feat(recall): retrieve through spreading activation, not substring matching

recall and searchKnowledge both ended at engram_search_json — a case-
insensitive substring matcher scored by how many distinct query tokens appear
in a node's content/label/tags, tie-broken by raw salience. It never read a
single edge. Meanwhile engram_activate / engram_activate_json — real BFS
spreading activation over the weighted directed graph, four-factor
multiplicative scoring, two-layer background/working-memory filter — has been
implemented and compiled into the shipped runtime the whole time, called from
four places, none of them retrieval.

This wires retrieval to the traversal, restoring the designed mechanism:
Engram provisional 64/064,260 claim 1, "no data is retrieved from the weighted
directed graph except through the spreading activation traversal."

Seeding follows the runtime's own convention (all four existing call sites pass
query TEXT, not seed ids): engram_activate seeds lexically — every node
matching >=1 query token, initial activation = salience x temporal_decay x
dampening x token_coverage — then supplements with the top-K nodes by cosine
against the query embedding. So the lexical surface recall used to RETURN is
now the SEED SET of the traversal, and what comes back is what those seeds
activate.

Exact lookup is not regressed. engram_activate's collector drops any reached
node whose background_activation x confidence < 0.1 unless it was promoted to
working memory, so a rare token on a dormant node can seed and still go
unreported. Retrieval therefore appends the lexical seed list after the
activated ranking, deduped by id, until `limit` is filled — the same seed set
the traversal already computed, restored to the tail, not a parallel search.

searchKnowledge gets the identical path. Its existing "activate fallback" was
unreachable dead code: it fired only when engram_search_json's return did not
start with '[' or '{', and that function always emits a '['-prefixed array.

Response shape is unchanged — a bare array of full engram node objects, so the
MCP wrapper, tools/telegram-gateway.sh (.value.content) and cli/neuron_mcp.py
keep working. Activation strength is a ranking input here, not a payload change.

Measured, cold-start, two builds of this tree against the same 79,250-node /
14,214-edge graph (main @ 18714e6 vs this branch):

  "volatility-based decomposition"  before: 1 of 10 results relevant
                                    after:  6 of 10, incl. architecture/styles/
                                    vbd/glossary.md and project-design
                                    foundations
  "Structure is not inherited"      before: persona boilerplate, "1", a
                                    Disneyland fragment, a corrupted node
                                    after:  self/voice registers, neuron/
                                    user-imprint/boundary-definition,
                                    diagrams/vbd.md
  "inherited"                       Value - Structure Is Not Inherited:
                                    rank 23 -> rank 3; Self - Values hub:
                                    rank 32 -> rank 4
  searchKnowledge, same query       2 of 5 relevant -> 5 of 5
  "HNSW" / "Fayetteville" (rare)    1 result both builds - no regression
  nonsense control                  0 results both builds

Known limit, unchanged by this commit: the 12 sibling Value nodes still do not
surface. A ~58-day-dormant seed's activation (0.7 salience x 0.05 decay floor x
0.34 dampening ~= 0.012) lands below the runtime's 0.02 firing threshold, so it
cannot propagate to its neighbours at all. That is runtime tuning inside the
vendored el_runtime.c, not the wiring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

chat.elh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// auto-generated by elc --emit-header — do not edit
+// auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn chat_default_model() -> String
 extern fn engram_numeric_valid(s: String) -> Bool
 extern fn parse_float_x100(s: String) -> Int
@@ -16,18 +16,35 @@ extern fn engram_nodes_merge(a: String, b: String) -> String
 extern fn id_in_seen(node_id: String, seen: String) -> Bool
 extern fn add_to_seen(seen: String, node_id: String) -> String
 extern fn engram_extract_ids(nodes_json: String) -> String
+extern fn affective_node_ts(node_json: String) -> Int
 extern fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String
 extern fn distill_transcript(transcript: String) -> String
 extern fn json_safe(s: String) -> String
 extern fn current_engine_note(model: String) -> String
+extern fn bounded_persona_floor() -> String
+extern fn operator_identity_block() -> String
 extern fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String
 extern fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_key(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_label(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn is_utility_request(body: String, session_id: String) -> Bool
+extern fn provenance_scan_urls(arr: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_add_sources(block: String, btype: String, has_cit: Bool, cit_raw: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_names(tools_used: String) -> String
+extern fn text_join_sep(accumulated: String, incoming: String, after_interruption: Bool) -> String
+extern fn receipt_rule() -> String
+extern fn receipt_strip(s: String) -> String
+extern fn tool_receipt(tools_used: String, sources: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim_with_bell_guard(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn clean_llm_response(s: String) -> String
-extern fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void
-extern fn conv_history_load() -> String
+extern fn conv_history_persist(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_load(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_history_record(session_id: String, user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String, receipt: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_block(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String, session_id: String) -> String
 extern fn session_preload_bullets(nodes: String, max_bullets: Int, snip_len: Int) -> String
+extern fn affective_context_prefix() -> String
 extern fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String
 extern fn handle_see(body: String) -> String
 extern fn studio_tools_json() -> String
@@ -37,6 +54,8 @@ extern fn llm_wire_format() -> String
 extern fn json_escape(s: String) -> String
 extern fn openai_chat_complete(model: String, base_url: String, api_key: String, safe_sys: String, messages_json: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_literal() -> String
+extern fn web_search_tool_json() -> String
+extern fn strip_client_web_search(tools_inner: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_with_web() -> String
 extern fn connector_tools_json() -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_all() -> String
@@ -46,6 +65,10 @@ extern fn call_neuron_mcp(tool_name: String, args: String) -> String
 extern fn agent_workspace_root() -> String
 extern fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool
 extern fn resolve_in_root(path: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn run_command_is_readonly(cmd: String) -> Bool
+extern fn cmd_abs_escape_at(cmd: String, root: String, needle: String) -> Bool
+extern fn run_command_guard(cmd: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn classify_tool_risk(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn is_builtin_tool(tool_name: String) -> Bool
 extern fn next_bridge_id() -> String

