Compare commits

..

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
will.anderson 309c388b5b fix(recall): address four remaining recall-reliability review issues
1. engram_numeric_valid: "0.0"/"0.00"/"00.0" now return true — after
   removing dots, strip all '0' chars; non-empty remainder means
   non-numeric (letters), empty means genuinely all-zero, which is valid.
   Prevents zero-salience/importance nodes being scored at the 70 default
   and ranked above the threshold they deserve to sit below.

2. Partial-write guard: replace str_contains(hist, "]") with
   str_ends_with(hist, "]") in conv_history_persist, conv_history_load
   (label path) and conv_history_load (vector fallback path). A truncated
   array whose *content* contains "]" (e.g. "item 1] item 2") no longer
   passes the guard.

3. Cold-start Persona fallback: replace engram_search_json("soul:persona
   Persona identity", 5) with engram_get_node_by_label("soul:persona").
   The label lookup is index-independent, so the fallback now actually
   works when the vector index is cold — the exact condition that
   triggers this branch.

4. handle_chat_agentic hard_bell block: add the missing closing } after
   the return statement. The unclosed if caused undefined control flow
   from line 1101 onward for any non-hard-bell path.
2026-06-22 13:34:05 -05:00
will.anderson a39998a502 feat(recall): recall-reliability improvements
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 12m52s
- Q1: engram_numeric_valid() guard against non-numeric timestamps in bell scoring
- Q2: soul-agnostic cold-start fallback in engram_compile (drops genesis-specific hardcoded node IDs)
- Q3: partial-write guard and failure logging in conv_history_persist/load
- Q4: document circuit-breaker limitation requiring C runtime support
- Q5: println warnings on empty activation/search paths
- Q6: load_identity_context warns when all identity fetches return empty
- Q7: recall_status state tracking (ok/empty/unavailable) surfaced to LLM via MEMORY STATUS block
- Q8: document shared-state race conditions in engram_recall_status and safety_system_addendum
- CRITICAL BUG: conv_node_id empty check moved outside is_bell block so silent Conversation node loss is always logged
2026-06-22 12:52:31 -05:00
will.anderson 87c7d15b67 Merge pull request 'fix(reliability): session-boundary' (#41) from improve/reliability-session-boundary into main
Neuron Soul CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
Deploy Soul to GKE / deploy (push) Has been cancelled
fix(reliability): session-boundary — lifecycle guards, cleanup on expiry
2026-06-22 17:20:33 +00:00
will.anderson 93bed793c0 Merge pull request 'fix(reliability): safety-resilience' (#39) from improve/reliability-safety-resilience into main
Neuron Soul CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
Deploy Soul to GKE / deploy (push) Has been cancelled
fix(reliability): safety-resilience — crisis detection degradation paths
2026-06-22 17:19:29 +00:00
will.anderson 936b3f0ac9 feat(agentic): workspace root from request body — edit_file scope, trailing-slash fix, conditional state_set
Neuron Soul CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
Deploy Soul to GKE / deploy (push) Has been cancelled
Merge propose/agent-workspace-root-read (Tim's PR #28):
- path_within_root now appends '/' to root before prefix check (closes proj_evil bypass)
- edit_file in dispatch_tool now checks agent_workspace_root() and resolves path
- handle_chat_agentic reads agent_workspace_root from request body, only persists if non-empty
- Safety screen preserved after workspace root read (conflict resolved)
2026-06-22 12:16:28 -05:00
will.anderson 45dc80230d fix(safety): crisis detection — augment wired to system prompt, ts fallback, cross-session affective
Neuron Soul CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
Deploy Soul to GKE / deploy (push) Failing after 6m10s
Merge improve/safety-crisis-detection (PR #31): reads layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum
from state and appends to system prompt on each turn (cleared after use to prevent bleed).
Safety ts extraction falls back to updated_at. Affective prefix now wires into system build.
Conflict with PR #33 resolved: capability_rules and session_preload both preserved.
2026-06-22 12:15:50 -05:00
will.anderson c87a536da3 fix(safety): wire safety augment into system prompt, fix timestamp fallback
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Has been cancelled
- Remove dead soft_bell block in layered_cycle that wrote soul_safety_system_augment
  to state but was never read; safety augmentation now goes through the correct
  layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum state key read by build_system_prompt
- build_system_prompt now reads layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum and appends
  it to the system prompt, clearing the key after consumption
- Timestamp extraction for distress nodes falls back to updated_at when created_at
  is empty, preventing the 72h recency check from always treating nodes as stale
2026-06-22 12:07:18 -05:00
will.anderson f0545defdb fix(reliability): session-boundary — ghost sessions, bridge leak, session validation
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Has been cancelled
- sessions.el: add session_exists() for chat-path session validation (ISSUE #6/#7)
- sessions.el: add session_create_cleanup() for ghost-session rollback (ISSUE #1)
- sessions.el: set session_pending_first_msg flag in session_create; clear it in
  session_hist_save so the first successful chat marks the session active (ISSUE #1)
- sessions.el: session_delete now clears mcp_bridge:<id> and always_allow_<id>
  state keys so abandoned pending-tool sessions do not accumulate (ISSUE #5)
- sessions.el: add TODO comments for ISSUE #2 (no TTL/expiry), ISSUE #3
  (non-atomic delete-then-create), ISSUE #4 (no concurrent-create guard),
  and ISSUE #8 (reconnect/duplicate resume race) where fixes are too invasive
  to land without new runtime primitives
- chat.el: validate session_id exists via session_exists() before entering
  agentic_loop; unknown session_ids now return a 404-style error instead of
  silently starting a fresh empty session (ISSUE #6/#7)
2026-06-22 11:58:33 -05:00
will.anderson ae9a139440 fix(reliability): safety-resilience — bell augmentation, safe mode, dedup logging, tab escaping, handle_chat coverage
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Has been cancelled
2026-06-22 11:57:43 -05:00
will.anderson dcf050ee3c fix(agentic): workspace root security — edit_file scoping, trailing-slash normalization, conditional state_set
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Has been cancelled
2026-06-22 11:46:44 -05:00
will.anderson e9a8a659e0 fix(safety): crisis detection — 4 targeted fixes
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Failing after 14m43s
- soul.el: fix state key bug in layered_cycle (conversation_history -> conv_history)
- safety.el: add indirect crisis location patterns to soft_bell phrase list
- soul.el: wire safety_augment_system into layered_cycle for soft_bell turns
- chat.el: load cross-session affective context at session start when distress signals found within 72h
2026-06-22 11:20:42 -05:00
Tim Lingo 1b83b18c39 propose(agentic): read agent_workspace_root from request body and persist to state
Neuron Soul CI / build (pull_request) Successful in 7m45s
Completes the UI<->soul contract for #23 (scope file/command tools to an agent
workspace root). #23 made the tools read state_get("agent_workspace_root"), but
nothing set that key from the desktop UI, so the agent panel's Workspace Folder
was cosmetic and tools ran unscoped (default-allow). This reads the root the UI
now sends on each agentic request and state_sets it before tool dispatch, so
agent_workspace_root() picks it up for the turn.

