vault: GCE Raft HA cluster replacing defunct Legion k3s deployment

Legion is offline. Vault needs a GCP-native home. This commit provisions
a 3-node Vault HA cluster on GCE e2-small VMs (us-central1 a/b/c) backed
by Raft consensus with GCP KMS auto-unseal already in place.

- vault-nodes.tf: 3 VMs with separate pd-ssd data disks (prevent_destroy),
  IAP-only SSH firewall, Raft peer firewall (8201), global HTTPS LB for
  vault.neuralplatform.ai with Google-managed cert, HTTP health checks
  against /v1/sys/health
- vault/startup.sh: idempotent boot script — installs Vault from HashiCorp
  APT repo, mounts/formats the data disk, writes Raft config with dynamic
  retry_join peers resolved via gcloud metadata, starts vault.service
- vault-auth-gcp.tf: GCP Secret Manager secret for init script; outputs
  the service account emails needed for GCP auth roles
- vault/configure-vault-auth.sh: post-init script to enable gcp auth
  method, write marketing-policy and soma-policy, bind roles to Cloud Run
  service account identities

After apply: set vault_lb_ip output as A record for vault.neuralplatform.ai
in Cloudflare, then run vault operator init on vault-node-1 to bootstrap.
This commit is contained in:
Will Anderson
2026-05-04 10:17:12 -05:00
parent 89564ccec7
commit 246368c132
4 changed files with 750 additions and 0 deletions
+48
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# ── Vault GCP IAM Auth Method — GCP IAM for Cloud Run services ───────────────
#
# This file defines the GCP Secret Manager secret that holds the Vault GCP
# auth configuration script, and the Vault policies for each service identity.
#
# IMPORTANT: The Vault Terraform provider is NOT configured in this workspace.
# The actual Vault auth method configuration is performed by running:
#
# servers/gcp/vault/configure-vault-auth.sh
#
# That script uses the `vault` CLI and must be run AFTER:
# 1. The vault-nodes are up and initialized (vault operator init on node-1)
# 2. VAULT_ADDR and VAULT_TOKEN are set in the environment
#
# Why no Vault Terraform provider here:
# - Adding the provider requires a working Vault cluster at `terraform init`
# - The cluster doesn't exist yet when this plan is first applied
# - The provider would encode the root token in TF state (undesirable)
# - A shell script run once post-bootstrap is simpler and more auditable
#
# If you want to add the Vault provider in a future iteration, the script
# below maps directly to `vault_auth_backend`, `vault_policy`, and
# `vault_gcp_auth_backend_role` resources.
# ── GCP Secret Manager secret for Vault auth init script ─────────────────────
# Store the post-init script here so it can be fetched from any node via
# gcloud secrets versions access — no file transfer needed.
resource "google_secret_manager_secret" "vault_auth_init_script" {
secret_id = "vault-auth-init-script"
project = var.project_id
replication {
auto {}
}
}
# ── Service account SA email data sources (for use in the configure script) ──
# The script uses these SA emails — surfaced here as outputs for convenience
output "vault_auth_sa_emails" {
description = "Service account emails for Vault GCP auth roles — used in configure-vault-auth.sh"
value = {
marketing = google_service_account.marketing.email
soma = google_service_account.soma.email
}
}
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# ── Vault HA Cluster — GCE-based Raft ────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Three GCE e2-small VMs across us-central1-{a,b,c} running HashiCorp Vault
# in Raft HA mode. Auto-unseal via the existing GCP KMS key (vault-kms.tf).
#
# Architecture:
# - vault-node-1 (us-central1-a) — bootstrapped first, others join via retry_join
# - vault-node-2 (us-central1-b)
# - vault-node-3 (us-central1-c)
# - Each VM gets the vault-node SA attached for KMS auto-unseal + ADC
# - Internal traffic: VMs talk Raft over port 8201 on GCP internal IPs
# - External access: HTTPS regional LB → port 8200
# (vault.neuralplatform.ai Cloudflare DNS → GCP LB IP)
#
# Ops SSH:
# gcloud compute ssh vault-node-1 --zone=us-central1-a --tunnel-through-iap
#
# After first boot, initialize Vault on node-1:
# vault operator init (save the root token + recovery keys securely)
# Nodes 2 and 3 auto-join via retry_join once they boot.
locals {
vault_version = "1.19.2"
