chat.el

@@ -1680,8 +1680,16 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
         if !path_within_root(path, root) {
             return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
         }
-        fs_write(resolve_in_root(path, root), content)
-        return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
+        // BUG-6 fix (2026-07-17): never claim ok without disk truth. fs_write's result was
+        // never checked, so a failed write reported ok — the exact false-receipt failure
+        // the run guards exist to kill. Verify the file landed and return the RESOLVED
+        // path so callers and the model can only narrate what is really on disk.
+        let dest: String = resolve_in_root(path, root)
+        fs_write(dest, content)
+        if !fs_exists(dest) {
+            return json_safe("{\"error\":\"write failed - nothing landed at " + dest + "\"}")
+        }
+        return json_safe("{\"ok\":true,\"path\":\"" + dest + "\"}")
     }
     if str_eq(tool_name, "web_get") {
         let url: String = json_get(tool_input, "url")
@@ -1935,8 +1943,24 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
     // no root (or cleared the field), and we must not overwrite a server-configured root
     // from NEURON_AGENT_ROOT with an empty string, which would silently un-scope the agent.
     let ws_root: String = json_get(body, "agent_workspace_root")
+    // BUG-LEAK fix (2026-07-16): the root used to live ONLY in the shared key, so any
+    // request that omitted it INHERITED the previous session's folder (proven: a rootless
+    // curl session wrote into another session's run folder). Now each session keeps its
+    // own copy, and every request RE-ASSERTS its own root (possibly empty) into the shared
+    // key the tool guards read — no session can ever act under another session's root.
+    // Empty state still falls through to env NEURON_AGENT_ROOT inside
+    // agent_workspace_root(), so a server-configured root survives unchanged.
+    // LIMITATION (for review): assumes serialized request handling; true per-call scoping
+    // means threading session_id through dispatch_tool/classify — deeper change, Will's call.
+    let sess_for_root: String = json_get(body, "session_id")
     if !str_eq(ws_root, "") {
+        if !str_eq(sess_for_root, "") {
+            state_set("agent_workspace_root_" + sess_for_root, ws_root)
+        }
         state_set("agent_workspace_root", ws_root)
+    } else {
+        let own_root: String = if str_eq(sess_for_root, "") { "" } else { state_get("agent_workspace_root_" + sess_for_root) }
+        state_set("agent_workspace_root", own_root)
     }
 
     // L1 safety screen — agentic path must pass the same gate as layered_cycle.
@@ -2066,6 +2090,14 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
 
     // Use caller-supplied session_id if provided, otherwise generate a bridge id.
     let session_id: String = if str_eq(req_session, "") { next_bridge_id() } else { req_session }
+    // PAUSE-CONTRACT fix (2026-07-16): honor the client's require_approval field — the
+    // Phase 1c contract ("the soul pauses on EVERY tool; the client's tier gate decides
+    // what actually prompts") was never implemented engine-side, which made the client's
+    // Ask autonomy silently inert for builtin sub-escalate tools. Persisted per session
+    // (set/reset on every request) so the /approve resume path keeps the same behavior
+    // for the rest of the run. Absent/false = behavior identical to before this fix.
+    let req_ask_all: String = json_get(body, "require_approval")
+    state_set("require_approval_" + session_id, if str_eq(req_ask_all, "true") { "true" } else { "" })
     // Provider fork: OpenAI-compatible providers (Ollama/OpenAI/Grok/Gemini) take the plain-completion
     // path (v1, no tools); everything else stays on the Anthropic agentic loop (the default).
     let use_openai: Bool = !str_eq(llm_base_url(), "") && str_eq(llm_wire_format(), "openai")
@@ -2134,6 +2166,12 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
 fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json: String, messages_in: String, h: Map, tools_log_in: String) -> String {
     let api_url: String = "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages"
 
+    // PAUSE-CONTRACT fix (2026-07-16): when the client asked to approve every action
+    // (require_approval on the request, persisted per session), EVERY tool turn bridges —
+    // the client's tier gate decides what actually prompts vs auto-continues. Read from
+    // session state so the /approve resume re-entry keeps the same behavior mid-run.
+    let ask_all: Bool = !str_eq(session_id, "") && str_eq(state_get("require_approval_" + session_id), "true")
+
     let messages: String = messages_in
     let final_text: String = ""
     let tools_log: String = tools_log_in
@@ -2220,7 +2258,10 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
         // confirm). Escalated calls suspend to the client's consent flow; the
         // /approve round-trip is the only path that executes them.
         let risk_tier: String = if is_tool_turn { classify_tool_risk(tool_name, tool_input) } else { "" }
-        let needs_bridge: Bool = is_tool_turn && (str_eq(risk_tier, "escalate") || (!is_builtin_tool(tool_name) && !is_always_allowed))
+        // PAUSE-CONTRACT fix (2026-07-16): ask_all bridges EVERYTHING — stricter only.
+        // Escalate keeps its unconditional bridge; "always allow" shortcuts never apply
+        // under ask_all (the client owns its own standing grants at its tier gate).
+        let needs_bridge: Bool = is_tool_turn && (ask_all || str_eq(risk_tier, "escalate") || (!is_builtin_tool(tool_name) && !is_always_allowed))
 