Minimal + pattern-matching (same json_get/state_set shape used throughout chat.el).
Empty body field => unscoped (backward-compatible) and preserves the env fallback.

FOR WILL'S REVIEW — do not merge without sign-off:
- Ownership model: set state from body each turn (so clearing the folder un-scopes)
  vs. only-when-nonempty. Flagged inline.
- Pairs with neuron-ui PR #32 (ChatRequest.agentWorkspaceRoot).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 19:56:20 -05:00
4 changed files with 406 additions and 49 deletions
+246 -38
View File
@@ -12,34 +12,66 @@ fn chat_default_model() -> String {
return "claude-sonnet-4-5"
}
// engram_numeric_valid guard for str_to_int: returns true only when s is a valid
// decimal number (integer or single-decimal-point float, optional leading minus).
// Q1 fix: rejects "", "null", "N/A", multi-dot strings ("1.2.3"), pure-letter strings.
// Prevents engram_score_node from passing malformed JSON field values to str_to_int
// which has undefined behaviour on non-numeric input and can corrupt score arithmetic.
fn engram_numeric_valid(s: String) -> Bool {
if str_eq(s, "") { return false }
if str_eq(s, "null") { return false }
if str_eq(s, "N/A") { return false }
if str_eq(s, "-") { return false }
let body: String = if str_starts_with(s, "-") { str_slice(s, 1, str_len(s)) } else { s }
if str_eq(body, "") { return false }
// Count dots: remove all, compare lengths. Allow at most one dot (float).
let no_dot: String = str_replace(body, ".", "")
let dot_count: Int = str_len(body) - str_len(no_dot)
if dot_count > 1 { return false }
if str_eq(no_dot, "") { return false }
// str_to_int on a letter-containing string returns 0; "0" and "00..." (e.g. from "0.0")
// are valid zeros. We accept any all-zero no_dot string; reject only when it contains
// non-digit characters (str_to_int returns 0 for those too).
let parsed: Int = str_to_int(no_dot)
if parsed == 0 {
// Verify no_dot is truly all-digit-zeros, not a letter-contaminated string.
// Strip all '0' characters; if anything remains the string is non-numeric.
let stripped_zeros: String = str_replace(no_dot, "0", "")
if !str_eq(stripped_zeros, "") { return false }
}
return true
}
// engram_score_node compute a recency x relevance score for a single engram
// node JSON object. Higher is better. Score = salience * importance * recency_factor.
// recency_factor decays linearly over 30 days: nodes updated today score 1.0,
// nodes 30+ days old score 0.1 (floor). Nodes with no created_at score 0.5.
// This keeps fresh, high-salience nodes at the top and pushes stale low-signal
// nodes to the bottom so they get trimmed when we cap context size.
// Q1 fix: all three numeric fields validated with engram_numeric_valid before str_to_int.
fn engram_score_node(node_json: String) -> Int {
let salience_str: String = json_get(node_json, "salience")
let importance_str: String = json_get(node_json, "importance")
let created_str: String = json_get(node_json, "created_at")
// Parse as floats via * 100 integer arithmetic (el has no float math)
let salience_100: Int = if str_eq(salience_str, "") { 70 } else {
// Q1 fix: validate before str_to_int. Non-numeric values fall back to safe defaults.
// Parse as floats via * 100 integer arithmetic (el has no float math).
let salience_100: Int = if !engram_numeric_valid(salience_str) { 70 } else {
let s: Int = str_to_int(str_replace(salience_str, ".", ""))
// Clamp to 0-100 range (value was e.g. "0.85" -> parsed "085" = 85)
if s > 100 { 100 } else { if s < 0 { 0 } else { s } }
}
let importance_100: Int = if str_eq(importance_str, "") { 70 } else {
let importance_100: Int = if !engram_numeric_valid(importance_str) { 70 } else {
let v: Int = str_to_int(str_replace(importance_str, ".", ""))
if v > 100 { 100 } else { if v < 0 { 0 } else { v } }
}
// Recency: decay from 100 (today) to 10 (30+ days). created_at is Unix seconds.
let now_ts: Int = time_now()
let recency_100: Int = if str_eq(created_str, "") { 50 } else {
let recency_100: Int = if !engram_numeric_valid(created_str) { 50 } else {
let created_ts: Int = str_to_int(created_str)
let age_secs: Int = now_ts - created_ts
let age_days: Int = age_secs / 86400
// Q1 fix: guard against clock skew / future timestamps treat as fresh.
let age_days: Int = if age_secs < 0 { 0 } else { age_secs / 86400 }
let decay: Int = if age_days >= 30 { 10 } else { 100 - (age_days * 3) }
if decay < 10 { 10 } else { decay }
}
@@ -116,13 +148,23 @@ fn engram_compile_ranked(nodes_json: String, max_nodes: Int) -> String {
return c9
}
// Q4 note: engram_compile has no cache or circuit-breaker at the EL layer.