vault_nodes = {
"vault-node-1" = { zone = "us-central1-a", node_id = "vault-node-1" }
"vault-node-2" = { zone = "us-central1-b", node_id = "vault-node-2" }
"vault-node-3" = { zone = "us-central1-c", node_id = "vault-node-3" }
}
}
# ── Service Account for Vault nodes ──────────────────────────────────────────
# Reuses the vault-unseal SA from vault-kms.tf for KMS access.
# Additional roles: logging + metrics from ops agent.
resource "google_project_iam_member" "vault_node_log_writer" {
project = var.project_id
role = "roles/logging.logWriter"
member = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.vault_unseal.email}"
}
resource "google_project_iam_member" "vault_node_metric_writer" {
project = var.project_id
role = "roles/monitoring.metricWriter"
member = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.vault_unseal.email}"
}
# Allow Vault nodes to read their own instance metadata (needed for GCP auth method later)
resource "google_project_iam_member" "vault_node_compute_viewer" {
project = var.project_id
role = "roles/compute.viewer"
member = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.vault_unseal.email}"
}
# ── Startup script staged in GCS ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# Stored in the existing runner-assets bucket (reuse infrastructure).
# The script installs Vault, writes the config, and starts the systemd unit.
resource "google_storage_bucket_object" "vault_startup" {
name = "vault/startup.sh"
bucket = google_storage_bucket.runner_assets.name
source = "${path.module}/vault/startup.sh"
metadata = {
sha256 = filesha256("${path.module}/vault/startup.sh")
}
}
resource "google_storage_bucket_iam_member" "vault_node_bucket_read" {
bucket = google_storage_bucket.runner_assets.name
role = "roles/storage.objectViewer"
member = "serviceAccount:${google_service_account.vault_unseal.email}"
}
# ── Vault node VMs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
resource "google_compute_instance" "vault_node" {
for_each = local.vault_nodes
name = each.key
machine_type = "e2-small"
zone = each.value.zone
project = var.project_id
tags = ["vault-node", "allow-iap-ssh"]
boot_disk {
initialize_params {
image = "projects/debian-cloud/global/images/family/debian-12"
size = 20
type = "pd-balanced"
}
}
# Separate persistent disk for Raft data — survives VM recreation
attached_disk {
source = google_compute_disk.vault_data[each.key].self_link
device_name = "vault-data"
mode = "READ_WRITE"
}
network_interface {
network = "default"
# No external IP — accessed via IAP SSH and the internal LB
# Vault API is published externally via the regional LB below
access_config {}
}
service_account {
email = google_service_account.vault_unseal.email
scopes = ["cloud-platform"]
}
metadata = {
# Pull and execute the real startup script from GCS
startup-script = <<-EOT
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euxo pipefail
apt-get update -y
apt-get install -y curl ca-certificates apt-transport-https gnupg google-cloud-cli
gsutil cat gs://${google_storage_bucket.runner_assets.name}/${google_storage_bucket_object.vault_startup.name} \
> /tmp/vault-startup.sh
chmod +x /tmp/vault-startup.sh
VAULT_NODE_ID="${each.value.node_id}" \
VAULT_VERSION="${local.vault_version}" \
/tmp/vault-startup.sh
EOT
enable-oslogin = "TRUE"
}
allow_stopping_for_update = true
depends_on = [
google_compute_disk.vault_data,
google_storage_bucket_object.vault_startup,
google_storage_bucket_iam_member.vault_node_bucket_read,
]
}
# ── Persistent data disks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 10 GiB per node. Kept separate from the boot disk so Raft data