         // Built-in tools dispatch locally; bridged tools yield "" (never sent upstream).
         let tool_result_raw: String = if is_tool_turn && !needs_bridge { dispatch_tool(tool_name, tool_input) } else { "" }
@@ -2360,6 +2401,10 @@ fn agentic_resume(session_id: String, tool_use_id: String, content: String) -> S
     if str_eq(blob, "") {
         return "{\"error\":\"unknown session_id\",\"reply\":\"\"}"
     }
+    // BUG-LEAK fix (2026-07-16): re-assert THIS session's own workspace root before the
+    // loop continues — a resume must never run under whatever root the last unrelated
+    // request happened to leave in the shared key.
+    state_set("agent_workspace_root", state_get("agent_workspace_root_" + session_id))
 
     let model: String = json_get(blob, "model")
     let safe_sys: String = json_get(blob, "safe_sys")

docs/NARRATED-RUNS-ENGINE-NOTES-20260713.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Narrated runs — engine notes for Will (2026-07-13)
+
+Source half: commit aa67f86 on feat/agent-phase1-soul (run-progress ledger,
+`/api/run-progress/<sid>` route, narration on the pause envelope, config display
+default). E2E-verified via the compiled test bed on Tim's clean profile.
+
+Compiled-form-only fixes (in `neuron-container-build/soul-narrated-runs-20260713.patch`,
+applies ON TOP of `soul-webfix-20260711.patch` — these need porting to chat.el when the
+webfix itself is ported):
+
+1. **pause_turn + tool_use interleave**: a pause_turn response can ALSO carry a client
+   tool_use; resuming verbatim leaves it unpaired → Anthropic 400 "tool_use ids were
+   found without tool_result". Fix: tool-bearing pause rounds are tool turns
+   (dispatch + pair); verbatim resume only when the round has no client tool.
+2. **Agentic toolset scope**: agentic_tools_all() fed EVERY connector/MCP tool (Notion,
+   code-execution…) into the loop. Code-execution flips the API into programmatic
+   tool calling, whose pairing protocol the single-tool manual loop does not speak —
+   source of the dangling-pair 400s AND the bash_code_execution workspace-dodge.
+   Fix: handle_chat_agentic declares builtins + ONE server web_search only.
+   Connector tools return when the loop gains real multi-tool/programmatic support.
+3. **disable_parallel_tool_use: true** on agentic requests — the loop captures only the
+   first tool_use per round; Opus-class models parallel-call. Enforce the invariant.
+4. **web_search server-tool default variant → web_search_20250305 (GA)**. The 20260209
+   variant couples to code-execution ⇒ programmatic mode (see #2, and the June note:
+   "inert unless code-execution attached").
+5. **Homegrown web_search removed** from the tool catalog (server-side is the one tool).
+
+Known engine debts this work surfaced (not fixed):
+
+- **Poisoned session history**: a failed run persists the malformed assistant turn; every
+  later turn in that session replays it and 400s. Needs history sanitation on load.
+- **Huge-history invalid-escape 400** (~346KB request) — likely the same poisoned blob.
+- **macOS note**: replacing a binary in place invalidates its ad-hoc signature (instant
+  silent SIGKILL, looks like exit 0). `rm + cp + codesign -f -s -` is the swap ritual.

sessions.el

@@ -677,6 +677,11 @@ fn handle_session_approve(session_id: String, body: String) -> String {
     // path for all sessions created through handle_chat_agentic / agentic_loop.
     let bridge_blob: String = state_get("mcp_bridge:" + session_id)
     if !str_eq(bridge_blob, "") {
+        // BUG-LEAK fix (2026-07-16): the approved tool executes below via dispatch_tool,
+        // whose path/command guards read the shared workspace-root key. Re-assert THIS
+        // session's own root first — an approval must never execute under whatever root
+        // the last unrelated request left behind.
+        state_set("agent_workspace_root", state_get("agent_workspace_root_" + session_id))
         // For "always": record tool_name in the always-allow list before resuming.
         // The tool_name is not stored in the bridge blob (only tool_use_id is).
         // Accept it from the body so the client can pass it along.
@@ -708,7 +713,13 @@ fn handle_session_approve(session_id: String, body: String) -> String {
         // For builtin tools with no client-provided content: fall back to
         // dispatch_tool so those tools still execute correctly.
         let client_content: String = json_get(body, "content")
-        let use_client_content: Bool = !str_eq(client_content, "")
+        // BUG-6 fix (2026-07-17): the naive json_get scanner matches "content" ANYWHERE
+        // in the body — including INSIDE tool_input — so every approved write_file (whose
+        // input always carries a content field) was mistaken for client-executed, never
+        // dispatched, and narrated as done: a false receipt with no file on disk. Builtin
+        // tools now ALWAYS dispatch server-side; client content is only honored for
+        // non-builtin (MCP/client-executed) tools. Stricter only.
+        let use_client_content: Bool = !str_eq(client_content, "") && !is_builtin_tool(approve_tool_name)
         let use_dispatch: Bool = is_builtin_tool(approve_tool_name) && !use_client_content
         let raw_input: String = json_get_raw(body, "tool_input")
         let eff_input: String = if str_eq(raw_input, "") { "{}" } else { raw_input }