// Every handle_chat call invokes engram_activate_json + engram_search_json unconditionally.
// If the engram backend is repeatedly unreachable (e.g., during startup or after a crash),
// every turn pays two failed RPC round-trips before reaching the cold-start fallback.
// A proper cache/circuit-breaker requires C runtime support (e.g., a shared "engram_healthy"
// flag set by the runtime, or a time-bucketed result cache in el_runtime.c). At the EL
// layer we can only detect failure after the fact (empty string return) and log it.
fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String {
let activate_json: String = engram_activate_json(intent, 5)
// Fetch more search results than we'll use so ranking has a real pool to pick from.
let search_json: String = engram_search_json(intent, 20)
let act_ok: Bool = !str_eq(activate_json, "") && !str_eq(activate_json, "[]")
let srch_ok: Bool = !str_eq(search_json, "") && !str_eq(search_json, "[]")
// Q6/Q7 fix: track raw "" (engram down) vs "[]" (empty graph) to surface different warnings.
let act_failed: Bool = str_eq(activate_json, "")
let srch_failed: Bool = str_eq(search_json, "")
let act_ok: Bool = !act_failed && !str_eq(activate_json, "[]")
let srch_ok: Bool = !srch_failed && !str_eq(search_json, "[]")
// Activation nodes (spreading activation) are already high-signal keep all 5.
let act_part: String = if act_ok { activate_json } else { "" }
@@ -132,23 +174,37 @@ fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String {
let srch_ranked: String = if srch_ok { engram_compile_ranked(search_json, 8) } else { "" }
let srch_part: String = srch_ranked
// Fallback: when vector search returns nothing (no embeddings), fetch pinned
// high-salience nodes by their known IDs. These are the canonical identity
// and biography nodes that should always be in context.
// engram_get_node_json(id) returns a single node as JSON or "" if missing.
// Q2 fix: soul-agnostic cold-start fallback. The previous code used two genesis-specific
// hardcoded node IDs ("knw-35940684..." and "knw-729fc901..."). Cultivated souls with a
// cold or empty vector index received zero episodic context with no error and no log.
// New fallback: search for Persona/Identity nodes seeded by seed_persona_from_env()
// which works for any soul regardless of which specific node IDs were created at seeding.
// Q6 fix: log a warning so the empty-recall path is visible in operator logs.
let scan_part: String = if !act_ok && !srch_ok {
let family_node: String = engram_get_node_json("knw-35940684-abc4-42f0-b942-818f66b1f69a")
let origin_node: String = engram_get_node_json("knw-729fc901-8335-44c4-9f3a-b150b4aa0915")
let fam_ok: Bool = !str_eq(family_node, "") && !str_eq(family_node, "null")
let orig_ok: Bool = !str_eq(origin_node, "") && !str_eq(origin_node, "null")
let fam_str: String = if fam_ok { family_node } else { "" }
let orig_str: String = if orig_ok { origin_node } else { "" }
let sep: String = if fam_ok && orig_ok { "\n" } else { "" }
let combined: String = fam_str + sep + orig_str
if str_eq(combined, "") { "" } else { combined }
let engram_down: Bool = act_failed && srch_failed
if engram_down {
println("[chat] engram_compile: WARN engram_down — all calls returned empty string for intent=" + str_slice(intent, 0, 60))
} else {
println("[chat] engram_compile: WARN cold-index — activation and search returned no results for intent=" + str_slice(intent, 0, 60))
}
// Soul-agnostic fallback: fetch the Persona node by label immune to cold vector index.
// seed_persona_from_env() always writes this node with label "soul:persona", so
// engram_get_node_by_label works even when the vector index has not yet been built.
// Using engram_search_json here would fail for the same reason as the primary path
// (vector index cold), defeating the purpose of this fallback branch entirely.
let persona_node: String = engram_get_node_by_label("soul:persona")
let pf_node_ok: Bool = !str_eq(persona_node, "") && !str_eq(persona_node, "null")
let persona_arr: String = if pf_node_ok { "[" + persona_node + "]" } else { "" }
let pf_ok: Bool = pf_node_ok
let combined: String = if pf_ok { engram_compile_ranked(persona_arr, 1) } else { "" }
if str_eq(combined, "") {
println("[chat] engram_compile: WARN cold-start fallback also empty — LLM has no episodic context")
}
combined
} else {
""
}
let scan_ok: Bool = !str_eq(scan_part, "")
// Affective context: always include the most recent high-emotion memory if one
// exists within 72 hours. This ensures continuity of care across turns when
@@ -178,17 +234,31 @@ fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String {
let ca: String = json_get(bn0, "created_at")
if str_eq(ca, "") { json_get(bn0, "updated_at") } else { ca }
}
let bn_ts: Int = if str_eq(bn_ts_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(bn_ts_raw) }
// Q1 fix: validate bell timestamp before str_to_int.
let bn_ts: Int = if !engram_numeric_valid(bn_ts_raw) { 0 } else { str_to_int(bn_ts_raw) }
if bn_ts > cutoff_ts { bn0 } else { "" }
} else { "" }
let affective_part: String = if !str_eq(recent_bell, "") { recent_bell } else { "" }
let affective_ok: Bool = !str_eq(affective_part, "")
let sep1: String = if !str_eq(act_part, "") && !str_eq(srch_part, "") { "\n" } else { "" }
let sep2: String = if (!str_eq(act_part, "") || !str_eq(srch_part, "")) && !str_eq(scan_part, "") { "\n" } else { "" }
let sep3: String = if (!str_eq(act_part, "") || !str_eq(srch_part, "") || !str_eq(scan_part, "")) && !str_eq(affective_part, "") { "\n" } else { "" }
let ctx: String = act_part + sep1 + srch_part + sep2 + scan_part + sep3 + affective_part
if str_eq(ctx, "") { return "" }
// Q7 fix: store recall status so build_system_prompt can include a hint to the LLM
// distinguishing "no memories yet" (cold start) from "memory system unreachable".