# survives a full VM deletion and recreation.
resource "google_compute_disk" "vault_data" {
for_each = local.vault_nodes
name = "${each.key}-data"
zone = each.value.zone
project = var.project_id
type = "pd-ssd"
size = 10
labels = {
managed-by = "terraform"
service = "vault"
node = each.key
}
lifecycle {
prevent_destroy = true
}
}
# ── Firewall rules ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# IAP SSH — ops access without a public SSH port
resource "google_compute_firewall" "vault_iap_ssh" {
name = "vault-iap-ssh"
network = "default"
project = var.project_id
direction = "INGRESS"
priority = 1000
allow {
protocol = "tcp"
ports = ["22"]
}
source_ranges = ["35.235.240.0/20"] # GCP IAP CIDR
target_tags = ["vault-node"]
}
# Raft cluster traffic — node-to-node port 8201 (internal only)
resource "google_compute_firewall" "vault_raft" {
name = "vault-raft-internal"
network = "default"
project = var.project_id
direction = "INGRESS"
priority = 1000
allow {
protocol = "tcp"
ports = ["8201"]
}
source_tags = ["vault-node"]
target_tags = ["vault-node"]
}
# Vault API — allow from the GCP health check ranges and the LB
resource "google_compute_firewall" "vault_api" {
name = "vault-api-from-lb"
network = "default"
project = var.project_id
direction = "INGRESS"
priority = 1000
allow {
protocol = "tcp"
ports = ["8200"]
}
# GCP health check ranges (130.211.0.0/22, 35.191.0.0/16)
# and RFC1918 for any internal service access
source_ranges = ["130.211.0.0/22", "35.191.0.0/16", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16"]
target_tags = ["vault-node"]
}
# ── Instance Groups (one unmanaged group per zone for the LB) ─────────────────
resource "google_compute_instance_group" "vault" {
for_each = local.vault_nodes
name = "vault-${each.key}"
zone = each.value.zone
project = var.project_id
instances = [google_compute_instance.vault_node[each.key].self_link]
named_port {
name = "vault-api"
port = 8200
}
}
# ── Regional HTTPS LB for vault.neuralplatform.ai ─────────────────────────────
# We use a global external HTTPS LB (same scheme as the prod marketing LB)
# so we can attach a Google-managed cert for vault.neuralplatform.ai.
#
# TLS is terminated at the LB. Vault listens on plain 8200 internally.
# The Cloudflare DNS A record for vault.neuralplatform.ai (neuralplatform zone)
# must point to vault_lb_ip output below — add it in Cloudflare dashboard
# or in the legion Terraform if you bring that zone under TF management.
resource "google_compute_global_address" "vault" {
name = "vault-ip"
project = var.project_id
}
resource "google_compute_managed_ssl_certificate" "vault" {
name = "vault-cert"
project = var.project_id
managed {
domains = ["vault.neuralplatform.ai"]
}
}
resource "google_compute_health_check" "vault" {
name = "vault-health"
project = var.project_id
# Vault listens on plain HTTP (tls_disable = true) — TLS is terminated at the LB
http_health_check {
port = 8200
request_path = "/v1/sys/health?standbyok=true&sealedok=true&uninitcode=200"
}
check_interval_sec = 15
timeout_sec = 5
healthy_threshold = 2
unhealthy_threshold = 3
}
resource "google_compute_backend_service" "vault" {
name = "vault-backend"
project = var.project_id
load_balancing_scheme = "EXTERNAL_MANAGED"
protocol = "HTTP" # Vault serves plain HTTP; TLS terminates at the LB
timeout_sec = 30
port_name = "vault-api"
health_checks = [google_compute_health_check.vault.self_link]
dynamic "backend" {
for_each = local.vault_nodes
content {
group = google_compute_instance_group.vault[backend.key].self_link
balancing_mode = "UTILIZATION"
max_utilization = 0.8
}
}
log_config {
enable = true
sample_rate = 1.0
}
}
resource "google_compute_url_map" "vault" {
name = "vault-urlmap"
project = var.project_id
default_service = google_compute_backend_service.vault.self_link
}
resource "google_compute_target_https_proxy" "vault" {
name = "vault-https-proxy"
project = var.project_id
url_map = google_compute_url_map.vault.self_link
ssl_certificates = [google_compute_managed_ssl_certificate.vault.self_link]
}
resource "google_compute_target_http_proxy" "vault_redirect" {
name = "vault-http-proxy"
project = var.project_id
url_map = google_compute_url_map.vault_redirect.self_link
}
resource "google_compute_url_map" "vault_redirect" {
name = "vault-urlmap-http-redirect"
project = var.project_id
default_url_redirect {
https_redirect = true
redirect_response_code = "MOVED_PERMANENTLY_DEFAULT"
strip_query = false
}
}
resource "google_compute_global_forwarding_rule" "vault_https" {
name = "vault-fwd-https"
project = var.project_id
target = google_compute_target_https_proxy.vault.self_link
ip_address = google_compute_global_address.vault.address
port_range = "443"
load_balancing_scheme = "EXTERNAL_MANAGED"
}
resource "google_compute_global_forwarding_rule" "vault_http" {
name = "vault-fwd-http"
project = var.project_id
target = google_compute_target_http_proxy.vault_redirect.self_link
ip_address = google_compute_global_address.vault.address
port_range = "80"
load_balancing_scheme = "EXTERNAL_MANAGED"
}
# ── Outputs ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
output "vault_lb_ip" {
description = "Global IP for vault.neuralplatform.ai — set as DNS A record in Cloudflare (neuralplatform.ai zone)"
value = google_compute_global_address.vault.address
}
output "vault_node_zones" {
description = "Zone placement of each Vault node"
value = {
for k, v in local.vault_nodes : k => v.zone
}
}
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# vault/configure-vault-auth.sh