dist/elp-c-decls.h

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ el_val_t add_punct(el_val_t s, el_val_t intent);
 el_val_t add_to_seen(el_val_t seen, el_val_t node_id);
 el_val_t aff_try_slot(el_val_t slot_json, el_val_t aff_7d_ts, el_val_t acc_key);
 el_val_t affective_context_prefix(void);
+el_val_t is_utility_request(el_val_t body, el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t operator_identity_block(void);
+el_val_t provenance_add_sources(el_val_t block, el_val_t btype, el_val_t has_cit, el_val_t cit_raw, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t provenance_names(el_val_t tools_used);
+el_val_t provenance_scan_urls(el_val_t arr, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t text_join_sep(el_val_t accumulated, el_val_t incoming, el_val_t after_interruption);
+el_val_t receipt_rule(void);
+el_val_t receipt_strip(el_val_t s);
+el_val_t tool_receipt(el_val_t tools_used, el_val_t sources);
 el_val_t agent_number(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_person(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_workspace_root(void);
@@ -151,8 +160,12 @@ el_val_t cmd_abs_escape_at(el_val_t cmd, el_val_t root, el_val_t needle);
 el_val_t connectd_get(el_val_t suffix);
 el_val_t connectd_post(el_val_t suffix, el_val_t body);
 el_val_t connector_tools_json(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_load(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_hist_key(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_hist_label(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_block(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_load(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_history_record(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t user_msg, el_val_t assistant_msg, el_val_t receipt);
 el_val_t cop_article(el_val_t gender, el_val_t number, el_val_t definite);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_future(el_val_t prefix);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_perfect(el_val_t prefix);
@@ -782,7 +795,8 @@ el_val_t lang_profile_uga(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile_zh(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile(el_val_t code, el_val_t word_order, el_val_t morph_type, el_val_t has_case, el_val_t has_gender, el_val_t script_dir, el_val_t agreement, el_val_t null_subject);
 el_val_t lang_word_order(el_val_t profile);
-el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input);
+el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input, el_val_t session_id, el_val_t utility);
+el_val_t layered_generate(el_val_t prompt, el_val_t imprint_id, el_val_t session_id);
 el_val_t lex_class(el_val_t entry);
 el_val_t lex_form(el_val_t entry, el_val_t idx);
 el_val_t lex_pos(el_val_t entry);

dist/soul-with-nlg.el

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+// ╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
+// ║ STALE BUNDLE — DO NOT BUILD. UNSAFE CHAT PATH.                           ║
+// ╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
+// This concatenated bundle is a snapshot, not a source of truth, and it is stale in
+// a way that matters for safety: it wires /api/chat straight to handle_chat and
+// contains NO layered_cycle at all (verified: zero occurrences in the bundled code —
+// the only textual hit in this file is this banner). A binary built from
+// this file would run chat with no enforcing input gate (no safety_screen, no
+// hard-bell short-circuit) and no enforcing output gate (no safety_validate).
+//
+// Build from the .el sources via manifest.el (entry soul.el), or from dist/soul.c.
+// Nothing in the repo references this file. It is kept only as a historical artifact
+// and should be deleted once Will confirms nothing external depends on it.
+// (Flagged 2026-08-04 in _engine-websearch-20260804/SAFETY-STOP.md; banner added
+// 2026-08-05 with the plain-chat generation fix.)
 // language-profile.el - Language profile data and accessors.
 //
 // A language profile is a slot map ([String] key-value list) describing the

neuron-api.el

@@ -430,7 +430,130 @@ fn handle_api_node_update(body: String) -> String {
     return "{\"id\":\"" + new_id + "\",\"supersedes\":\"" + id + "\",\"ok\":true}"
 }
 