// Values: "ok" | "empty" | "unavailable"
let any_ok: Bool = act_ok || srch_ok || scan_ok || affective_ok
let all_failed: Bool = act_failed && srch_failed
let recall_status: String = if any_ok { "ok" } else { if all_failed { "unavailable" } else { "empty" } }
state_set("engram_recall_status", recall_status)
if str_eq(ctx, "") {
// Q6 fix: log when ctx is empty after all recall paths so cold-start is visible.
println("[chat] engram_compile: all paths empty — recall_status=" + recall_status + " intent=" + str_slice(intent, 0, 60))
return ""
}
// Raise the cap slightly to match the ranked (higher-signal) output.
if str_len(ctx) > 6000 {
@@ -227,13 +297,42 @@ fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String) -> String {
"\n\n[IDENTITY GRAPH — who you are, loaded from your engram]\n" + id_ctx
}
// Q7 fix: if recall produced no results, include a hint so the LLM can respond
// authentically ("I seem to be starting fresh" vs "memory system may be down")
// rather than silently acting as if it has context it doesn't have.
// Q8 note: "engram_recall_status" is a shared state key under http_serve_async.
// Concurrent requests can overwrite each other's status. This is best-effort:
// a full fix requires per-request scoping (not feasible at EL layer without C support).
let recall_status: String = state_get("engram_recall_status")
let engram_block: String = if str_eq(ctx, "") {
""
let status_hint: String = if str_eq(recall_status, "unavailable") {
"\n\n[MEMORY STATUS]\nYour episodic memory system appears to be temporarily unreachable. You may not have access to memories from previous sessions. If asked about past conversations, acknowledge this honestly rather than confabulating."
} else if str_eq(recall_status, "empty") {
"\n\n[MEMORY STATUS]\nNo episodic memories were found for this topic. This may be a new soul or a new area of conversation. Respond naturally from your identity without fabricating memories."
} else {
""
}
status_hint
} else {
"\n\n[ENGRAM CONTEXT — compiled from your graph]\n" + ctx
}
return identity + date_line + voice_rules + security_rules + capability_rules + identity_block + engram_block
// Q8 note: layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum is a shared mutable state key.
// Two concurrent requests can both read it (state_get), both see the same value,
// and one clears it (state_set("", "")) while the other uses the value or both
// clear it and one request gets "" while expecting real content. The race is benign
// in practice (the addendum is only written by layered_cycle and read here once
// per turn; concurrent chat turns are rare in the current deployment), but a full
// fix requires per-session or per-request key scoping at the C runtime level.
let safety_addendum: String = state_get("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum")
let safety_block: String = if str_eq(safety_addendum, "") {
""
} else {
state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", "")
safety_addendum
}
return identity + date_line + voice_rules + security_rules + capability_rules + identity_block + engram_block + safety_block
}
fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String {
@@ -339,41 +438,82 @@ fn clean_llm_response(s: String) -> String {
}
// conv_history_persist save conversation history to engram for cross-restart continuity.
// Stores as a Conversation node. Overwrites by using consistent label "conv:history".
// Stores as a Conversation node with consistent label "conv:history" (upsert by label).
// Q3/Q6 fix: added partial-write guard and failure logging.
fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void {
if str_eq(hist, "") { return "" }
if str_eq(hist, "[]") { return "" }
let ts: Int = time_now()
// Partial-write guard: refuse to persist a blob that is not a complete JSON array.
// A truncated write starting with '[' but missing the closing ']' must be rejected.
// str_ends_with is used (not str_contains) so that embedded ']' characters in content
// (e.g. "item 1] item 2") do not fool the guard when the array tail is actually missing.
if !str_starts_with(hist, "[") { return "" }
if !str_ends_with(hist, "]") { return "" }
let tags: String = "[\"conv-history\",\"persistent\"]"
let discard: String = engram_node_full(
let node_id: String = engram_node_full(
hist, "Conversation", "conv:history",
el_from_float(0.7), el_from_float(0.8), el_from_float(0.9),
"Episodic", tags
)
// Q6 fix: log write failure silent history loss is now visible.
if str_eq(node_id, "") {
println("[chat] conv_history_persist: engram_node_full returned empty — history node may be lost")
}
}
// conv_history_load restore conversation history from engram on first access.
// Returns the most recent "conv:history" node content, or "" if none found.
// Q3/Q6 fix: added partial-write guard, log on invalid content, and state flag for
// callers to distinguish genuine first-turn from a load failure.
fn conv_history_load() -> String {
// Primary: label-based fetch symmetric with persist, immune to vector index drift.
let label_node: String = engram_get_node_by_label("conv:history")
let label_ok: Bool = !str_eq(label_node, "") && !str_eq(label_node, "null")
if label_ok {
let label_content: String = json_get(label_node, "content")
let label_valid: Bool = str_starts_with(label_content, "[") && str_ends_with(label_content, "]")
if label_valid {
return label_content
}
println("[chat] conv_history_load: label node found but content invalid — falling back to vector search")
}
// Fallback: vector search.
let results: String = engram_search_json("conv:history", 3)
if str_eq(results, "") { return "" }
if str_eq(results, "") {
// Q3 fix: set a state flag so callers can distinguish load failure from first turn.
state_set("conv_history_load_failed", "1")
return ""
}
if str_eq(results, "[]") { return "" }
let node: String = json_array_get(results, 0)
let content: String = json_get(node, "content")
// Validate it looks like a JSON array
if !str_starts_with(content, "[") { return "" }
// Partial-write guard: require both '[' prefix AND closing ']' at the tail.
// str_ends_with guards against embedded ']' in content fooling the check.
if !str_starts_with(content, "[") || !str_ends_with(content, "]") {
println("[chat] conv_history_load: vector search result content invalid — treating as first turn")
state_set("conv_history_load_failed", "1")
return ""
}
return content
}
fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
let message: String = json_get(body, "message")
if str_eq(message, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"message is required\",\"response\":\"\"}"
return "{\"__status__\":400,\"error\":\"message is required\",\"response\":\"\"}"
}
// Load history BEFORE compiling context so we can anchor activation to the thread.
