative on this path, because on this
+    // path it is structurally true — layered_generate offers no tools at all (build_system_prompt
+    // chat mode + a request body with no "tools" key). Recording "no tools ran" is not padding:
+    // it is the only thing that distinguishes "nothing ran" from "we forgot to write down what
+    // ran", and that ambiguity is what made the model confess to a search it had performed.
+    //
+    // FIX E1: a utility generation is answered but not recorded. Guarded here rather than at
+    // the route so every /api/chat dispatch site inherits it from one place.
+    let receipt: String = tool_receipt("", "")
+    if !utility {
+        conv_history_record(session_id, raw_input, validated, receipt)
+    }
+    return validated
 }
 
 let soul_cgi_id_raw: String = env("SOUL_CGI_ID")

soul.elh

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 // auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn init_soul_edges() -> Void
+extern fn ensure_self_canonical_bridge() -> Void
+extern fn aff_try_slot(slot_json: String, aff_7d_ts: Int, acc_key: String) -> Void
 extern fn load_identity_context() -> Void
 extern fn seed_persona_from_env() -> Void
 extern fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void
-extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String