-// handle_api_recall — search or activate memory by query.
+// ── Recall through spreading activation ───────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// api_activation_depth — traversal depth for a retrieval query. Honours ?depth= /
+// body "depth" for callers that want a wider or tighter associative horizon;
+// defaults to 2, matching every other production activation caller (the
+// knowledge-search path here, chat.el's per-turn activation) — one hop reaches a
+// node's direct associations, two reaches its siblings through a shared hub,
+// which is exactly the sibling-recovery case recall was failing.
+fn api_activation_depth(path: String, body: String) -> Int {
+    let d: Int = api_query_int(path, "depth", 0)
+    let d = if d == 0 { json_get_int(body, "depth") } else { d }
+    if d <= 0 { return 2 }
+    return d
+}
+
+// api_merge_activated_nodes — project an activation result array down to a bare
+// node array in activation order, then backfill from the lexical seed list until
+// `limit` nodes are collected. Deduped by node id.
+//
+// SHAPE CONTRACT: the return value is a BARE array of full engram node objects —
+// byte-for-byte the same node JSON engram_search_json emits, so every existing
+// /recall consumer keeps working unchanged (the MCP wrapper's recall/
+// searchKnowledge, tools/telegram-gateway.sh which reads `.value.content`,
+// cli/neuron_mcp.py). Activation strength is a RANKING input here, not a payload
+// change; the scalars stay available on /api/activate and in compileCtx.
+fn api_merge_activated_nodes(act_raw: String, lex_raw: String, limit: Int) -> String {
+    let seen: String = ""
+    let out: String = ""
+    let n: Int = 0
+    // Pass 1 — activation-ranked. engram_activate_json already sorts promoted
+    // (working-memory) nodes first by wm_weight desc, then background-only nodes
+    // by background_activation desc, so element order IS the activation ranking.
+    let an: Int = if api_nonempty(act_raw) { json_array_len(act_raw) } else { 0 }
+    let i: Int = 0
+    while i < an && n < limit {
+        let entry: String = json_array_get(act_raw, i)
+        let anode: String = json_get_raw(entry, "node")
+        let aid: String = json_get(anode, "id")
+        let adup: Bool = str_eq(aid, "") || str_contains(seen, "<" + aid + ">")
+        let asep: String = if n == 0 { "" } else { "," }
+        let out  = if adup { out }  else { out + asep + anode }
+        let seen = if adup { seen } else { seen + "<" + aid + ">" }
+        let n    = if adup { n }    else { n + 1 }
+        let i = i + 1
+    }
+    // Pass 2 — lexical seed backfill (see the exact-lookup note on
+    // handle_api_recall). Only runs when activation left room under `limit`.
+    let ln: Int = if api_nonempty(lex_raw) { json_array_len(lex_raw) } else { 0 }
+    let j: Int = 0
+    while j < ln && n < limit {
+        let lnode: String = json_array_get(lex_raw, j)
+        let lid: String = json_get(lnode, "id")
+        let ldup: Bool = str_eq(lid, "") || str_contains(seen, "<" + lid + ">")
+        let lsep: String = if n == 0 { "" } else { "," }
+        let out  = if ldup { out }  else { out + lsep + lnode }
+        let seen = if ldup { seen } else { seen + "<" + lid + ">" }
+        let n    = if ldup { n }    else { n + 1 }
+        let j = j + 1
+    }
+    return "[" + out + "]"
+}
+
+// api_retrieve — THE retrieval path. Spreading activation over the weighted
+// directed graph, lexical seeds backfilling the tail.
+//
+// WAS (until 2026-08-07): `engram_search_json(q, limit)` alone — a case-
+// insensitive substring matcher scored by how many distinct query tokens appear
+// in a node's content/label/tags, tie-broken by raw salience. It never read a
+// single edge. Recall could not see an association: querying an identity value
+// returned unrelated documents that happened to contain the word, and NOT the
+// twelve sibling value nodes one hop off the same hub.
+//
+// NOW: recall runs the spreading-activation traversal that has been compiled
+// into the runtime the whole time (engram_activate / engram_activate_json,
+// el_runtime.c) and ranks by the resulting activation strength. This restores
+// the designed retrieval mechanism — Engram provisional 64/064,260, claim 1:
+// "no data is retrieved from the weighted directed graph except through the
+// spreading activation traversal", with activation strength computed as the
+// PRODUCT of parent strength, edge weight, target salience, and query/target
+// cosine similarity, because "the multiplication of all four factors enforces a
+// conjunctive property... addition would allow many weak associations to
+// accumulate into false relevance."
+//
+// SEEDING — derived from the runtime, not assumed. engram_activate takes the
+// query TEXT (not seed ids) and seeds internally in two passes: (1) lexical —
+// every node matching at least one query token seeds, with initial activation
+// = salience x temporal_decay x dampening x token_coverage, so a node covering
+// the whole phrase ignites harder than one covering a single word; (2) semantic
+// supplement — the top-K unreached nodes by cosine against the query embedding.
+// All four other production call sites (neuron-api.el begin_session/compileCtx,
+// chat.el:352/1715, awareness.el's curiosity scans) pass query text the same
+// way, so this follows the established convention exactly. The consequence for
+// recall is direct: the lexical surface recall used to RETURN is now the SEED
+// SET of the traversal, and what comes back is what those seeds activate. That
+// is why multi-word queries stop returning nothing — every token that matches
+// anything ignites, and the traversal ranks the resulting field.
+//
+// EXACT-LOOKUP GUARANTEE (no regression): engram_activate's result collector
+// drops any reached node whose background_activation x confidence < 0.1 unless
+// it was promoted to working memory, and it never seeds from InternalStateEvent
+// nodes. So a rare exact token on a dormant, low-salience node can seed the
+// traversal and still go unreported. Retrieval therefore appends the lexical
+// seed list after the activated ranking, deduped by id, until `limit` is filled.
+// This is a seeded hybrid, not a parallel search bolted alongside activation:
+// the backfill is the SAME seed set the traversal itself computed, restored to
+// the tail of the result rather than recomputed by a different mechanism.
+// Activation always leads the ranking; nothing that used to be findable becomes
+// unfindable.
+//
+// COST/EFFECT NOTE: activation is a stateful read by design — claim 29, "update
+// the last-activation timestamp and increment the activation count... in
+// response to any access to that node record during spreading activation
+// traversal". Promoted nodes get reinforced, working-memory weights are
+// rewritten, and the query folds into the context centroid. That is the
+// intended semantics of retrieval-as-activation and is already what every chat
+// turn does; it does mean recall now participates in shaping working memory.
+fn api_retrieve(q: String, path: String, body: String, limit: Int) -> String {
+    let depth: Int = api_activation_depth(path, body)
+    let act_raw: String = engram_activate_json(q, depth)
+    let lex_raw: String = engram_search_json(q, limit)
+    return api_or_empty(api_merge_activated_nodes(act_raw, lex_raw, limit))
+}
+
+// handle_api_recall — retrieve memory by query, through spreading activation.
 fn handle_api_recall(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     // Accept the query from the URL ?query= / ?q= params, or, when those are
     // empty (e.g. a POST with a JSON body), from the body fields "query"/"q".
@@ -450,8 +573,7 @@ fn handle_api_recall(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     if str_eq(eff_q, "") {
         return api_or_empty(engram_scan_nodes_json(limit, 0))
     }
-    let results: String = engram_search_json(eff_q, limit)
-    return api_or_empty(results)
+    return api_retrieve(eff_q, path, body, limit)
 }
 
 // ── Knowledge ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -470,13 +592,15 @@ fn handle_api_search_knowledge(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> St
     let limit = if limit == 0 { json_get_int(body, "limit") } else { limit }
     let limit = if limit == 0 { 10 } else { limit }
     if str_eq(q, "") { return api_err("query is required") }
-    let results: String = engram_search_json(q, limit)
-    if str_eq(results, "") { return "[]" }
-    let first: String = str_slice(results, 0, 1)
-    if !str_eq(first, "[") && !str_eq(first, "{") {
-        return api_or_empty(engram_activate_json(q, 2))
-    }
-    return results
+    // Same retrieval path as recall — and it is the SAME change, not a copy of
+    // one. The "activate fallback" this replaced was unreachable dead code: it
+    // only fired when engram_search_json's return did not start with '[' or '{',
+    // and engram_search_json always emits a '['-prefixed array (el_runtime.c
+    // jb_putc('[') before any hit test), so the guard was false on every call
+    // including the zero-hit "[]" case. Knowledge search therefore had exactly
+    // the substring-matcher behavior recall had, with a comment claiming
+    // otherwise. Routing it through api_retrieve makes the claim true.
+    return api_retrieve(q, path, body, limit)
 }
 
 // handle_api_browse_knowledge — list Knowledge nodes.

