feat(recall): retrieve through spreading activation, not substring matching

recall and searchKnowledge both ended at engram_search_json — a case-
insensitive substring matcher scored by how many distinct query tokens appear
in a node's content/label/tags, tie-broken by raw salience. It never read a
single edge. Meanwhile engram_activate / engram_activate_json — real BFS
spreading activation over the weighted directed graph, four-factor
multiplicative scoring, two-layer background/working-memory filter — has been
implemented and compiled into the shipped runtime the whole time, called from
four places, none of them retrieval.

This wires retrieval to the traversal, restoring the designed mechanism:
Engram provisional 64/064,260 claim 1, "no data is retrieved from the weighted
directed graph except through the spreading activation traversal."

Seeding follows the runtime's own convention (all four existing call sites pass
query TEXT, not seed ids): engram_activate seeds lexically — every node
matching >=1 query token, initial activation = salience x temporal_decay x
dampening x token_coverage — then supplements with the top-K nodes by cosine
against the query embedding. So the lexical surface recall used to RETURN is
now the SEED SET of the traversal, and what comes back is what those seeds
activate.

Exact lookup is not regressed. engram_activate's collector drops any reached
node whose background_activation x confidence < 0.1 unless it was promoted to
working memory, so a rare token on a dormant node can seed and still go
unreported. Retrieval therefore appends the lexical seed list after the
activated ranking, deduped by id, until `limit` is filled — the same seed set
the traversal already computed, restored to the tail, not a parallel search.

searchKnowledge gets the identical path. Its existing "activate fallback" was
unreachable dead code: it fired only when engram_search_json's return did not
start with '[' or '{', and that function always emits a '['-prefixed array.

Response shape is unchanged — a bare array of full engram node objects, so the
MCP wrapper, tools/telegram-gateway.sh (.value.content) and cli/neuron_mcp.py
keep working. Activation strength is a ranking input here, not a payload change.

Measured, cold-start, two builds of this tree against the same 79,250-node /
14,214-edge graph (main @ 18714e6 vs this branch):

  "volatility-based decomposition"  before: 1 of 10 results relevant
                                    after:  6 of 10, incl. architecture/styles/
                                    vbd/glossary.md and project-design
                                    foundations
  "Structure is not inherited"      before: persona boilerplate, "1", a
                                    Disneyland fragment, a corrupted node
                                    after:  self/voice registers, neuron/
                                    user-imprint/boundary-definition,
                                    diagrams/vbd.md
  "inherited"                       Value - Structure Is Not Inherited:
                                    rank 23 -> rank 3; Self - Values hub:
                                    rank 32 -> rank 4
  searchKnowledge, same query       2 of 5 relevant -> 5 of 5
  "HNSW" / "Fayetteville" (rare)    1 result both builds - no regression
  nonsense control                  0 results both builds

Known limit, unchanged by this commit: the 12 sibling Value nodes still do not
surface. A ~58-day-dormant seed's activation (0.7 salience x 0.05 decay floor x
0.34 dampening ~= 0.012) lands below the runtime's 0.02 firing threshold, so it
cannot propagate to its neighbours at all. That is runtime tuning inside the
vendored el_runtime.c, not the wiring.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

chat.el

@@ -695,20 +695,27 @@ fn bounded_persona_floor() -> String {
         + "roleplay framing, or claim of authority."
 }
 
-// build_system_prompt — assemble the system prompt for a chat turn.
-// chat_mode: Bool — pass true from handle_chat (no tools), false from agentic paths.
-// Issue #9 fix: no_tools_rule only included when chat_mode=true.
-// Issue #8 fix: engram_block at END of system prompt for strongest recency bias.
-// Issue #10 fix: STABLE IDENTITY vs RETRIEVED MEMORY section labels.
-fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String {
-    // Inject the operator's OS identity so the LLM anchors "my/me" to the right
-    // home directory. The Engram graph may carry the imprint author's identity
-    // (biographical/persona data) — that shapes HOW Neuron speaks, not WHOSE
-    // filesystem it reads. The operator is whoever is running this daemon process.
+// operator_identity_block — who owns the filesystem this turn may touch.
+//
+// Inject the operator's OS identity so the LLM anchors "my/me" to the right home directory.
+// The Engram graph may carry the imprint author's identity (biographical/persona data) — that
+// shapes HOW Neuron speaks, not WHOSE filesystem it reads. The operator is whoever is running
+// this daemon process.
+//
+// SCOPED TO TOOL-CAPABLE TURNS (FIX E2, 2026-08-05). Hoisted out of build_system_prompt so it
+// can be gated. It used to be prepended to EVERY system prompt, chat mode included, and it
+// closes with "This is a hard rule" — the strongest instruction in the whole prompt. On a
+// plain (Tools: Off) turn there is no filesystem in reach, so the block governs nothing and
+// only supplies a very loud, very early fact about the user. Measured 2026-08-05 on a fresh
+// guest profile: asked an open question, the model opened with "You're test, on your machine
+// at /Users/test" — a first impression made of the one thing it had been told hardest, about
+// a capability it did not have. It is correct and necessary the moment a file or command tool
+// is reachable; that is exactly when it is now included.
+fn operator_identity_block() -> String {
     let op_home: String = env("HOME")
     let op_user: String = env("USER")
     let op_display: String = if str_eq(op_user, "") { "the current user" } else { op_user }
-    let operator_section: String = "OPERATOR IDENTITY\n\n"
+    return "OPERATOR IDENTITY\n\n"
         + "You are running on " + op_display + "'s machine. Their home directory is " + op_home + ".\n\n"
         + "When they say \"my files\", \"my notes\", \"my downloads\", \"my desktop\", or any possessive "
         + "referring to their filesystem, always resolve those paths under " + op_home + " — never under "
@@ -716,6 +723,16 @@ fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String {
         + "The memory graph may include identity context from a different person (the imprint who shaped your personality and values). "
         + "That context governs how you think and speak — it does not tell you whose machine you are on. "
         + "The person speaking to you right now is " + op_display + " at " + op_home + ".\n\n"
+}
+
+// build_system_prompt — assemble the system prompt for a chat turn.
+// chat_mode: Bool — pass true from handle_chat (no tools), false from agentic paths.
+// Issue #9 fix: no_tools_rule only included when chat_mode=true.
+// Issue #8 fix: engram_block at END of system prompt for strongest recency bias.
+// Issue #10 fix: STABLE IDENTITY vs RETRIEVED MEMORY section labels.
+fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String {
+    // FIX E2 (2026-08-05): tool-capable turns only. See operator_identity_block.
+    let operator_section: String = if chat_mode { "" } else { operator_identity_block() }
 
     let identity: String = state_get("soul_identity")
     let current_date: String = time_format(time_now(), "%A, %B %d, %Y")
@@ -790,7 +807,7 @@ fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String {
     // in this revision — the chat_mode flag had no effect on the prompt. Restored here, in the
     // permanent-rules group, immediately after capability_rules (the rule it qualifies).
     // Zero effect on agentic paths: they pass chat_mode=false, so no_tools_rule is "".
-    return identity + operator_section + date_line + voice_rules + security_rules + capability_rules + no_tools_rule + bounded_persona_block + identity_block + affective_boot_block + engram_block + safety_block
+    return identity + operator_section + date_line + voice_rules + security_rules + capability_rules + receipt_rule() + no_tools_rule + bounded_persona_block + identity_block + affective_boot_block + engram_block + safety_block
 }
 
 fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String {
@@ -803,6 +820,292 @@ fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String {
     return "[" + inner + "," + entry + "]"
 }
 