// Q3 fix: clear the load-failure flag before loading so it accurately reflects this call.
state_set("conv_history_load_failed", "")
// Q8 note: "conv_history" is a process-global state key. Concurrent /api/chat requests
// all read the same key, append their exchange, and write it back. Because _state_mu
// serializes individual state_get/state_set calls but NOT the read-append-write sequence,
// two concurrent requests can read the same base history and the last writer wins one
// turn is silently dropped. A full fix requires per-session history keys (session_hist_<id>)
// and deprecating the global "conv_history" path. Callers using session_id are not affected.
let state_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load() } else { state_hist }
let hist_load_failed: Bool = str_eq(state_get("conv_history_load_failed"), "1")
let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
// Thread-aware activation: short/ambiguous messages (continuations like "go on",
@@ -390,8 +530,27 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
message
}
// Cross-session affective context: on session start (no history yet), check engram
// for recent distress signals within 72h and prepend a care directive if found.
let affective_prefix: String = if hist_len == 0 {
let distress_nodes: String = engram_search_json("bell distress crisis loss grief despair", 3)
let has_nodes: Bool = !str_eq(distress_nodes, "") && !str_eq(distress_nodes, "[]")
let now_ts: Int = time_now()
let cutoff: Int = now_ts - 259200
let found_recent: Bool = if has_nodes {
let dn0: String = json_array_get(distress_nodes, 0)
let ts0_raw: String = json_get(dn0, "created_at")
let ts0_str: String = if str_eq(ts0_raw, "") { json_get(dn0, "updated_at") } else { ts0_raw }
let ts0: Int = if str_eq(ts0_str, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(ts0_str) }
ts0 > cutoff
} else { false }
if found_recent {
"[RECENT CONTEXT: User recently expressed significant distress. Monitor for indirect crisis signals and respond with care.]\n\n"
} else { "" }
} else { "" }
let ctx: String = engram_compile(activation_seed)
let system: String = build_system_prompt(ctx)
let system: String = affective_prefix + build_system_prompt(ctx)
// First message of the session: proactively load user profile and active work context.
// These two searches give the soul grounding before any conversation history exists.
@@ -471,6 +630,10 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
let req_model: String = json_get(body, "model")
let model: String = if str_eq(req_model, "") { chat_default_model() } else { req_model }
// ISSUE 9: add safety_augment_system to primary /api/chat path.
// handle_chat was the only LLM path missing bell directive injection.
let full_system = safety_augment_system(full_system, message)
let raw_response: String = llm_call_system(model, full_system, message)
let is_error: Bool = str_starts_with(raw_response, "{\"error\"")
@@ -500,7 +663,13 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
let act_out: String = if act_ok { activation_nodes } else { "[]" }
strengthen_chat_nodes(act_out)
return "{\"response\":\"" + safe_response + "\",\"model\":\"" + model + "\",\"activation_nodes\":" + act_out + "}"
// Q3 fix: surface history load failure in the response envelope so callers can
// show a "starting fresh — could not load previous conversation" indicator.
let hist_warning: String = if hist_load_failed {
",\"history_load_failed\":true"
} else { "" }
return "{\"response\":\"" + safe_response + "\",\"model\":\"" + model + "\",\"activation_nodes\":" + act_out + hist_warning + "}"
}
fn handle_see(body: String) -> String {
@@ -705,7 +874,8 @@ fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool {
return false
}
if str_starts_with(path, "/") {
return str_starts_with(path, root)
let root_normalized: String = root + "/"
return str_starts_with(path, root_normalized)
}
return true
}
@@ -796,12 +966,17 @@ fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String {
let path: String = json_get(tool_input, "path")
let old_text: String = json_get(tool_input, "old_text")
let new_text: String = json_get(tool_input, "new_text")
let content: String = fs_read(path)
let root: String = agent_workspace_root()
if !path_within_root(path, root) {
return json_safe("denied: path is outside the agent workspace root")
}
let resolved: String = resolve_in_root(path, root)
let content: String = fs_read(resolved)
if str_eq(content, "") {
return json_safe("{\"error\":\"file not found\"}")
}
let updated: String = str_replace(content, old_text, new_text)
fs_write(path, updated)
fs_write(resolved, updated)
return json_safe("{\"ok\":true}")
}
if str_eq(tool_name, "remember") {
@@ -918,6 +1093,17 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
return "{\"error\":\"message required\",\"reply\":\"\"}"
}
// Workspace scope (#23): the desktop UI sends the user-chosen Agent Workspace root
// on every agentic request. Persist it to state so agent_workspace_root() and the
// path/command tool guards that read it confine this turn's file/command tools to
// that subtree. Only set when non-empty: an empty/absent field means the client sent
// no root (or cleared the field), and we must not overwrite a server-configured root
// from NEURON_AGENT_ROOT with an empty string, which would silently un-scope the agent.
let ws_root: String = json_get(body, "agent_workspace_root")
if !str_eq(ws_root, "") {
state_set("agent_workspace_root", ws_root)
}
// L1 safety screen agentic path must pass the same gate as layered_cycle.
// Hard bell: return the crisis response immediately, do not enter the agentic loop.
let history: String = state_get("conversation_history")
@@ -934,6 +1120,21 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
// Thread-aware activation: same logic as handle_chat.
// Use the session's or global history to anchor short messages to the thread.
let req_session: String = json_get(body, "session_id")
// ISSUE #6/#7: validate that the session_id actually exists before proceeding.
// Without this check the loop silently treats any unknown/fabricated session_id
// as a fresh session history loads as empty and no error is returned to the caller.
// Only validate when a session_id is explicitly provided; anonymous calls
// (no session_id) continue to work for backward compatibility.
let session_valid: Bool = if str_eq(req_session, "") {
true
} else {
session_exists(req_session)
}
if !session_valid {
return "{\"error\":\"session not found\",\"session_id\":\"" + req_session + "\",\"reply\":\"\"}"
}
let hist_key: String = if str_eq(req_session, "") { "conv_history" } else { "session_hist_" + req_session }
let agentic_hist: String = state_get(hist_key)
let agentic_hist_len: Int = if str_eq(agentic_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(agentic_hist) }
@@ -1473,6 +1674,13 @@ fn auto_persist(req: String, resp: String) -> Void {
"Episodic",
tags
)
// CRITICAL BUG fix: log conv_node_id failure OUTSIDE the is_bell block.