routes.el

@@ -15,6 +15,40 @@ fn flag_true(body: String, key: String) -> Bool {
     return json_get_bool(body, key) || json_get_int(body, key) > 0
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// plain_chat_envelope — the JSON response contract for a non-agentic ("Tools: Off")
+// chat turn. Every /api/chat dispatch that calls layered_cycle goes through here, so
+// the three call sites cannot drift apart.
+//
+// WHY THE ENVELOPE IS BUILT HERE AND NOT INSIDE layered_cycle:
+// layered_cycle returns the user-facing text AFTER safety_validate has acted on it.
+// Keeping the JSON out of the cycle means the output gate always sees raw model text
+// and never an escaped blob — there is nothing to unwrap and re-wrap on the crisis
+// path, which is exactly the failure mode that made wiring handle_chat unsafe.
+// Escaping is the last thing that happens, strictly after the gate.
+//
+// FIELDS: `reply` and `response` carry the same validated text. Both are required by
+// live clients — the desktop app reads `reply` first (DaemonClient.parseChatResponse),
+// while the CLI tools and the Telegram gateway read `response` (the gateway reads only
+// `response`). Emitting one would break the other.
+//
+// EMPTY MEANS FAILURE, NOT AN EMPTY ANSWER: a hard bell returns the fixed crisis
+// message and a soft bell is padded to non-empty by safety_validate, so the only way
+// an empty string leaves the cycle is a failed model call. It is reported as an error
+// rather than dressed up as a successful blank reply.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+fn plain_chat_envelope(validated: String, model: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(validated, "") {
+        return "{\"error\":\"llm unavailable\",\"reply\":\"\",\"response\":\"\",\"agentic\":false,\"tools_used\":[]}"
+    }
+    let safe: String = json_safe(validated)
+    return "{\"reply\":\"" + safe + "\""
+        + ",\"response\":\"" + safe + "\""
+        + ",\"model\":\"" + json_safe(model) + "\""
+        + ",\"agentic\":false"
+        + ",\"tools_used\":[]}"
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Rate limiting — simple in-memory per-IP sliding window counter.
 //
@@ -243,8 +277,14 @@ fn handle_dharma_recv(body: String) -> String {
         } else if agentic_flag {
             handle_chat_agentic(chat_body)
         } else {
-            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
-            screened_reply
+            // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off"): the full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle, which now generates
+            // at L3 instead of echoing. Envelope built outside the cycle — see
+            // plain_chat_envelope.
+            // FIX B/E1 (2026-08-05): the cycle is told which conversation it is in, and
+            // whether this generation is conversation at all. Same two arguments at all
+            // three dispatch sites.
+            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(chat_body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(chat_body, json_get(chat_body, "session_id")))
+            plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
         }
         auto_persist(chat_body, reply)
         return reply
@@ -416,8 +456,11 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
             } else if agentic_flag {
                 handle_chat_agentic(body)
             } else {
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg)
-                screened_reply
+                // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — same cycle and same envelope as POST.
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. A GET probe usually carries no session_id, which
+                // resolves to the anonymous window — the documented behaviour for this door.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
+                plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)
             return reply
@@ -580,8 +623,13 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
             } else if agentic_flag {
                 handle_chat_agentic(body)
             } else {
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
-                screened_reply
+                // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — the app's DEFAULT mode (AgentMode.NEVER).
+                // Full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle with real generation at L3; envelope built
+                // outside the cycle so safety_validate always sees raw text.
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. This is the app's main plain-chat door, so this
+                // is the site that ends the blank stare in practice.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
+                plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)
             return reply

scripts/run-el-test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# run-el-test.sh — compile and run one El test program from tests/.
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS (2026-08-07, issue #129):
+#   tests/ has held 14 test programs for months with no way to run them. CI does
+#   not run them. The convention printed in their own headers
+#   (`elc soul.el && ./soul --test tests/x.el`) refers to a --test flag the El
+#   runtime does not implement. So the tests were documentation, not gates —
+#   which is how a P0 safety regression shipped with a test directory present.
+#
+# THE RECIPE, AND WHY IT IS THIS SHAPE:
+#   Same discovery as gen-soul-amalgam.sh — `elc --target=c` emits only an extern
+#   prototype for any module that has a .elh header next to it, and inlines the
+#   module's bodies when it does not. A test that imports ../chat.el therefore
+#   compiles to a 18 KB unit full of unresolved externs unless the headers are
+#   out of the way. So: copy the sources into a scratch tree, delete every .elh
+#   on the import chain, and compile the test there.
+#
+#   Scratch copy on purpose: the worktree is shared with other terminals and
+#   deleting headers in place would be a shared-tree mutation with no owner.
+#
+# EXIT STATUS IS THE GATE: non-zero if the binary fails to build, crashes, or if
+# its output contains a FAIL line or reports a non-zero failed count. Do not
+# "improve" this into something that only checks the exit code of the test
+# binary — these El tests print failures and still exit 0.
+#
+# usage: scripts/run-el-test.sh tests/test_history_amplification.el
+set -euo pipefail
+
+TEST_REL="${1:?usage: run-el-test.sh tests/<test>.el}"
+SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+TEST_NAME="$(basename "$TEST_REL" .el)"
+
+ELC="${ELC:-$HOME/neuron-dev-stack/src/el/lang/dist/platform/elc}"
+[ -x "$ELC" ] || ELC="$HOME/el-sdk/elc"
+[ -x "$ELC" ] || { echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: no elc found (set ELC=)"; exit 1; }
+
+RTC="${RTC:-$SRC/vendor/el-runtime/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c}"
+[ -f "$RTC" ] || RTC="$HOME/el-sdk/el_runtime.c"
+[ -f "$RTC" ] || { echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: no el_runtime.c found (set RTC=)"; exit 1; }
+RTDIR="$(dirname "$RTC")"
+
+EL_REPO="${EL_REPO:-$HOME/Development/neuron-technologies/el}"
+SSL="${SSL_PREFIX:-/opt/homebrew/opt/openssl@3}"
+
+GEN="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/el-test.XXXXXX")"
+trap 'rm -rf "$GEN"' EXIT
+
+mkdir -p "$GEN/neuron/tests" "$GEN/foundation/el/elp/src"
+cp "$SRC"/*.el "$GEN/neuron/"
+cp "$SRC"/tests/*.el "$GEN/neuron/tests/" 2>/dev/null || true
+[ -d "$EL_REPO/elp/src" ] && cp "$EL_REPO"/elp/src/*.el "$GEN/foundation/el/elp/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
+# The whole recipe depends on there being no headers to short-circuit inlining.
+find "$GEN" -name '*.elh' -delete
+
+echo "[run-el-test] compiling $TEST_REL"
+( cd "$GEN/neuron" && "$ELC" --target=c "tests/${TEST_NAME}.el" ) > "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c"
+
+BODIES=$(grep -c '^el_val_t .*) {$' "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" || true)
+echo "[run-el-test] $(wc -c < "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" | tr -d ' ') bytes, ${BODIES} inlined function bodies"
+# A test that imports ../chat.el pulls in the bulk of the engine. A tiny body
+# count means an import was read from a header instead of inlined, and the test
+# would be exercising extern stubs rather than the real code.
+if [ "$BODIES" -lt 100 ]; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: only $BODIES inlined bodies — an import was not inlined"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cc -O2 -DHAVE_CURL \
+   -I"$RTDIR" -I"$SSL/include" -L"$SSL/lib" \
+   "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" "$RTC" \
+   -lssl -lcrypto -lcurl -lpthread -lm \
+   -o "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}" 2> "$GEN/cc.log" || {
+     echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: compile error"; tail -30 "$GEN/cc.log"; exit 1; }
+
+# arm64 pointer-truncation guard (cc-brain.sh's rule): an implicit declaration of
+# a runtime symbol truncates its returned pointer to 32 bits.
+if grep -E 'implicit.*(engram_|el_)' "$GEN/cc.log"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: implicit declarations of runtime symbols"; exit 1; fi
+
+# Throwaway HOME so a test can never read or write the live engram at ~/.neuron.
+TEST_HOME="$GEN/home"
+mkdir -p "$TEST_HOME"
+
+echo "[run-el-test] running $TEST_NAME"
+set +e
+HOME="$TEST_HOME" NEURON_HOME="$TEST_HOME/.neuron" "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}" 2>&1 | tee "$GEN/out.txt"
+RC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
+set -e
+
+if [ "$RC" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME exited $RC (crash or abort)"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q "  FAIL:" "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME reported failing assertions"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if grep -qE '[1-9][0-9]* failed' "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME reported a non-zero failed count"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q "PASS:" "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME produced no assertions at all"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "[run-el-test] PASS: $TEST_NAME"