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// ONE HISTORY KEY FOR BOTH PATHS  (FIX B, 2026-08-05)
+//
+// THE BUG — the BLANK STARE. The agentic path keyed conversation history on
+// "session_hist_<id>"; the plain path was hard-wired to the process-global "conv_history"
+// and never read session_id at all. One conversation, two buckets. Measured on a fresh
+// guest engram: a user chatted with Tools OFF, turned Tools ON and said "try again", and
+// the scoped node contained exactly two turns starting at "Try again" while every earlier
+// exchange sat in the unscoped node. From the user's side the assistant simply forgot the
+// conversation it was in the middle of, at the exact moment they asked it to try harder.
+//
+// THESE TWO FUNCTIONS ARE THE FIX. Both paths now derive their key and their engram label
+// from here, so there is exactly one definition of "where does this conversation's history
+// live" and it cannot drift again. Not a fallback bolted onto one path — one rule, used by
+// both. (The rejected 2-line alternative was to have the plain path fall back to reading
+// the agentic key: that keeps the global as a live write target, and the global bucket is
+// process-global. handle_chat's own TODO(reliability #3) says so — concurrent requests
+// without a session_id race on its read-append-write, which is how one conversation bleeds
+// into another.)
+//
+// THE ANONYMOUS BUCKET. An empty session_id still maps to "conv_history". That is the
+// documented anonymous path (GET /api/chat probes, curl, the CLI) and it must keep working.
+// It is now the ONLY writer of that key, which makes the bleed risk explicit and bounded
+// instead of ambient.
+//
+// TURNS THAT PRECEDE THE SESSION — decided, not left implicit. The soul session used to be
+// created lazily on first AGENTIC use (measured: session:meta was written 37ms AFTER the
+// message that needed it), so early plain turns had no scoped key to go to. Two candidate
+// answers:
+//   (1) migrate the unscoped node into the scoped one when the session is created, or
+//   (2) create the session eagerly, at the door, on the first turn of either path.
+// We chose (2), and the app half ships with it (DaemonClient.chatWithHandshake now resolves
+// the soul session id for plain sends too, registering on first use exactly as the agentic
+// path already did). Reason: (1) repairs the damage after the fact and, worse, it would copy
+// the CONTENTS of a process-global bucket — which may hold a different conversation — into a
+// named session. That is the bleed the TODO warns about, performed deliberately. (2) makes
+// the situation impossible instead: every turn of a real conversation carries the same scoped
+// id from turn one, so nothing is ever written to the anonymous bucket that needs rescuing.
+// Migration is therefore deliberately NOT implemented, and must not be added later without
+// solving the provenance question first.
+fn conv_hist_key(session_id: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(session_id, "") {
+        return "conv_history"
+    }
+    return "session_hist_" + session_id
+}
+
+fn conv_hist_label(session_id: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(session_id, "") {
+        return "conv:history"
+    }
+    return "conv:history:" + session_id
+}
+
+// is_utility_request — a generation the USER did not ask for (FIX E1, 2026-08-05).
+//
+// The app makes model calls that are not conversation: title generation
+// ("Write a 3-6 word title (Title Case) for this conversation...") and insight/suggestion
+// passes. They ran down the same plain /api/chat door as a real message, so they were
+// recorded into conversation history as if the user had typed them. Measured: the unscoped
+// history node contained the literal title prompt and the model's reply "What Is Neuron" as
+// a user/assistant pair, and usage.jsonl carried the same call as the "model":"unknown" row.
+// The user then sees the assistant answering a question they never asked, and the model
+// reads its own title-writing as part of the dialogue.
+//
+// Primary signal is an explicit "utility":true on the request — the app declares intent
+// rather than the engine guessing. The two id prefixes are a compatibility fallback so an
+// older client that does not send the flag (round 7's jar, the CLI helpers) still gets the
+// right behaviour when it sends its throwaway id raw.
+fn is_utility_request(body: String, session_id: String) -> Bool {
+    if str_eq(json_get(body, "utility"), "true") {
+        return true
+    }
+    if str_starts_with(session_id, "__title__") {
+        return true
+    }
+    if str_starts_with(session_id, "__insight__") {
+        return true
+    }
+    return false
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// TOOL PROVENANCE IN HISTORY  (FIX A, 2026-08-05)
+//
+// THE BUG — the FALSE CONFESSION. hist_append above stores {"role","content"} and nothing
+// else. server_tool_use blocks, web_search_tool_result blocks and every citation are
+// discarded at the moment the turn is recorded, and the next turn replays that text-only
+// array. So the model is shown a data-rich answer it apparently produced with no evidence
+// any tool ran — and its own permanent rule ("never describe a search you did not perform")
+// leaves exactly one conclusion available: that it invented the data. Measured 2026-08-05:
+// asked where its figures came from, it apologised for fabricating a web search it had in
+// fact performed. Four independent lines of evidence showed the search was real. The defect
+// is not the model's honesty. It is that we deleted the evidence and then asked it to
+// account for itself.
+//
+// THE SHAPE OF THE FIX — a receipt line inside content, not a sibling field. History entries
+// are replayed VERBATIM into the Anthropic messages array (see the prior_messages seed in
+// handle_chat_agentic), and a message object there may carry role and content only; an extra
+// key is not part of that contract. So provenance rides INSIDE the assistant turn's content,
+// as a trailing bracketed line. It is appended to the HISTORY copy only — the reply returned
+// to the client is the loop's own envelope and is untouched, so the user never sees it.
+//
+// WHAT IT BUYS beyond not-defaming-itself: with the source URLs recorded, "what source did
+// you use?" becomes a question the next turn can actually answer from the transcript.
+//
+// STOPGAP, AND SAID SO. The real answer is Will's Receipt Contract (neuron#78): structured,
+// verifiable receipts on the wire that a client can render and a model cannot confuse with
+// prose. Until that lands, a line the model can read is the difference between "I searched"
+// and "I must have made it up".
+
+// provenance_scan_urls — pull "url"/"title" pairs out of a JSON array into a display string.
+// Used for both citation arrays (web_search_result_location) and web_search_tool_result
+// content arrays (web_search_result); both spell the fields the same way. Deduped by
+// substring, capped at 6 entries per array so a broad search cannot flood the window.
+fn provenance_scan_urls(arr: String, acc: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(arr, "") { return acc }
+    if str_eq(arr, "null") { return acc }
+    if !str_starts_with(arr, "[") { return acc }
+    let total: Int = json_array_len(arr)
+    let limit: Int = if total > 6 { 6 } else { total }
+    let out: String = acc
+    let i: Int = 0
+    while i < limit {
+        let item: String = json_array_get(arr, i)
+        let url: String = json_get(item, "url")
+        let title: String = json_get(item, "title")
+        let skip: Bool = str_eq(url, "") || str_contains(out, url)
+        let entry: String = if str_eq(title, "") { url } else { title + " (" + url + ")" }
+        let out = if skip {
+            out
+        } else {
+            if str_eq(out, "") { entry } else { out + "; " + entry }
+        }
+        let i = i + 1
+    }
+    return out
+}
+
+// provenance_add_sources — one call site inside the content-block walk, so that walk keeps
+// exactly one mutation per variable (the El scope rule documented at the walk).
+// Reads sources from whichever block carries them: a cited text block's citations array, or
+// a web_search_tool_result's own content array.
+fn provenance_add_sources(block: String, btype: String, has_cit: Bool, cit_raw: String, acc: String) -> String {
+    // Hard cap on the whole accumulator: provenance is evidence, not payload.
+    if str_len(acc) > 600 { return acc }
+    if has_cit { return provenance_scan_urls(cit_raw, acc) }
+    if str_eq(btype, "web_search_tool_result") {
+        return provenance_scan_urls(json_get_raw(block, "content"), acc)
+    }
+    return acc
+}
+
+// provenance_names — dedupe a tools_used JSON array into a readable list.
+// json_array_get on an array of strings may or may not keep the quotes depending on the
+// runtime build, so they are stripped defensively rather than assumed either way.
+fn provenance_names(tools_used: String) -> String {
+    if str_eq(tools_used, "") { return "" }
+    if str_eq(tools_used, "[]") { return "" }
+    let total: Int = json_array_len(tools_used)
+    let limit: Int = if total > 12 { 12 } else { total }
+    let out: String = ""
+    let i: Int = 0
+    while i < limit {
+        let raw_nm: String = json_array_get(tools_used, i)
+        let nm: String = str_replace(raw_nm, "\"", "")
+        let skip: Bool = str_eq(nm, "") || str_contains(out, nm)
+        let out = if skip {
+            out
+        } else {
+            if str_eq(out, "") { nm } else { out + ", " + nm }
+        }
+        let i = i + 1
+    }
+    return out
+}
+
+// tool_receipt — the line appended to an assistant turn's HISTORY copy.
+//
+// Emitted on every recorded turn, including turns where nothing ran. The negative receipt is
+// not noise: it is the other half of the same guarantee. Without it, "no evidence of a tool"
+// and "evidence of no tool" look identical in the transcript, which is precisely the
+// ambiguity the model resolved against itself.
+// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// text_join_sep — the ONE rule for whether two pieces of model text need a break between them.
+// (FIX C, 2026-08-05.)
+//
+// THE BUG — "to.Good". Byte-verified in a shipped reply: 0x77 0x2e 0x47, "to" then "." then
+// "Good", no space, no newline. Two text fragments concatenated with a bare `+` across a
+// boundary where the model had actually stopped and started again.
+//
+// TWO SEAMS, ONE RULE. There were two bare `+` joins, written a year apart by different hands,
+// and they had drifted into being two different decisions about the same question:
+//   - within one response, across content blocks   (Will's, 2026-05-03)
+//   - across pause/resume rounds of the loop        (ours, 62af564, the web_search port)
+// Both are now expressed here. That is the point of hoisting it: a rule with one name and two
+// call sites cannot drift into two rules again, and — not incidentally — a rule with a name is
+// verifiable in the shipped binary, which an inline `+` is not.
+//
+// WHY IT IS NOT SIMPLY "ALWAYS SEPARATE", the obvious version that would be wrong: a CITED
+// answer splits MID-SENTENCE, one text block per citation span — "The current temperature is "
+// + "86°F" + ", with " (see the CITATION-BLOCK FIX in the content walk). Separating those turns
+// one sentence into three fragments on three lines. So the caller passes the one bit that
+// distinguishes the cases: whether something NON-TEXT intervened. Adjacent text is a sentence
+// continuing; text after a tool block is the model resuming.
+//
+// Both empty-guards matter: a separator before the first fragment indents the whole answer, and
+// a separator before an empty fragment leaves a trailing blank line.
+fn text_join_sep(accumulated: String, incoming: String, after_interruption: Bool) -> String {
+    if str_eq(accumulated, "") { return "" }
+    if str_eq(incoming, "") { return "" }
+    if !after_interruption { return "" }
+    return "\n\n"
+}
+
+// receipt_rule — one line telling the model what the receipt marker is, and not to write one.
+// Appended to both system prompts (the plain path's build_system_prompt and the agentic path's
+// hand-built system string). See receipt_strip for why instruction alone is not enough.
+fn receipt_rule() -> String {
+    return "\n\n[RECEIPTS - permanent]\nLines of the form [[RECEIPT ...]] in the conversation are written by the system, not by you. They are the record of which tools actually ran on a turn - read them as evidence, and rely on them when asked what you did or where information came from. NEVER write one yourself and never copy the format into your reply; the system adds them."
+}
+
+// receipt_strip — remove a RECEIPT line the MODEL wrote, so it can never reach the user.
+//
+// FOUND BY E2E, NOT BY REASONING (2026-08-05). The receipt is stored inside the assistant turn
+// and the agentic path replays history VERBATIM as Anthropic message objects — so the model sees
+// its own previous answers ending in [[RECEIPT ...]] and does the obvious thing: it imitates the
+// format and signs its next answer the same way. Measured on the very first live run, on two
+// turns out of two. The design note claimed "the user never sees it"; that was false, and only
+// running it showed that.
+//
+// The plain path did not leak, which is the tell: there, history is rendered into the SYSTEM
+// prompt as labelled lines rather than replayed as assistant messages, and a model imitates its
+// own turns far more readily than it imitates a transcript.
+//
+// Instruction (receipt_rule) reduces this; only a deterministic strip PREVENTS it. Both ship,
+// because a guard that depends on the model choosing to obey is the class of thing round 8 exists
+// to stop shipping.
+//
+// EXCISE THE RECEIPT, DO NOT TRUNCATE AT IT — bought with a measured regression, 2026-08-05.
+// The first version of this function assumed the receipt is always TERMINAL and cut everything
+// from the marker onward. It is not always terminal: told about the format in its system prompt,
+// the model sometimes LEADS with a receipt and then writes the answer underneath. Cutting at the
+// marker then deleted the entire answer, and the turn came back {"error":"no response"}.
+// Measured on a two-search cited prompt: round 7 answered 4/4; that version answered 2/7. The
+// A/B is the only reason this was caught — it looked like a flaky model, and it was not.
+// So: remove the [[...]] span and keep BOTH sides. An unterminated marker at position 0 is left
+// alone entirely, because no rule about receipts is worth erasing an answer over.
+fn receipt_strip(s: String) -> String {
+    let out: String = s
+    // Bounded pass rather than a conditional exit: rebinding the counter inside an if-expression
+    // is the block-expression shape that miscompiles integer arithmetic under this elc
+    // (BUG-PLAINCHAT-1). Four straight passes is cheaper than being clever, and once no marker
+    // remains every further pass is a no-op.
+    let guard: Int = 0
+    while guard < 4 {
+        let p: Int = str_index_of(out, "[[RECEIPT")
+        let found: Bool = p >= 0
+        let rest: String = if found { str_slice(out, p, str_len(out)) } else { "" }
+        let e: Int = if found { str_index_of(rest, "]]") } else { 0 - 1 }
+        let head: String = if found { str_slice(out, 0, p) } else { "" }
+        let tail: String = if e >= 0 { str_slice(rest, e + 2, str_len(rest)) } else { "" }
+        let out = if !found {
+            out
+        } else {
+            if e >= 0 {
+                head + tail
+            } else {
+                if p == 0 { out } else { head }
+            }
+        }
+        let guard = guard + 1
+    }
+    return str_trim(out)
+}
+
+fn tool_receipt(tools_used: String, sources: String) -> String {
+    let names: String = provenance_names(tools_used)
+    if str_eq(names, "") {
+        return "\n\n[[RECEIPT - recorded by the soul, not written by the model: no tools ran on this turn.]]"
+    }
+    let src_part: String = if str_eq(sources, "") { "" } else { " Sources retrieved: " + sources + "." }
+    return "\n\n[[RECEIPT - recorded by the soul, not written by the model: tools that actually executed on this turn: "
+        + names + "." + src_part + "]]"
+}
+
 fn hist_trim(hist: String) -> String {
     let inner: String = str_slice(hist, 1, str_len(hist) - 1)
     let marker: String = "{\"role\":"
@@ -898,7 +1201,7 @@ fn clean_llm_response(s: String) -> String {
 // conv_history_persist — save conversation history to engram for cross-restart continuity.
 // Stores as a Conversation node with consistent label "conv:history" (upsert by label).
 // Q3/Q6 fix: added partial-write guard and failure logging.
-fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void {
+fn conv_history_persist(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void {
     if str_eq(hist, "") { return "" }
     if str_eq(hist, "[]") { return "" }
     // Partial-write guard: refuse to persist a blob that is not a complete JSON array.
@@ -906,8 +1209,9 @@ fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void {
     if !str_starts_with(hist, "[") { return "" }
     if !str_contains(hist, "]") { return "" }
     let tags: String = "[\"conv-history\",\"persistent\"]"
+    // FIX B: one label rule, shared with the agentic path. See conv_hist_label.
     let node_id: String = engram_node_full(
-        hist, "Conversation", "conv:history",
+        hist, "Conversation", conv_hist_label(session_id),
         el_from_float(0.7), el_from_float(0.8), el_from_float(0.9),
         "Episodic", tags
     )
@@ -920,9 +1224,11 @@ fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void {
 // conv_history_load — restore conversation history from engram on first access.
 // Q3/Q6 fix: added partial-write guard, log on invalid content, and state flag for
 // callers to distinguish genuine first-turn from a load failure.
-fn conv_history_load() -> String {
+fn conv_history_load(session_id: String) -> String {
+    // FIX B: scoped label, shared with the agentic path. See conv_hist_label.
+    let hist_label: String = conv_hist_label(session_id)
     // Primary: label-based fetch — symmetric with persist, immune to vector index drift.
-    let label_node: String = engram_get_node_by_label("conv:history")
+    let label_node: String = engram_get_node_by_label(hist_label)
     let label_ok: Bool = !str_eq(label_node, "") && !str_eq(label_node, "null")
     if label_ok {
         let label_content: String = json_get(label_node, "content")
@@ -933,7 +1239,7 @@ fn conv_history_load() -> String {
         println("[chat] conv_history_load: label node found but content invalid — falling back to vector search")
     }
     // Fallback: vector search.
-    let results: String = engram_search_json("conv:history", 3)
+    let results: String = engram_search_json(hist_label, 3)
     if str_eq(results, "") {
         // Q3 fix: set a state flag so callers can distinguish load failure from first turn.
         state_set("conv_history_load_failed", "1")
@@ -961,12 +1267,22 @@ fn conv_history_load() -> String {
 // rather than the raw model output means the history window can never replay something the
 // output gate replaced or augmented. Callers on a hard bell must not call this at all —
 // bell turns are kept out of conversation history by design (see layered_cycle).
-fn conv_history_record(user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String) -> Void {
+//
+// FIX B (2026-08-05): keyed on the caller's session, via conv_hist_key — the same rule the
+// agentic path uses, so one conversation has one history no matter which switch position it
+// was sent from.
+//
+// FIX A (2026-08-05): `receipt` is appended to the assistant turn AFTER safety_validate has
+// run. That does not weaken the contract above: the receipt is soul-generated text about what
+// the soul itself did, never model output, so there is nothing for the output gate to have an
+// opinion about. Recording it inside the gated text would be the actual violation.
+fn conv_history_record(session_id: String, user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String, receipt: String) -> Void {
     if str_eq(user_msg, "") { return "" }
-    let state_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load() } else { state_hist }
+    let hist_key: String = conv_hist_key(session_id)
+    let state_hist: String = state_get(hist_key)
+    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load(session_id) } else { state_hist }
     let h1: String = hist_append(stored_hist, "user", user_msg)
-    let h2: String = hist_append(h1, "assistant", assistant_msg)
+    let h2: String = hist_append(h1, "assistant", assistant_msg + receipt)
     // Bell-guarded trim: an evicted turn that triggered a bell is preserved to engram
     // before it leaves the in-memory window.
     let final_hist: String = if json_array_len(h2) > 20 {
@@ -974,18 +1290,18 @@ fn conv_history_record(user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String) -> Void {
     } else {
         h2
     }
-    state_set("conv_history", final_hist)
-    conv_history_persist(final_hist)
+    state_set(hist_key, final_hist)
+    conv_history_persist(session_id, final_hist)
 }
 