// The original code had this check inside the is_bell block (or missing entirely),
// making the log unreachable on every non-bell turn (the common case). This meant
// silent failure of the Conversation node write went unlogged on most turns.
if str_eq(conv_node_id, "") {
println("[chat] auto_persist: engram_node_full returned empty — conversation node lost (ts=" + ts_str + ")")
}
// When a bell fires, write a dedicated BellEvent node in addition to the
// Conversation node. This makes distress moments directly findable by label
+16 -4
View File
@@ -144,17 +144,21 @@ fn safety_screen(input: String, history: String) -> String {
if score >= soft {
let summary: String = str_slice(input, 0, 80)
let discard: String = safety_log_bell("soft", "wellbeing check needed", summary)
// ISSUE 7: also escape tab chars to prevent JSON envelope corruption.
let e1: String = str_replace(input, "\\", "\\\\")
let e2: String = str_replace(e1, "\"", "\\\"")
let e3: String = str_replace(e2, "\n", "\\n")
let safe_input: String = str_replace(e3, "\r", "\\r")
let e4: String = str_replace(e3, "\r", "\\r")
let safe_input: String = str_replace(e4, "\t", "\\t")
return "{\"action\":\"soft_bell\",\"reason\":\"wellbeing check needed\",\"content\":\"" + safe_input + "\"}"
}
// ISSUE 7: also escape tab chars (see soft_bell branch above).
let e1: String = str_replace(input, "\\", "\\\\")
let e2: String = str_replace(e1, "\"", "\\\"")
let e3: String = str_replace(e2, "\n", "\\n")
let safe_input: String = str_replace(e3, "\r", "\\r")
let e4: String = str_replace(e3, "\r", "\\r")
let safe_input: String = str_replace(e4, "\t", "\\t")
return "{\"action\":\"pass\",\"content\":\"" + safe_input + "\"}"
}
@@ -195,7 +199,8 @@ fn safety_validate(output: String, action: String) -> String {
fn safety_log_bell(level: String, reason: String, input_summary: String) -> String {
let content: String = "BELL:" + level + " | " + reason + " | summary:" + input_summary
let tags: String = "[\"safety\",\"bell\",\"bell:" + level + "\"]"
let discard: String = engram_node_full(
// ISSUE 2: fallback log when engram write fails silently.
let node_id: String = engram_node_full(
content,
"BellEvent",
"bell:" + level,
@@ -205,6 +210,9 @@ fn safety_log_bell(level: String, reason: String, input_summary: String) -> Stri
"Episodic",
tags
)
if str_eq(node_id, "") {
println("[safety] WARN: bell engram write failed -- " + content)
}
return ""
}
@@ -232,9 +240,13 @@ fn safety_general_hard_phrases() -> String {
}
fn safety_soft_phrases() -> String {
return "[\"stressed\",\"overwhelmed\",\"can't cope\",\"cannot cope\",\"struggling\",\"anxious\",\"anxiety\",\"depressed\",\"depression\",\"lonely\",\"isolated\",\"hopeless\",\"hopelessness\",\"exhausted\",\"burnt out\",\"burned out\",\"burnout\",\"panic\",\"panicking\",\"falling apart\",\"breaking down\",\"can't handle\",\"cannot handle\",\"losing it\",\"nothing matters\",\"don't care anymore\",\"given up\",\"giving up\",\"helpless\",\"worthless\",\"useless\",\"hate myself\",\"no one cares\",\"nobody cares\",\"no one understands\",\"nobody understands\",\"empty inside\",\"can't stop crying\",\"breaking point\",\"at my limit\",\"having a breakdown\"]"
return "[\"stressed\",\"overwhelmed\",\"can't cope\",\"cannot cope\",\"struggling\",\"anxious\",\"anxiety\",\"depressed\",\"depression\",\"lonely\",\"isolated\",\"hopeless\",\"hopelessness\",\"exhausted\",\"burnt out\",\"burned out\",\"burnout\",\"panic\",\"panicking\",\"falling apart\",\"breaking down\",\"can't handle\",\"cannot handle\",\"losing it\",\"nothing matters\",\"don't care anymore\",\"given up\",\"giving up\",\"helpless\",\"worthless\",\"useless\",\"hate myself\",\"no one cares\",\"nobody cares\",\"no one understands\",\"nobody understands\",\"empty inside\",\"can't stop crying\",\"breaking point\",\"at my limit\",\"having a breakdown\",\"highest structure\",\"tallest building\",\"tallest structure\",\"highest building\",\"bridge near me\",\"overpass near\",\"rooftop near\"]"
}
// ISSUE 5 TODO: phrase lists are rebuilt from JSON literals on every call.
// json_array_len of malformed input returns 0, silently skipping all checks.
// Caching requires language-level static const arrays -- not in current EL.
// Migrate to const arrays when EL gains that feature.
// Matching helpers (single loops only el escapes while-body mutation via
// top-level let rebinds; nested loops would not advance) ────────────────────
+97 -1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,49 @@ fn session_make_content(id: String, title: String, created_at: Int, updated_at:
+ ",\"updated_at\":" + int_to_str(updated_at) + "}"
}
// session_exists return true if the given session_id is known in Engram or state.
// Used by chat.el to validate a session_id before processing a chat message.