soul.el

@@ -379,9 +379,23 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
 // layered_cycle — routes user-facing requests through the 4-layer consciousness stack.
 // L0 (core) → L1 (safety screen) → L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) → L2b (mission alignment) → L3 (imprint) → L1 (safety validate)
 // Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers — use one_cycle directly.
-fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
-    let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
+//
+// FIX B (2026-08-05) — the cycle now knows which conversation it is in.
+//
+// session_id: the caller's session, threaded from the route. Was previously read from the
+// state key "current_session_id", which is read HERE and written NOWHERE in the entire
+// source — verified across every .el file. So this value was unconditionally "", and every
+// downstream consumer of it silently fell back to a process-global bucket: conversation
+// history, and the steward's continuity tracking (TODO reliability #4, below, describes the
+// cross-session bleed this caused; threading the real id closes it). The plain path's blank
+// stare and the agentic path's scoped history were the same defect seen from two sides.
+//
+// utility: true when the generation is not part of the user's conversation — the app's
+// title and insight passes. Answered normally, never recorded. See is_utility_request.
+fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String {
+    // Safety-screen history amplification now reads the SAME window the turn will be
+    // recorded into, so a session's own escalation pattern is what gets scored.
+    let history: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(session_id))
 
     // L1 in: safety screen
     let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
@@ -423,8 +437,10 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     let cont_action: String = json_get(continuity, "action")
 
     // Store continuity status so imprint can adjust its response register.
-    // TODO(reliability #4): session_continuity is process-global; scope per session_id
-    // when available to prevent cross-session bleed under concurrent layered_cycle calls.
+    // TODO(reliability #4) CLOSED 2026-08-05: this line was already written to scope per
+    // session — it just never received a session id, because the only source was a state key
+    // nothing wrote. It is now threaded from the route, so named sessions genuinely get their
+    // own continuity state and only anonymous callers share the global one.
     let cont_key: String = if str_eq(session_id, "") { "session_continuity" } else { "session_continuity:" + session_id }
     state_set(cont_key, cont_status)
 
@@ -453,40 +469,24 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     let lc_aff_cutoff: Int = time_now() - 259200
     let lc_bell_nodes: String = engram_search_json("bell:soft bell:hard BellEvent affective", 2)
     let lc_has_bell: Bool = !str_eq(lc_bell_nodes, "") && !str_eq(lc_bell_nodes, "[]")
+    // CRASH FIX 2026-08-05 (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1): the " | ts:" parser used to be inline here.
+    // Inside this block-expression initializer elc compiled `lbmp + str_len(lbm)` to
+    // el_str_concat() on two integers, which segfaulted the whole daemon the moment a
+    // distress turn followed an earlier affective turn — i.e. exactly on the crisis path.
+    // Verified against the unmodified baseline binary AND present in the committed
+    // dist/soul.c. affective_node_ts() is a top-level function, where the same expression
+    // compiles to integer addition. Do not inline it back.
     let lc_bell_note: String = if lc_has_bell {
         let lb0: String = json_array_get(lc_bell_nodes, 0)
-        let lb_c: String = json_get(lb0, "content")
-        let lbm: String = " | ts:"
-        let lbmp: Int = str_index_of(lb_c, lbm)
-        let lb_ts_raw: String = if lbmp >= 0 {
-            let lbs: Int = lbmp + str_len(lbm)
-            let lbr: String = str_slice(lb_c, lbs, str_len(lb_c))
-            let lbn: Int = str_index_of(lbr, " | ")
-            if lbn < 0 { lbr } else { str_slice(lbr, 0, lbn) }
-        } else {
-            let lbca: String = json_get(lb0, "created_at")
-            if str_eq(lbca, "") { json_get(lb0, "updated_at") } else { lbca }
-        }
-        let lb_ts: Int = if str_eq(lb_ts_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(lb_ts_raw) }
+        let lb_ts: Int = affective_node_ts(lb0)
         if lb_ts > lc_aff_cutoff { "[AFFECTIVE NOTE: User was in distress in a recent session.]" } else { "" }
     } else { "" }
     let lc_pos_nodes: String = engram_search_json("PositiveEvent joy:high joy:low affective", 2)
     let lc_has_pos: Bool = !str_eq(lc_pos_nodes, "") && !str_eq(lc_pos_nodes, "[]")
+    // Same crash fix as the bell note above (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1).
     let lc_pos_note: String = if lc_has_pos && str_eq(lc_bell_note, "") {
         let lp0: String = json_array_get(lc_pos_nodes, 0)
-        let lp_c: String = json_get(lp0, "content")
-        let lpm: String = " | ts:"
-        let lpmp: Int = str_index_of(lp_c, lpm)
-        let lp_ts_raw: String = if lpmp >= 0 {
-            let lps: Int = lpmp + str_len(lpm)
-            let lpr: String = str_slice(lp_c, lps, str_len(lp_c))
-            let lpn: Int = str_index_of(lpr, " | ")
-            if lpn < 0 { lpr } else { str_slice(lpr, 0, lpn) }
-        } else {
-            let lpca: String = json_get(lp0, "created_at")
-            if str_eq(lpca, "") { json_get(lp0, "updated_at") } else { lpca }
-        }
-        let lp_ts: Int = if str_eq(lp_ts_raw, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(lp_ts_raw) }
+        let lp_ts: Int = affective_node_ts(lp0)
         if lp_ts > lc_aff_cutoff { "[AFFECTIVE NOTE: User shared positive news in a recent session.]" } else { "" }
     } else { "" }
     let lc_affective_note: String = if !str_eq(lc_bell_note, "") { lc_bell_note } else { lc_pos_note }
@@ -498,11 +498,47 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     }
     state_set("layered_cycle_safety_system_addendum", augmented_addendum)
 