 // conv_history_block — recent dialogue, rendered for a system prompt.
 //
 // Same rendering handle_chat uses (role label + snipped content, one line per turn), read
-// from the same "conv_history" window, so a plain-chat turn can follow the thread instead
+// from the session's own window (FIX B), so a plain-chat turn can follow the thread instead
 // of answering every message from cold. Read-only: never writes history.
-fn conv_history_block() -> String {
-    let state_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load() } else { state_hist }
+fn conv_history_block(session_id: String) -> String {
+    let state_hist: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(session_id))
+    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load(session_id) } else { state_hist }
     let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
     if hist_len == 0 {
         return ""
@@ -997,8 +1313,15 @@ fn conv_history_block() -> String {
         let rh_role: String = json_get(rh_entry, "role")
         let rh_content: String = json_get(rh_entry, "content")
         let rh_label: String = if str_eq(rh_role, "user") { "User" } else { "Assistant" }
-        let rh_snip: String = if str_len(rh_content) > 400 { str_slice(rh_content, 0, 400) + "..." } else { rh_content }
-        let rh_line: String = rh_label + ": " + rh_snip
+        // FIX A: the provenance receipt lives at the END of an assistant turn, so a plain
+        // 400-char head-snip would delete exactly the evidence this whole change exists to
+        // preserve — and on a long sourced answer it would delete it every time. Split the
+        // receipt off, snip only the prose, then re-attach it.
+        let rh_cut: Int = str_index_of(rh_content, "\n\n[[RECEIPT")
+        let rh_body: String = if rh_cut < 0 { rh_content } else { str_slice(rh_content, 0, rh_cut) }
+        let rh_tail: String = if rh_cut < 0 { "" } else { str_slice(rh_content, rh_cut, str_len(rh_content)) }
+        let rh_snip: String = if str_len(rh_body) > 400 { str_slice(rh_body, 0, 400) + "..." } else { rh_body }
+        let rh_line: String = rh_label + ": " + rh_snip + rh_tail
         let rh_out = if str_eq(rh_out, "") { rh_line } else { rh_out + "\n" + rh_line }
         let rh_i = rh_i + 1
     }
@@ -1044,7 +1367,7 @@ fn conv_history_block() -> String {
 //
 // Returns "" when the model call fails, so the caller reports the failure honestly instead
 // of echoing the user's own text back at them.
-fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String) -> String {
+fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String, session_id: String) -> String {
     if str_eq(prompt, "") {
         return ""
     }
@@ -1052,7 +1375,10 @@ fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String) -> String {
     let ctx: String = engram_compile(prompt)
     let model: String = chat_default_model()
     let base_system: String = build_system_prompt(ctx, true) + current_engine_note(model)
-    let hist_block: String = conv_history_block()
+    // FIX B (2026-08-05): the session's own window, not the process-global one. This is the
+    // read half of the blank stare — a turn sent with Tools OFF now sees the turns that were
+    // sent with Tools ON, because they are in the same bucket.
+    let hist_block: String = conv_history_block(session_id)
     let full_system: String = base_system + hist_block
 