#
# Configures Vault GCP IAM auth method and access policies for Cloud Run services.
#
# Run this ONCE after the Vault cluster is initialized and unsealed:
#
# export VAULT_ADDR=https://vault.neuralplatform.ai
# export VAULT_TOKEN=<root-token-from-vault-operator-init>
# bash servers/gcp/vault/configure-vault-auth.sh
#
# What this script does:
# 1. Enables the GCP auth method at auth/gcp
# 2. Creates Vault policies for marketing and soma
# 3. Creates GCP IAM auth roles bound to each service's Cloud Run SA
# 4. (Optional) Creates the kv-v2 secret engines at secret/ if not present
#
# After running this script, Cloud Run services can authenticate to Vault using
# their GCP service account identity — no long-lived tokens needed.
#
# Auth flow for Cloud Run:
# 1. Service calls metadata server to get an OIDC token for its SA
# 2. POST /v1/auth/gcp/login with role=<role> and jwt=<oidc-token>
# 3. Vault validates the token against GCP IAM, returns a Vault token
# 4. Service uses the Vault token to read secrets
#
# Vault CLI docs:
# https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/auth/gcp
set -euo pipefail
: "${VAULT_ADDR:?Set VAULT_ADDR to the Vault cluster address}"
: "${VAULT_TOKEN:?Set VAULT_TOKEN to a root or admin token}"
GCP_PROJECT="neuron-785695"
# SA emails from terraform outputs (vault-auth-gcp.tf)
MARKETING_SA="neuron-marketing-sa@${GCP_PROJECT}.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
SOMA_SA="neuron-soma-sa@${GCP_PROJECT}.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
echo "=== Vault GCP Auth Bootstrap ==="
echo "VAULT_ADDR: ${VAULT_ADDR}"
echo "GCP Project: ${GCP_PROJECT}"
echo ""
# ── Step 1: Enable kv-v2 secret engine ───────────────────────────────────────
echo "--- Enabling kv-v2 secret engine at secret/ ---"
if vault secrets list | grep -q "^secret/"; then
echo "secret/ already enabled — skipping"
else
vault secrets enable -path=secret kv-v2
echo "Enabled secret/ (kv-v2)"
fi
# ── Step 2: Enable GCP auth method ────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "--- Enabling GCP auth method ---"
if vault auth list | grep -q "^gcp/"; then
echo "gcp/ auth already enabled — skipping"
else
vault auth enable gcp
echo "Enabled gcp/ auth method"
fi
# Configure the auth method to trust the GCP project
vault write auth/gcp/config \
project_id="${GCP_PROJECT}"
echo "Configured auth/gcp for project ${GCP_PROJECT}"
# ── Step 3: Write Vault policies ──────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "--- Writing Vault policies ---"
vault policy write marketing-policy - <<'POLICY'
# marketing-policy: read access to marketing secrets
path "secret/data/marketing/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "secret/metadata/marketing/*" {
capabilities = ["list", "read"]
}
POLICY
echo "Wrote marketing-policy"
vault policy write soma-policy - <<'POLICY'
# soma-policy: read access to soma secrets
path "secret/data/soma/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "secret/metadata/soma/*" {
capabilities = ["list", "read"]
}
POLICY
echo "Wrote soma-policy"
# ── Step 4: Create GCP IAM auth roles ────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "--- Creating GCP auth roles ---"
# Marketing role — bound to the marketing Cloud Run SA
# type=iam means auth is validated against GCP IAM (service account JWT)
vault write auth/gcp/role/marketing \
type="iam" \