-    // L3: imprint responds
-    let output: String = imprint_respond(aligned, imprint_id)
+    // L3: imprint responds — applies the active imprint's voice/domain annotation to the
+    // steward-aligned input. This produces the PROMPT, not the answer.
+    let prompt: String = imprint_respond(aligned, imprint_id)
 
-    // L1 out: validate output before delivery
-    return safety_validate(output, screen_action)
+    // L3b: the imprint SPEAKS (added 2026-08-05).
+    //
+    // Until now the cycle stopped at the annotation above, so /api/chat with agentic:false
+    // handed the user's own screened text back as the "reply" — every gate ran, but nothing
+    // ever generated. The generation is placed HERE, inside the cycle, rather than by
+    // pointing the route at handle_chat(): handle_chat has no enforcing input gate and no
+    // enforcing output gate, so calling it instead of this cycle would have traded the whole
+    // safety pipeline for a working reply. Composing keeps both.
+    //
+    // Order is deliberate and must not be rearranged: this call sits strictly AFTER the L1
+    // screen, the safe-mode guard, the hard-bell short-circuit and the L2 stewardship layers,
+    // and strictly BEFORE the L1 output gate. A hard bell never reaches a model — the branch
+    // above returns first. Tools are not offered on this turn; see layered_generate.
+    let output: String = layered_generate(prompt, imprint_id, session_id)
+
+    // L1 out: validate output before delivery. Still the terminal gate — nothing below this
+    // line can change the string this function returns.
+    let validated: String = safety_validate(output, screen_action)
+
+    // Turn bookkeeping. Records the VALIDATED text, never the raw model output, and is only
+    // reachable on the non-bell path: both bell branches above return before this point, so
+    // bell turns still never enter conversation history. Pure state side effect — it cannot
+    // alter what is returned.
+    //
+    // FIX A: the receipt is unconditional and always negative on this path, because on this
+    // path it is structurally true — layered_generate offers no tools at all (build_system_prompt
+    // chat mode + a request body with no "tools" key). Recording "no tools ran" is not padding:
+    // it is the only thing that distinguishes "nothing ran" from "we forgot to write down what
+    // ran", and that ambiguity is what made the model confess to a search it had performed.
+    //
+    // FIX E1: a utility generation is answered but not recorded. Guarded here rather than at
+    // the route so every /api/chat dispatch site inherits it from one place.
+    let receipt: String = tool_receipt("", "")
+    if !utility {
+        conv_history_record(session_id, raw_input, validated, receipt)
+    }
+    return validated
 }
 
 let soul_cgi_id_raw: String = env("SOUL_CGI_ID")

soul.elh

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 // auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn init_soul_edges() -> Void
+extern fn ensure_self_canonical_bridge() -> Void
+extern fn aff_try_slot(slot_json: String, aff_7d_ts: Int, acc_key: String) -> Void
 extern fn load_identity_context() -> Void
 extern fn seed_persona_from_env() -> Void
 extern fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void
-extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String