     let raw: String = llm_call_system(model, full_system, prompt)
@@ -1065,7 +1391,9 @@ fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String) -> String {
         return ""
     }
 
-    return clean_llm_response(raw)
+    // FIX A follow-up: a model that has seen receipts in its context may sign its own answer
+    // with one. Strip it before the caller ever sees it. See receipt_strip.
+    return receipt_strip(clean_llm_response(raw))
 }
 
 // session_preload_bullets — render up to max_bullets nodes from a JSON array as
@@ -1155,8 +1483,12 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
     // Load history BEFORE compiling context so we can anchor activation to the thread.
     // TODO(reliability #3 — conv_history global race): process-global key; concurrent
     // /api/chat requests without session_id race on this read-append-write.
-    let state_hist: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load() } else { state_hist }
+    // NOTE 2026-08-05 (FIX B): this function is DEAD (see the banner above) and is left on the
+    // anonymous key deliberately. The race the TODO describes is exactly why the live plain
+    // path was scoped instead of given a fallback to this global. If this function is ever
+    // revived it must take a session_id and use conv_hist_key, like every live caller now does.
+    let state_hist: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(""))
+    let stored_hist: String = if str_eq(state_hist, "") { conv_history_load("") } else { state_hist }
     let hist_load_failed: Bool = str_eq(state_get("conv_history_load_failed"), "1")
     let hist_len: Int = if str_eq(stored_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(stored_hist) }
 
@@ -1352,8 +1684,8 @@ fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String {
     } else {
         updated_hist2
     }
-    state_set("conv_history", final_hist)
-    conv_history_persist(final_hist)
+    state_set(conv_hist_key(""), final_hist)
+    conv_history_persist("", final_hist)
 
     // Session-end summary hook: write a dated SessionSummary node once per boot when
     // the conversation reaches >= 5 user turns (10 hist entries = 5 user+assistant pairs).
@@ -2187,6 +2519,24 @@ fn handle_chat_plan(body: String) -> String {
     return "{\"plan\":" + plan_json + ",\"model\":\"" + json_safe(model) + "\"}"
 }
 
+// ── agentic_safety_screen — the agentic path's L1 input gate ──────────────────
+//
+// Extracted 2026-08-07 (issue #129) so the agentic path's safety INPUT is
+// reachable by a test. It owns exactly two decisions: which history window the
+// screen sees, and the screen call itself.
+//
+// Why it is a function and not two inline lines: those two lines sat in the
+// middle of a 300-line handler, and a key rename (ff421d3) moved the producer
+// without moving this consumer. Nothing failed, nothing logged — the
+// history-amplification half of the crisis score simply received "" on every
+// real session for a day. Inline safety inputs are untestable safety inputs.
+// See tests/test_history_amplification.el, which fails if this window and
+// conv_history_record ever stop agreeing.
+fn agentic_safety_screen(session_id: String, message: String) -> String {
+    let history: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(session_id))
+    return safety_screen(message, history)
+}
+
 fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
     let message: String = json_get(body, "message")
     if str_eq(message, "") {
@@ -2222,10 +2572,10 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
 