project_id="${GCP_PROJECT}" \
bound_service_accounts="${MARKETING_SA}" \
policies="marketing-policy" \
ttl="1h" \
max_ttl="24h"
echo "Created role: marketing (bound to ${MARKETING_SA})"
# Soma role — bound to the soma Cloud Run SA
vault write auth/gcp/role/soma \
type="iam" \
project_id="${GCP_PROJECT}" \
bound_service_accounts="${SOMA_SA}" \
policies="soma-policy" \
ttl="1h" \
max_ttl="24h"
echo "Created role: soma (bound to ${SOMA_SA})"
# ── Step 5: Smoke test ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "--- Smoke test ---"
echo "Verifying policies exist:"
vault policy list | grep -E "marketing-policy|soma-policy"
echo ""
echo "Verifying auth roles exist:"
vault list auth/gcp/role
echo ""
echo "=== Done ==="
echo ""
echo "Vault GCP auth is configured. Cloud Run services can now authenticate using:"
echo " POST \${VAULT_ADDR}/v1/auth/gcp/login"
echo " body: { role: 'marketing', jwt: '<gcp-oidc-token>' }"
echo ""
echo "Next steps:"
echo " 1. Write secrets: vault kv put secret/marketing/... key=value"
echo " 2. Write secrets: vault kv put secret/soma/... key=value"
echo " 3. Rotate the root token: vault token create -policy=... and revoke root"
echo " 4. Store the recovery keys securely (used if KMS key needs re-wrapping)"
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# vault/startup.sh
#
# Boot script for Vault HA cluster nodes on GCE.
# Idempotent — safe to re-run on VM restart.
#
# Required env vars (set by the GCE metadata startup-script):
# VAULT_NODE_ID — e.g. "vault-node-1"
# VAULT_VERSION — e.g. "1.19.2"
#
# After first boot:
# 1. On vault-node-1: vault operator init
# → save root token and recovery keys in a secure location (Vault bootstrap
# requires them; the recovery keys are for KMS-sealed Vault)
# 2. Nodes 2 and 3 auto-join via retry_join once initialized
#
# Ops access:
# gcloud compute ssh vault-node-1 --zone=us-central1-a --tunnel-through-iap
set -euxo pipefail
exec > >(tee /var/log/vault-bootstrap.log) 2>&1
: "${VAULT_NODE_ID:?VAULT_NODE_ID must be set}"
: "${VAULT_VERSION:?VAULT_VERSION must be set}"
# ── Install Vault ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
apt-get update -y
apt-get install -y curl ca-certificates gnupg lsb-release unzip
# HashiCorp GPG key + repo
curl -fsSL https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com/gpg \
| gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/hashicorp-archive-keyring.gpg] \
https://apt.releases.hashicorp.com $(lsb_release -cs) main" \
> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/hashicorp.list
apt-get update -y
apt-get install -y vault="${VAULT_VERSION}-1"
# Give Vault cap to lock memory (prevents secrets being swapped to disk)
setcap cap_ipc_lock=+ep /usr/bin/vault
# ── Mount and prepare the data disk ──────────────────────────────────────────
# The data disk is attached as /dev/disk/by-id/google-vault-data
# First boot: format it. Subsequent boots: just mount it.
DATA_DEVICE="/dev/disk/by-id/google-vault-data"
DATA_MOUNT="/opt/vault/data"
mkdir -p "${DATA_MOUNT}"
# Only format if not already formatted (idempotent)
if ! blkid "${DATA_DEVICE}" | grep -q ext4; then
mkfs.ext4 -F "${DATA_DEVICE}"
fi
# Mount (skip if already mounted)
if ! mountpoint -q "${DATA_MOUNT}"; then
mount "${DATA_DEVICE}" "${DATA_MOUNT}"
fi
# Persist in fstab
DEVICE_UUID="$(blkid -s UUID -o value "${DATA_DEVICE}")"