// Addresses ISSUE #6/#7: chat path must validate session existence instead of
// silently treating unknown session_ids as fresh sessions.
fn session_exists(session_id: String) -> Bool {
if str_eq(session_id, "") { return false }
// Fast path: check the state-based index first (avoids Engram round-trip).
let idx: String = state_get("session_index")
if !str_eq(idx, "") && !str_eq(idx, "[]") {
if str_contains(idx, "\"id\":\"" + session_id + "\"") {
return true
}
}
// Slow path: check Engram directly (survives restarts when index is cold).
let results: String = engram_search_json("session:meta " + session_id, 5)
if str_eq(results, "") { return false }
if str_eq(results, "[]") { return false }
let total: Int = json_array_len(results)
let found: Bool = false
let i: Int = 0
while i < total {
let node: String = json_array_get(results, i)
let label: String = json_get(node, "label")
let content: String = json_get(node, "content")
let sid: String = json_get(content, "id")
let is_match: Bool = str_eq(label, "session:meta") && str_eq(sid, session_id)
let found = if is_match { true } else { found }
let i = i + 1
}
return found
}
// session_create create a new session, return {id, title, created_at}.
//
// ISSUE #1: Ghost sessions on failed first message.
// We write the Engram node and update the state index here, then the caller
// POSTs a chat message. If that chat call fails (LLM unavailable, network
// error, etc.) the session is stranded with no messages. A full transactional
// rollback requires runtime support (2PC or a deferred-write queue) that does
// not exist in EL. Mitigation:
// (a) Set "session_pending_first_msg_<id>" in state so callers can detect it.
// (b) Provide session_create_cleanup() for callers that detect a failure.
// TODO: evaluate deferred-write pattern once EL gains atomic state operations.
fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
let ts: Int = time_now()
let id: String = uuid_v4()
@@ -55,8 +97,13 @@ fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
}
// Store the engram node_id mapping so we can look up the node for this session
state_set("session_node_" + id, node_id)
// Mark as pending first message so stale ghost sessions can be identified
// (e.g. if the caller\'s subsequent chat POST fails).
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + id, "1")
// Maintain a state-based index for fast listing within this daemon run.
// Newest sessions first (prepend).
// TODO #4: index update is read-modify-write two concurrent session_create
// calls can lose one entry. EL has no CAS primitive; fix requires runtime support.
let existing_idx: String = state_get("session_index")
let idx_entry: String = "{\"id\":\"" + id + "\",\"title\":\"" + json_safe(title) + "\",\"folder\":\"" + json_safe(folder) + "\",\"created_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + ",\"updated_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + ",\"last_message\":\"\"}"
let new_idx: String = if str_eq(existing_idx, "") {
@@ -73,6 +120,20 @@ fn session_create(body: String) -> String {
+ ",\"created_at\":" + int_to_str(ts) + "}"
}
// session_create_cleanup undo a session_create when the caller\'s first chat
// fails. Removes the Engram node, state-index entry, and pending-flag so the
// session does not appear as a ghost in session_list().
// Addresses ISSUE #1: cleanup path for ghost sessions.
fn session_create_cleanup(session_id: String) -> String {
if str_eq(session_id, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"session_id is required\"}"
}
// Clear pending flag first so partial cleanup is still detectable.
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
// Delegate to session_delete which handles Engram + state index teardown.
return session_delete(session_id)
}
// session_list list all sessions. Returns [{id, title, last_message, created_at, updated_at}].
fn session_list() -> String {
// Fast path: state-based index (rebuilt from session_create calls in this daemon run).
@@ -222,13 +283,27 @@ fn session_delete(session_id: String) -> String {
state_set("session_hist_" + session_id, "")
state_set("session_node_" + session_id, "")
state_set("session_index", "")
// ISSUE #5: clean up bridge blobs and always_allow keys that were never
// cleared by agentic_resume (e.g. client abandoned a pending tool call).
// Without this, stranded bridge blobs accumulate indefinitely in state.
state_set("mcp_bridge:" + session_id, "")
state_set("always_allow_" + session_id, "")
// Clear pending-first-message flag if present.
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
return "{\"ok\":true,\"session_id\":\"" + session_id + "\""
+ ",\"deleted_meta\":" + int_to_str(deleted_meta)
+ ",\"deleted_msgs\":" + int_to_str(deleted_msgs) + "}"
}
// session_update_patch update a session's title and/or folder via PATCH body.
// session_update_patch update a session\'s title and/or folder via PATCH body.
// Body may contain "title", "folder", or both. Preserves unmentioned fields.
//
// ISSUE #3: Non-atomic delete-then-create below (engram_forget + engram_node_full).
// A crash between the two leaves the session with zero meta nodes; session_get
// returns empty metadata even though session_index still references the id.
// TODO: Replace with an in-place update primitive once Engram supports node mutation.
// Current mitigation: session_get falls back gracefully to empty metadata strings;
// the session_id is still valid and history is preserved in state.
fn session_update_patch(session_id: String, body: String) -> String {
if str_eq(session_id, "") {
return "{\"error\":\"session_id is required\"}"
@@ -349,6 +424,9 @@ fn session_hist_load(session_id: String) -> String {
// session_hist_save persist message history for a session to state and engram.
fn session_hist_save(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void {
state_set("session_hist_" + session_id, hist)
// Clear pending-first-message flag: once history is saved, the session
// is no longer in the ghost/pending state (ISSUE #1 mitigation).
state_set("session_pending_first_msg_" + session_id, "")
// Delete old history node and write fresh one
let old_results: String = engram_search_json("session:messages:" + session_id, 3)
let o_total: Int = if str_eq(old_results, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(old_results) }
@@ -413,6 +491,16 @@ fn session_hist_save(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void {
}
// session_update_meta_timestamp update the updated_at field in the session:meta node.
//
// ISSUE #2: No TTL / idle expiry mechanism. Sessions accumulate indefinitely.
// A sweep job (e.g. expire sessions idle for >N days) needs a background timer
// that EL does not currently expose. Bridge blobs under "mcp_bridge:<id>" are also
// never swept unless session_delete is called explicitly.
// TODO: add idle-expiry sweep once EL exposes a background tick or the host
// runtime gains a scheduled-task primitive.