     // L1 safety screen — agentic path must pass the same gate as layered_cycle.
     // Hard bell: return the crisis response immediately, do not enter the agentic loop.
-    // Fix(issue #9): "conversation_history" key was never written; history lives under "conv_history".
-    // Old key caused history-amplification in safety_screen to always receive "" on agentic path.
-    let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let screen_result: String = safety_screen(message, history)
+    // The history window this screen sees is owned by agentic_safety_screen (issue #129);
+    // it must be the same window conv_history_record writes, or the escalation half of the
+    // crisis score is silently starved. Do not inline this read back into the handler.
+    let screen_result: String = agentic_safety_screen(sess_for_root, message)
     let screen_action: String = json_get(screen_result, "action")
     if str_eq(screen_action, "hard_bell") {
         safety_log_bell("hard", json_get(screen_result, "reason"), str_slice(message, 0, 80))
@@ -2253,7 +2603,10 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
         return "{\"error\":\"session not found\",\"session_id\":\"" + req_session + "\",\"reply\":\"\"}"
     }
 
-    let hist_key: String = if str_eq(req_session, "") { "conv_history" } else { "session_hist_" + req_session }
+    // FIX B (2026-08-05): the key rule now lives in one place and the plain path uses the
+    // same one. Behaviour on this path is unchanged — conv_hist_key reproduces exactly what
+    // this line computed inline — but there is no longer a second, divergent definition.
+    let hist_key: String = conv_hist_key(req_session)
     let agentic_hist: String = state_get(hist_key)
     let agentic_hist_len: Int = if str_eq(agentic_hist, "") { 0 } else { json_array_len(agentic_hist) }
     // Issue 8 fix: use engram_is_continuation instead of brittle 50-char threshold.
@@ -2311,7 +2664,7 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
 
     let system: String = identity + bounded_persona_floor() + " You have access to tools: read files, write files, browse the web, search your memory, run commands. Use them when they add genuine value. Be direct.
 
-" + ctx + ag_session_preload
+" + ctx + ag_session_preload + receipt_rule()
 
     let api_key: String = agentic_api_key()
     let tools_json: String = agentic_tools_all()
@@ -2367,38 +2720,31 @@ fn handle_chat_agentic(body: String) -> String {
     // Persist the exchange to session/global history for thread continuity on next turn.
     // Only save when the loop completed (reply present), not when tool_pending.
     let reply_text: String = json_get(result, "reply")
-    let discard_hist: Bool = if !str_eq(reply_text, "") {
+    // FIX A (2026-08-05): the evidence the next turn needs. `result` already carries
+    // tools_used, and agentic_loop now also returns the source URLs it saw; both are folded
+    // into a receipt line and stored WITH the assistant turn. Without this the next turn sees
+    // a sourced answer and no trace of the search, and concludes it made the data up — the
+    // false confession. See tool_receipt.
+    let turn_tools: String = json_get_raw(result, "tools_used")
+    let turn_sources: String = json_get(result, "sources")
+    let turn_receipt: String = tool_receipt(turn_tools, turn_sources)
+    // FIX E1 (2026-08-05): a utility generation (title, insight) is not conversation and is
+    // not recorded as one. It is still answered normally — only the transcript is spared.
+    let record_turn: Bool = !str_eq(reply_text, "") && !is_utility_request(body, req_session)
+    let discard_hist: Bool = if record_turn {
         let updated: String = hist_append(agentic_hist, "user", message)
-        let updated2: String = hist_append(updated, "assistant", reply_text)
+        let updated2: String = hist_append(updated, "assistant", reply_text + turn_receipt)
         // Increased from 20 to 40 turns: consistent with handle_chat window expansion.
         let trimmed: String = if json_array_len(updated2) > 40 { hist_trim(updated2) } else { updated2 }
         state_set(hist_key, trimmed)
         // Persist to engram for cross-restart continuity.
-        // Named sessions get session-scoped labels, fixing ephemeral-only limitation (issue #4).
-        if str_eq(hist_key, "conv_history") {
-            conv_history_persist(trimmed)
-        } else {
-            if !str_eq(trimmed, "") && !str_eq(trimmed, "[]") {
-                let sess_hist_label: String = "conv:history:" + req_session
-                let sess_hist_tags: String = "[\"session-history\",\"persistent\"]"
-                let sess_hist_id: String = engram_node_full(
-                    trimmed, "Conversation", sess_hist_label,
-                    el_from_float(0.6), el_from_float(0.7), el_from_float(0.8),
-                    "Episodic", sess_hist_tags
-                )
-                // NOTE: bind an explicit Bool value here. A bare `if { println(...) }`
-                // leaves a void-typed branch in value position, which the current elc
-                // lowers to `_if_result = (println(...))` — invalid C. Yielding a value
-                // keeps the branch non-void without changing behavior (still only logs).
-                let persist_ok: Bool = if str_eq(sess_hist_id, "") {
-                    println("[chat] agentic: named session history persist failed for session=" + req_session)
-                    false
-                } else { true }
-                persist_ok
-            } else {
-                false
-            }
-        }
+        // FIX B (2026-08-05): ONE persist, through the shared helper. This site used to hold
+        // a second, hand-rolled copy of the same write for named sessions — a different label
+        // expression, different salience scores and a different tag set for the same data.
+        // Since conv_hist_label now gives both callers the same label and engram_node_full
+        // upserts by label, two score policies were writing the same node. One writer, one
+        // label rule, one policy.
+        conv_history_persist(req_session, trimmed)
         true
     } else { false }
 
@@ -2432,6 +2778,11 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
     let messages: String = messages_in
     let final_text: String = ""
     let tools_log: String = tools_log_in
+    // FIX A (2026-08-05): source URLs accumulated across every round of this turn, so the
+    // receipt written into history can name what the search actually returned. Carried at
+    // loop level for the same reason tools_log is: a resumed round must not lose the
+    // evidence gathered before the pause.
+    let sources_all: String = ""
     let iteration: Int = 0
     let keep_going: Bool = true
 
@@ -2504,6 +2855,30 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
             + ",\"messages\":" + messages
             + "}"
 