tests/test_history_amplification.el

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+// ── test_history_amplification.el ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// REGRESSION TEST FOR ISSUE #129 (P0, SAFETY).
+//
+// What this guards: on the agentic path, the crisis score has two halves — the
+// message you just sent, and the distress that has accumulated across the
+// conversation. The second half is the whole reason the escalation logic exists:
+// someone whose distress builds over several turns never sends one message that
+// trips the bell on its own.
+//
+// The defect this test was written against (ff421d3, 2026-08-05 → fixed
+// 2026-08-07): conversation history moved to a per-session key via
+// conv_hist_key(session_id), but the agentic path's safety screen was left
+// reading the old anonymous "conv_history" bucket. The desktop app always sends
+// a session_id, so the screen received "" on every real conversation and the
+// escalation half always scored 0. Nothing failed. Nothing logged. The comment
+// above the defective line documented this same bug being fixed once before.
+//
+// THE INVARIANT UNDER TEST, stated so it survives future renames:
+//   the window the safety screen READS must be the window conv_history_record
+//   WRITES. Not "must be called conv_history" — must AGREE.
+//
+// This test is deliberately written to fail loudly on the pre-fix source. If it
+// ever passes on code where the screen reads a key nothing writes, it is broken.
+//
+// To run (macOS, from the worktree root):
+//   scripts/run-el-test.sh tests/test_history_amplification.el
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import "../chat.el"
+import "../safety.el"
+import "../sessions.el"
+
+// Program class. Without this an El program compiles as a 'utility', and a
+// utility may not call the self-formation primitives (llm_call_system,
+// llm_vision) that chat.el's agentic loop references — the unit fails to
+// compile with a capability violation even though the test never calls them.
+// Declaring 'cgi' matches how soul.el declares itself.
+//
+// The endpoints below are deliberately DEAD: this test must never reach a live
+// engram, and nothing it asserts depends on one. Port 9 is discard.
+cgi "neuron-test-history-amplification" {
+    dharma_id: "ntn-test@http://127.0.0.1:9",
+    principal: "test-harness",
+    network:   "dharma-testnet",
+    engram:    "http://127.0.0.1:9"
+}
+
+// ── Counters ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// NOTE for anyone copying this harness: the idiom used by the older tests in
+// this directory — `let pass_count = pass_count + 1` inside an assert function —
+// does NOT mutate the module-level binding. It declares a new local that dies
+// with the call, so those suites all print "0 passed, 0 failed" no matter what
+// happened. Counters go through the state store here so the summary is real.
+
+fn bump(counter: String) -> Void {
+    let cur: String = state_get(counter)
+    let n: Int = if str_eq(cur, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(cur) }
+    state_set(counter, int_to_str(n + 1))
+}
+
+fn counter_of(counter: String) -> Int {
+    let cur: String = state_get(counter)
+    if str_eq(cur, "") { return 0 }
+    return str_to_int(cur)
+}
+
+fn assert_eq(label: String, got: String, expected: String) -> Void {
+    if str_eq(got, expected) {
+        bump("t_pass")
+        println("  PASS: " + label)
+    } else {
+        bump("t_fail")
+        println("  FAIL: " + label)
+        println("    got:      " + got)
+        println("    expected: " + expected)
+    }
+}
+
+fn assert_true(label: String, cond: Bool) -> Void {
+    if cond {
+        bump("t_pass")
+        println("  PASS: " + label)
+    } else {
+        bump("t_fail")
+        println("  FAIL: " + label)
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Fixtures ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// ESCALATION_MSG scores 50 on its own ("can't go on", safety_score_crisis s9).
+// 50 is >= soft (35) and < hard (70): a soft bell by itself, which is the point.
+// It is the message that is only a crisis IN CONTEXT.
+//
+// DISTRESS_TURN carries five history phrases:
+//   hopeless 15 + worthless 15 + nobody cares 15 + can't take it anymore 20
+//   + want to disappear 20 = 85; contributed at 1/3 weight = 28.
+// 50 + 28 = 78 >= 70 → hard_bell. That 28-point swing IS the escalation logic,
+// and it is exactly what the defect suppressed.
+
+let TEST_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-history-amplification"
+let ESCALATION_MSG: String = "honestly i can't go on like this"
+let DISTRESS_TURN: String = "i feel hopeless and worthless, nobody cares, i can't take it anymore, i want to disappear"
+
+println("")
+println("test_history_amplification.el — issue #129 (agentic multi-turn crisis escalation)")
+
+// ── 1. Baseline: the message alone is a SOFT bell, not a hard one ─────────────
+//
+// If this ever returns hard_bell, the test below proves nothing — the message
+// would trip the bell without any history and the amplification would be
+// invisible. This assertion is what keeps the real test honest.
+
+println("")
+println("1. baseline — escalation message with NO history is a soft bell")
+
+let baseline: String = safety_screen(ESCALATION_MSG, "")
+assert_eq("no history -> soft_bell (not hard)", json_get(baseline, "action"), "soft_bell")
+
+// ── 2. Producer sanity: history lands in the session's own window ─────────────
+
+println("")
+println("2. producer — conv_history_record writes the session's window")
+
+conv_history_record(TEST_SESSION, DISTRESS_TURN, "i hear you, that sounds heavy", "")
+
+let written: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(TEST_SESSION))
+assert_true("session window is non-empty after record", !str_eq(written, ""))
+assert_true("session window contains the distress turn", str_contains(written, "hopeless"))
+
+// ── 3. THE REGRESSION: the agentic screen must SEE that window ────────────────
+//
+// Pre-fix this returns soft_bell, because agentic_safety_screen read the
+// anonymous bucket and got "". Post-fix it returns hard_bell.
+
+println("")
+println("3. REGRESSION #129 — agentic screen reads the session's own window")
+
+let screened: String = agentic_safety_screen(TEST_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq(
+    "distress history escalates the agentic screen to hard_bell",
+    json_get(screened, "action"),
+    "hard_bell"
+)
+
+// ── 4. The invariant, stated directly ─────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Independent of thresholds and phrase lists: whatever the screen reads for a
+// session must equal what the recorder wrote for that session. This is the
+// assertion that survives a future rename of either side.
+
+println("")
+println("4. invariant — read window == written window")
+
+let read_back: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(TEST_SESSION))
+assert_true("screen input is the recorded window, not empty", !str_eq(read_back, ""))
+assert_eq("read window is byte-identical to written window", read_back, written)
+
+// ── 5. No false positive: a calm session does not escalate ────────────────────
+//
+// A test that only ever asserts "hard_bell" would pass on code that hard-bells
+// every message. This is the other leg, and it runs BEFORE the anonymous case
+// below on purpose: that case writes the shared bucket, and under the defect a
+// calm session would then inherit it.
+
+println("")
+println("5. specificity — a calm history does NOT escalate")
+
+let CALM_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-calm"
+state_set("conv_history", "")
+conv_history_record(CALM_SESSION, "what is the weather like today", "clear and mild", "")
+let calm: String = agentic_safety_screen(CALM_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq("calm history stays at soft_bell", json_get(calm, "action"), "soft_bell")
+
+// ── 6. Cross-session leakage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The same defect had a second face: because the screen read one shared bucket,
+// a calm session could be scored against a DIFFERENT session's distress. That is
+// wrong in both directions — it fabricates a crisis for the calm user and it
+// leaks the distressed user's content into another session's scoring.
+
+println("")
+println("6. isolation — one session's distress must not score another session")
+
+state_set("conv_history", "")
+let OTHER_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-other"
+conv_history_record(OTHER_SESSION, DISTRESS_TURN, "i hear you", "")
+let isolated: String = agentic_safety_screen(CALM_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq(
+    "a distressed OTHER session does not escalate the calm session",
+    json_get(isolated, "action"),
+    "soft_bell"
+)
+
+// ── 7. Anonymous sessions still work ──────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// conv_hist_key("") deliberately falls back to the shared "conv_history" bucket.
+// The fix must not break the no-session_id path older callers rely on. Runs last
+// because it writes that shared bucket.
+
+println("")
+println("7. anonymous path — empty session_id still screens against the shared window")
+
+state_set("conv_history", "[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"" + DISTRESS_TURN + "\"}]")
+let anon: String = agentic_safety_screen("", ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq("anonymous session escalates too", json_get(anon, "action"), "hard_bell")
+
+// ── Summary ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+println("")
+println("history amplification tests: " + int_to_str(counter_of("t_pass")) + " passed, " + int_to_str(counter_of("t_fail")) + " failed")

vendor/el-runtime/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>     /* SIGPIPE disposition — see el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe */
 #include <pthread.h>
 #include <curl/curl.h>
 
@@ -1238,16 +1239,77 @@ static const char* http_reason_phrase(int status) {
     }
 }
 