if ! grep -q "${DEVICE_UUID}" /etc/fstab; then
echo "UUID=${DEVICE_UUID} ${DATA_MOUNT} ext4 defaults,noatime 0 2" >> /etc/fstab
fi
# ── Derive internal IPs for retry_join ───────────────────────────────────────
# GCE metadata server gives us the IPs of the other nodes by instance name.
# We query the Compute API via the attached SA (ADC — no key file needed).
# For the initial single-node bootstrap, retry_join failures are harmless
# (Raft simply starts as a single-node cluster until peers join).
fetch_internal_ip() {
local instance_name="$1"
local zone="$2"
gcloud compute instances describe "${instance_name}" \
--zone="${zone}" \
--format="get(networkInterfaces[0].networkIP)" \
2>/dev/null || echo ""
}
# Map of all Vault nodes: name → zone
declare -A NODE_ZONES
NODE_ZONES["vault-node-1"]="us-central1-a"
NODE_ZONES["vault-node-2"]="us-central1-b"
NODE_ZONES["vault-node-3"]="us-central1-c"
# Build retry_join stanzas for all nodes other than self
RETRY_JOIN_STANZAS=""
for node in "vault-node-1" "vault-node-2" "vault-node-3"; do
if [[ "${node}" == "${VAULT_NODE_ID}" ]]; then
continue
fi
zone="${NODE_ZONES[$node]}"
ip="$(fetch_internal_ip "${node}" "${zone}")"
if [[ -n "${ip}" ]]; then
RETRY_JOIN_STANZAS="${RETRY_JOIN_STANZAS}
retry_join {
leader_api_addr = \"http://${ip}:8200\"
}"
fi
done
# ── Get the internal IP of this node ─────────────────────────────────────────
MY_INTERNAL_IP="$(curl -sf -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/network-interfaces/0/ip")"
# ── Write Vault config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
mkdir -p /etc/vault.d
cat > /etc/vault.d/vault.hcl <<EOF
ui = true
listener "tcp" {
address = "0.0.0.0:8200"
cluster_address = "0.0.0.0:8201"
# TLS terminated at GCP LB — plain HTTP internally is fine
tls_disable = true
}
storage "raft" {
path = "/opt/vault/data"
node_id = "${VAULT_NODE_ID}"
${RETRY_JOIN_STANZAS}
}
seal "gcpckms" {
project = "neuron-785695"
region = "global"
key_ring = "vault"
crypto_key = "vault-unseal"
}
api_addr = "http://${MY_INTERNAL_IP}:8200"
cluster_addr = "http://${MY_INTERNAL_IP}:8201"
# Telemetry for Cloud Monitoring
telemetry {
prometheus_retention_time = "30s"
disable_hostname = false
}
EOF
chmod 640 /etc/vault.d/vault.hcl
# ── Create vault user and fix permissions ─────────────────────────────────────
id vault &>/dev/null || useradd --system --home /etc/vault.d --shell /bin/false vault
chown -R vault:vault /etc/vault.d /opt/vault/data
# ── Systemd unit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
cat > /etc/systemd/system/vault.service <<'EOF'
[Unit]
Description=HashiCorp Vault — a tool for managing secrets
Documentation=https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs
Requires=network-online.target
After=network-online.target
ConditionFileNotEmpty=/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl
StartLimitIntervalSec=60
StartLimitBurst=3
[Service]
Type=notify
User=vault
Group=vault
ProtectSystem=full
ProtectHome=read-only
PrivateTmp=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
SecureBits=keep-caps
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_IPC_LOCK
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYSLOG CAP_IPC_LOCK
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ExecStart=/usr/bin/vault server -config=/etc/vault.d/vault.hcl
ExecReload=/bin/kill --signal HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
KillSignal=SIGINT
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=5
TimeoutStopSec=30
LimitNOFILE=65536
LimitMEMLOCK=infinity
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
EOF
systemctl daemon-reload
systemctl enable vault
# Start or restart (restart is idempotent — re-reads config on VM metadata updates)
if systemctl is-active vault &>/dev/null; then
systemctl restart vault
else
systemctl start vault
fi
echo "Vault ${VAULT_NODE_ID} started successfully"
echo "Run 'vault operator init' on vault-node-1 to bootstrap the cluster"