+        // ── ROUND-START MARKER (2026-08-06, round 9.1 D2 / ADR 0006 item 2) ──────────
+        // The ledger below only ever appended AFTER a round returned, so a healthy
+        // first leg produced ZERO progress by construction. Since server-side
+        // web_search moved inside the outbound call (2026-08-04) that leg measures
+        // 84-117 s, and the client had no way to tell "working" from "dead" — which is
+        // how a 25 s client-side watchdog came to kill a healthy mission.
+        //
+        // Only this loop knows a round has started, so only this loop can say so. One
+        // entry, written BEFORE the call goes out, using the ledger and the wire shape
+        // that already exist: the app has handled tool == "__working__" as an
+        // Activity-only life signal since 2026-07-13 (ChatView.kt:1148) and never
+        // received one. Narration is deliberately empty - the marker means "a round
+        // started", nothing more, and the client renders it as a heartbeat, not prose.
+        //
+        // This is a strict subset of WS3 item 3 (push/poll progress). It builds none of
+        // WS3's run registry: no new state key, no new route, no new lifecycle.
+        if !str_eq(session_id, "") {
+            let start_key: String = "run_progress_" + session_id
+            let start_prev: String = state_get(start_key)
+            let start_entry: String = "{\"i\":" + int_to_str(iteration) + ",\"t\":\"\",\"tool\":\"__working__\"}"
+            let start_next: String = if str_eq(start_prev, "") { start_entry } else { start_prev + "," + start_entry }
+            state_set(start_key, start_next)
+        }
+
         let raw_resp: String = http_post_with_headers(api_url, req_body, h)
 
         let is_error: Bool = str_starts_with(raw_resp, "{\"error\"")
@@ -2578,6 +2953,13 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
         // separate from tools_log so this inner walk has exactly one mutation site per
         // variable (the El scope rule below), then merged in at the outer level.
         let srv_log: String = ""
+        // FIX A: source URLs seen this round (citations + web_search results). Merged into
+        // the loop-level accumulator below, same shape as srv_log.
+        let src_log: String = ""
+        // FIX C: seam tracking. True once a NON-text block has been walked, so the next text
+        // block knows it is resuming after an interruption rather than continuing a sentence.
+        // See the separator decision at the text accumulation site.
+        let saw_nontext: Bool = false
         let ci: Int = 0
         let c_total: Int = json_array_len(eff_content)
         while ci < c_total {
@@ -2595,8 +2977,34 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
             let has_cit: Bool = !str_eq(cit_raw, "") && !str_eq(cit_raw, "null")
             let btype_scan: String = json_get(block, "type")
             let btype: String = if has_cit { "text" } else { btype_scan }
-            // Accumulate text at top level using if-expression
-            let text_out = if str_eq(btype, "text") { text_out + json_get(block, "text") } else { text_out }
+            // ── FIX C, seam 1 of 2 (2026-08-05): "to.Good" ────────────────────────────────
+            // Byte-verified in a shipped reply: 0x77 0x2e 0x47 — "to" then "." then "Good",
+            // with no space and no newline. The bare `+` below joined the last sentence of a
+            // pre-search paragraph directly onto the first word of the post-search paragraph.
+            // Will wrote this line on 2026-05-03 and it was correct for a year: before
+            // server-side web_search, text blocks were adjacent, and adjacent text blocks are
+            // one continuous string that must be joined with nothing.
+            //
+            // WHY THE OBVIOUS FIX IS WRONG. Inserting a separator between all text blocks
+            // shatters every cited answer. A cited response splits MID-SENTENCE, one block per
+            // citation span: "The current temperature is " + "86°F" + ", with " — see the
+            // CITATION-BLOCK FIX note above. A blanket "\n\n" turns that into three fragments
+            // on three lines. Both failure modes are real and they pull in opposite directions.
+            //
+            // THE DISTINCTION THAT RESOLVES IT: a text block that directly follows another
+            // text block is a continuation and gets nothing; a text block that follows an
+            // INTERVENING NON-TEXT block (server_tool_use, web_search_tool_result, tool_use)
+            // resumes after an interruption and gets "\n\n". saw_nontext carries exactly that
+            // one bit, and text_join_sep holds the rule — shared with the resume seam below.
+            // Mid-sentence citation splits are untouched: no non-text block sits between them.
+            let is_text: Bool = str_eq(btype, "text")
+            let btext: String = if is_text { json_get(block, "text") } else { "" }
+            let text_out = if is_text {
+                text_out + text_join_sep(text_out, btext, saw_nontext) + btext
+            } else { text_out }
+            let saw_nontext = if is_text { false } else { true }
+            // FIX A: record where the facts came from, from whichever block carries them.
+            let src_log = provenance_add_sources(block, btype, has_cit, cit_raw, src_log)
             // FUTURE-PROOF: tools Anthropic runs on our behalf (web_search today, whatever
             // ships tomorrow) arrive as server_tool_use blocks, never as client tool_use.
             // Count the CATEGORY by the block's own name so a new server tool appears in
@@ -2678,6 +3086,12 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
         } else {
             if str_eq(tools_log, "") { srv_log } else { tools_log + "," + srv_log }
         }
+        // FIX A: same merge, for the sources seen in this round's blocks.
+        let sources_all = if str_eq(src_log, "") {
+            sources_all
+        } else {
+            if str_eq(sources_all, "") { src_log } else { sources_all + "; " + src_log }
+        }
 
         // The assistant turn that requested the tool — needed verbatim on resume so the
         // tool_use/tool_result pairing stays valid when the client posts its result.
@@ -2732,7 +3146,17 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
         // CONTINUES the answer, it does not repeat it — overwriting here would throw away
         // everything the model wrote before the pause, which is the same truncation the
         // pause handling exists to prevent. A version-fallback round contributes nothing.
-        let final_text = if !is_tool_turn && !can_fallback { final_text + text_out } else { final_text }
+        //
+        // ── FIX C, seam 2 of 2 (2026-08-05) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+        // The other half of "to.Good". This join is ours (62af564, the web_search port) and
+        // is unconditionally a boundary: the two sides are separate rounds of the Anthropic
+        // loop, separated by a pause and a tool execution. There is no mid-sentence case to
+        // protect here — the model was interrupted, and when it resumes it starts a new
+        // thought. So this seam passes after_interruption=true unconditionally; text_join_sep's
+        // own empty-guards handle the first round and an empty round.
+        let final_text = if !is_tool_turn && !can_fallback {
+            final_text + text_join_sep(final_text, text_out, true) + text_out
+        } else { final_text }
         // Output cap hit mid-action: the tool block is truncated and will NOT run. Say so
         // instead of ending on silent almost-work.
         let final_text = if str_eq(stop_reason, "max_tokens") && has_tool {
@@ -2756,6 +3180,7 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
             + ",\"narration\":\"" + json_safe(pend_narration) + "\""
             + ",\"model\":\"" + model + "\""
             + ",\"agentic\":true"
+            + ",\"sources\":\"" + json_safe(sources_all) + "\""
             + ",\"tools_used\":" + tools_arr + "}"
     }
 