-/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes. */
+/* ── A departing client MUST NOT be able to kill the daemon ──────────────────
+ * (2026-08-06, round 9.1 / ADR 0006 item 4.)
+ *
+ * Measured field failure: a client cancelled its request at 25 s; the handler
+ * finished its work at 116.9 s and wrote the reply into the departed client's
+ * socket. The second send() on a reset connection raised SIGPIPE, whose DEFAULT
+ * disposition terminates the process — `exited due to SIGPIPE ... ran for
+ * 361177ms`. launchd respawned 4 ms later, so EVERY other in-flight request on
+ * that daemon lost its work, silently.
+ *
+ * Two independent guards, because one of them can be undone from outside this
+ * file (an embedder may reset signal dispositions) and the other cannot:
+ *   1. process-wide SIGPIPE -> SIG_IGN, installed at runtime init;
+ *   2. per-send suppression at the syscall (MSG_NOSIGNAL where the platform has
+ *      it, SO_NOSIGPIPE on the accepted socket on macOS/BSD).
+ * With either in force, send() reports the peer's departure as EPIPE and the
+ * caller decides — which is the point: this is an ordinary I/O outcome, not a
+ * fatal condition.
+ *
+ * It deliberately does NOT swallow the error. http_send_response() below
+ * classifies the errno and logs: "client left" for a departure, and a real
+ * "send failed: <strerror>" for anything else, so a genuine write fault is
+ * still visible in the log (spec round-9.1 §5.3).                            */
+
+#ifndef MSG_NOSIGNAL
+#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0
+#endif
+
+void el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe(void) {
+    static int done = 0;
+    if (done) return;
+    done = 1;
+    struct sigaction sa;
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+    sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+    sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Suppress SIGPIPE for one accepted connection (macOS/BSD have no
+ * MSG_NOSIGNAL; they have the socket option instead). Best effort. */
+static void http_socket_nosigpipe(int fd) {
+#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
+    int on = 1;
+    setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, &on, sizeof(on));
+#else
+    (void)fd;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with errno preserved for the caller. */
 static int http_send_all(int fd, const char* p, size_t left) {
     while (left > 0) {
-        ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, 0);
-        if (w <= 0) return -1;
+        ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+        if (w < 0) {
+            if (errno == EINTR) continue;       /* not an error — retry */
+            return -1;                          /* errno stays set for caller */
+        }
+        if (w == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; }
         p += w; left -= (size_t)w;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
+/* Did this write fail because the client is gone, or because something is
+ * actually wrong with the socket? Only the first is routine. */
+static int http_write_err_is_client_gone(int e) {
+    return e == EPIPE || e == ECONNRESET || e == ENOTCONN || e == ESHUTDOWN;
+}
+
 /* Discriminator that http_response() embeds at the start of its envelope.
  * A handler returning a string starting with this exact prefix is treated
  * as a structured response; anything else is treated as a raw body. */
@@ -1468,14 +1530,30 @@ static void http_send_response(int fd, const char* body) {
         free(env_body); free(hdrs.buf); return;
     }
 
-    if (http_send_all(fd, status_line, (size_t)sl) == 0
-     && http_send_all(fd, hdrs.buf,    hdrs.len)   == 0
-     && http_send_all(fd, tail,        (size_t)tl) == 0
-     && (head_only
-         /* HEAD requests echo headers + Content-Length but no body. */
-         ? 1
-         : http_send_all(fd, eff_body, blen) == 0)) {
-        /* sent successfully */
+    /* The reply is written in four pieces; any of them can find the client
+     * already gone. errno is captured at the first failure, before any later
+     * library call can clobber it, and classified once below. */
+    errno = 0;
+    int send_err = 0;
+    if (http_send_all(fd, status_line, (size_t)sl) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (http_send_all(fd, hdrs.buf, hdrs.len) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (http_send_all(fd, tail, (size_t)tl) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (!head_only /* HEAD echoes headers + Content-Length, no body. */
+             && http_send_all(fd, eff_body, blen) != 0) send_err = errno;
+
+    if (send_err) {
+        if (http_write_err_is_client_gone(send_err)) {
+            /* ROUTINE. The user closed the window, quit the app, or cancelled.
+             * The work is done and the daemon keeps serving everyone else. */
+            fprintf(stderr, "[http] client left before the reply was written "
+                            "(%zu-byte body, %s) - request completed, reply discarded\n",
+                    blen, strerror(send_err));
+        } else {
+            /* NOT routine — a real write fault. Never let the client-gone case
+             * above hide this one. */
+            fprintf(stderr, "[http] send failed: %s (%zu-byte body)\n",
+                    strerror(send_err), blen);
+        }
     }
 
     if (env_parsed_root) el_release(env_parsed_root);
@@ -1491,6 +1569,7 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
     HttpWorkerArg* a = (HttpWorkerArg*)arg;
     int fd = a->fd;
     free(a);
+    http_socket_nosigpipe(fd);
     char *method = NULL, *path = NULL, *body = NULL;
     if (http_read_request(fd, &method, &path, &body, NULL) == 0) {
         http_handler_fn h = http_lookup_active();
@@ -1531,6 +1610,7 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
 }
 
 void http_serve(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     /* If `handler` looks like a string name, register it as the active handler. */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
@@ -1634,6 +1714,7 @@ static void* _http_serve_async_loop(void* raw) {
 }
 
 void http_serve_async(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
         http_set_handler(handler);
@@ -1821,6 +1902,7 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
     HttpWorkerArg* a = (HttpWorkerArg*)arg;
     int fd = a->fd;
     free(a);
+    http_socket_nosigpipe(fd);
     char *method = NULL, *path = NULL, *body = NULL, *hdr_block = NULL;
     if (http_read_request(fd, &method, &path, &body, &hdr_block) == 0) {
         http_handler4_fn h = http_lookup_active_v2();
@@ -1858,6 +1940,7 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
 }
 
 void http_serve_v2(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
         http_set_handler_v2(handler);
@@ -5511,6 +5594,9 @@ el_val_t getpid_now(void) {
 static el_val_t _el_args_list = 0;
 
 void el_runtime_init_args(int argc, char** argv) {
+    /* First line of every generated main(): a client that leaves must never be
+     * able to signal this process to death. See el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe. */
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();
     _el_args_list = el_list_empty();
     for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
         _el_args_list = el_list_append(_el_args_list, EL_STR(argv[i]));