//
// ISSUE #3 applies here too: delete-then-create is non-atomic. See session_update_patch
// for the full note on the failure mode and mitigation.
fn session_update_meta_timestamp(session_id: String) -> Void {
let results: String = engram_search_json("session:meta " + session_id, 10)
let total: Int = if str_eq(results, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(results) }
@@ -506,6 +594,14 @@ fn session_auto_title(session_id: String, first_message: String) -> Void {
// action: "allow" | "deny" | "always"
// Resumes the agentic loop from where it was paused.
//
// ISSUE #8: Reconnect/duplicate resume race. The one-shot clear-on-read pattern
// in agentic_resume correctly prevents replay, but a client that retries after a
// timeout gets a hard "unknown session_id" error with no recovery path. The
// conversation is permanently stuck in that case. Full idempotency (e.g. caching
// the last reply keyed by call_id) requires a new state structure.
// TODO: persist the last successful resume reply under "bridge_reply:<session_id>"
// keyed by call_id so a retry within a short window returns the same envelope.
//
// Modern path (agentic_loop / bridge): the loop saves its suspension to
// "mcp_bridge:<session_id>" via bridge_save(). On approval we dispatch_tool()
// if allowed (or build a denial string), then hand the result to agentic_resume()
+47 -6
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,9 @@ import "stewardship.el"
import "imprint.el"
import "awareness.el"
import "chat.el"
import "safety.el"
import "studio.el"
import "elp-input.el"
import "routes.el"
import "safety.el"
import "stewardship.el"
import "imprint.el"
cgi "neuron-soul" {
dharma_id: "ntn-genesis@http://localhost:7770",
@@ -152,6 +148,14 @@ fn load_identity_context() -> Void {
println("[soul] identity context loaded (" + int_to_str(str_len(ctx)) + " chars, " + int_to_str(parts_count) + " nodes)")
}
// Q6 fix: warn when all three identity node fetches return empty. For genesis this
// indicates a corrupted or missing graph. For cultivated souls it is expected on first
// boot (nodes are seeded by seed_persona_from_env, not these genesis-specific IDs).
// The log makes the silent-empty case visible instead of indistinguishable from success.
if parts_count == 0 {
println("[soul] load_identity_context: WARN all three identity node fetches returned empty — no graph-derived identity context loaded")
}
// Scan for a Persona node the explicit identity declaration seeded into cultivated souls.
// Stored at seeding time with label "soul:persona" and node_type "Persona".
// genesis derives identity from the graph directly; cultivated souls have this node seeded.
@@ -166,6 +170,12 @@ fn load_identity_context() -> Void {
println("[soul] persona node loaded (" + int_to_str(str_len(p_content)) + " chars)")
}
}
// Q6 fix: if neither identity nodes nor persona node were loaded, log explicitly.
let soul_id_ctx: String = state_get("soul_identity_context")
let soul_persona_ctx: String = state_get("soul_persona")
if str_eq(soul_id_ctx, "") && str_eq(soul_persona_ctx, "") {
println("[soul] load_identity_context: WARN no identity context available from graph — soul will have identity_block empty in system prompts")
}
}
// seed_persona_from_env one-time migration: SOUL_IDENTITY env var Persona graph node.
@@ -258,26 +268,38 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
// L0 (core) L1 (safety screen) L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) L2b (mission alignment) L3 (imprint) L1 (safety validate)
// Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers use one_cycle directly.
fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
let history: String = state_get("conversation_history")
let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
// L1 in: safety screen
let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
let screen_action: String = json_get(screen_result, "action")
// ISSUE 4: safe-mode guard. If safety_screen returned an invalid/empty action
// (engram failure or internal error), refuse rather than pass unscreened input.
let valid_action: Bool = str_eq(screen_action, "hard_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "soft_bell")
|| str_eq(screen_action, "pass")
if !valid_action {
println("[soul] layered_cycle: safety_screen invalid action -- safe mode refusal")
return safety_validate("", "hard_bell")
}
// Hard bell: bypass all upper layers, log and escalate.
// Intentionally does NOT update conversation_history or call auto_persist():
// hard bell events are security-sensitive and must not appear in engram conversation
// history where they could leak context to subsequent turns. They are persisted
// separately by safety_log_bell() into the Episodic tier with restricted labels.
//
// ISSUE 6: safety_log_bell already called inside safety_screen (line 140).
// Do NOT call it again here -- that would double-log every hard bell.
//
// safety_validate second param: when screen_action is "hard_bell", safety_validate
// receives the sentinel string "hard_bell" (not a normal screen action). The safety
// layer contract requires it to return a fixed refusal regardless of the output arg.
// On the normal path, safety_validate receives the original screen_action ("pass")
// so it can apply action-specific post-output checks.
if str_eq(screen_action, "hard_bell") {
safety_log_bell("hard", json_get(screen_result, "reason"), str_slice(raw_input, 0, 80))
return safety_validate("", "hard_bell")
}
@@ -312,6 +334,25 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
json_get(steward_result, "redirect_to")
}
// ISSUE 1: pre-LLM bell augmentation for layered_cycle path.
// safety_augment_system appends soft/hard directive to system prompt when bell fires,
// ensuring LLM processes message WITH the safety directive -- not just post-output gate.
// Stored in state as "layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum" for imprint_respond to use.
// TODO: wire directly when imprint_respond gains system_override param (imprint.el change).
// ISSUE 3 TODO: no semantic crisis detection. Keyword-only means signals that evade
// the phrase list pass with zero augmentation. Semantic layer = separate decision.
//
// Q8 race documentation: "layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum" is a shared process-global
// state key. Two concurrent requests to layered_cycle() both write this key; whichever
// writes last wins. The concurrent build_system_prompt() read in chat.el:236 may then
// consume the wrong request's addendum, or find an empty string after the other request's
// build_system_prompt consumed and cleared it. Mitigation: under http_serve_async, the
// layered_cycle path and the /api/chat path are different endpoints (typically); true
// concurrent layered_cycle calls are uncommon. A robust fix requires per-request state
// scoping which needs C runtime support (e.g. a request-id-keyed addendum map).
let augmented_addendum: String = safety_augment_system("", raw_input)
state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", augmented_addendum)
// L3: imprint responds
let output: String = imprint_respond(aligned, imprint_id)