@@ -2763,6 +3188,10 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
     // genuine no-response (model returned an empty text block). The iteration cap
     // means the task was too complex for the agentic loop depth — surface it clearly
     // so the caller/operator knows to increase the cap or break the task apart.
+    // FIX A follow-up: strip any receipt the MODEL wrote before this becomes the reply. Placed
+    // ABOVE the empty check on purpose — a turn whose entire output was an imitated receipt has
+    // produced no answer, and must be reported as no answer rather than as a receipt.
+    let final_text = receipt_strip(final_text)
     if str_eq(final_text, "") {
         let hit_cap: Bool = iteration >= 12
         let err_msg: String = if hit_cap {
@@ -2782,7 +3211,10 @@ fn agentic_loop(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
         let done_next: String = if str_eq(done_prev, "") { "{\"done\":true}" } else { done_prev + ",{\"done\":true}" }
         state_set(done_key, done_next)
     }
-    return "{\"reply\":\"" + safe_text + "\",\"model\":\"" + model + "\",\"agentic\":true,\"tools_used\":" + tools_arr + ",\"iterations\":" + int_to_str(iteration) + "}"
+    // FIX A: "sources" carries the URLs this turn actually retrieved, so handle_chat_agentic
+    // can write them into the history receipt and the next turn can answer "what source did
+    // you use?" from the transcript instead of guessing (or apologising).
+    return "{\"reply\":\"" + safe_text + "\",\"model\":\"" + model + "\",\"agentic\":true,\"tools_used\":" + tools_arr + ",\"sources\":\"" + json_safe(sources_all) + "\",\"iterations\":" + int_to_str(iteration) + "}"
 }
 
 // bridge_save — persist a suspended agentic turn keyed by session_id. Stored as a
@@ -2800,12 +3232,31 @@ fn bridge_save(session_id: String, model: String, safe_sys: String, tools_json:
     // JSON values (not string-escaped) so the round-trip through state_get/json_get_raw
     // never corrupts nested quotes. Scalar strings (model, safe_sys, tools_log,
     // tool_use_id) stay as string fields via json_safe as before.
+    //
+    // FIELD ORDER IS LOAD-BEARING (round-9 fix, 2026-08-06). json_get is a first-
+    // substring-match scanner (strstr for "\"key\":", el_runtime.c), and the two raw
+    // fields embed the UNESCAPED conversation — every key the model's own blocks carry
+    // ("tool_use_id" in each web_search_tool_result, "content", "type", ...) is findable
+    // by a whole-blob scan. With messages_raw serialized BEFORE tool_use_id, the resume
+    // read json_get(blob, "tool_use_id") returned the FIRST web_search_tool_result's
+    // srvtoolu_… id instead of the saved client-tool id, so every search-then-bridge
+    // turn 400'd on approval ("unexpected tool_use_id found in tool_result blocks:
+    // srvtoolu_…") and the run died as {"error":"llm unavailable"}. Same first-match-
+    // scanner class as BUG-6 (approve "content" matched inside tool_input) and the
+    // round-8 citation-block fix.
+    //
+    // The rule: every json_safe'd scalar precedes both raw fields (escaping means a
+    // scalar value can never contain a bare "key": byte pattern, so first-match lands
+    // on the blob's own fields), and tools_raw — our own fixed tool schema — precedes
+    // messages_raw — arbitrary model/user content — so neither raw extraction can
+    // first-match into model-controlled bytes either. Do not reorder; do not add a
+    // field after messages_raw.
     let blob: String = "{\"model\":\"" + json_safe(model) + "\""
         + ",\"safe_sys\":\"" + json_safe(safe_sys) + "\""
-        + ",\"messages_raw\":" + messages
-        + ",\"tools_raw\":" + tools_json
         + ",\"tools_log\":\"" + json_safe(tools_log) + "\""
-        + ",\"tool_use_id\":\"" + json_safe(tool_use_id) + "\"}"
+        + ",\"tool_use_id\":\"" + json_safe(tool_use_id) + "\""
+        + ",\"tools_raw\":" + tools_json
+        + ",\"messages_raw\":" + messages + "}"
     state_set("mcp_bridge:" + session_id, blob)
     return true
 }
@@ -2842,11 +3293,17 @@ fn agentic_resume(session_id: String, tool_use_id: String, content: String) -> S
     let tools_log: String = json_get(blob, "tools_log")
     let saved_use_id: String = json_get(blob, "tool_use_id")
 
-    // Bind the result to the tool the soul actually suspended on. The client should
-    // echo the call_id; if it omits or mismatches it, fall back to the saved id so a
-    // late/partial client still resumes correctly.
-    let use_id: String = if str_eq(tool_use_id, "") { saved_use_id } else { tool_use_id }
-    let eff_use_id: String = if str_eq(use_id, saved_use_id) { use_id } else { saved_use_id }
+    // Bind the result to the tool the loop actually suspended on. The client echoes
+    // the call_id from the pending envelope; that value came straight from
+    // pend_tool_id and never round-tripped through this blob, so when both are
+    // present and disagree the CLIENT's id is the one with clean provenance (a blob
+    // written by a pre-round-9 binary misreads tool_use_id by first-match scanning
+    // into messages_raw — see bridge_save). A client that omits call_id still
+    // resumes on the saved id, which the reordered blob now reads correctly.
+    // (The old guard here — "on mismatch, prefer saved" — reduced to eff_use_id ≡
+    // saved_use_id in both branches: the client's correct id could never win, which
+    // is what turned the misread into a deterministic 400 on resume.)
+    let eff_use_id: String = if str_eq(tool_use_id, "") { saved_use_id } else { tool_use_id }
 
     // Result may be large (an MCP page/file); truncate like local tool results do.
     let trimmed: String = if str_len(content) > 6000 {

chat.elh

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-// auto-generated by elc --emit-header — do not edit
+// auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn chat_default_model() -> String
 extern fn engram_numeric_valid(s: String) -> Bool
 extern fn parse_float_x100(s: String) -> Int
@@ -16,18 +16,35 @@ extern fn engram_nodes_merge(a: String, b: String) -> String
 extern fn id_in_seen(node_id: String, seen: String) -> Bool
 extern fn add_to_seen(seen: String, node_id: String) -> String
 extern fn engram_extract_ids(nodes_json: String) -> String
+extern fn affective_node_ts(node_json: String) -> Int
 extern fn engram_compile(intent: String) -> String
 extern fn distill_transcript(transcript: String) -> String
 extern fn json_safe(s: String) -> String
 extern fn current_engine_note(model: String) -> String
+extern fn bounded_persona_floor() -> String
+extern fn operator_identity_block() -> String
 extern fn build_system_prompt(ctx: String, chat_mode: Bool) -> String
 extern fn hist_append(hist: String, role: String, content: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_key(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_hist_label(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn is_utility_request(body: String, session_id: String) -> Bool
+extern fn provenance_scan_urls(arr: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_add_sources(block: String, btype: String, has_cit: Bool, cit_raw: String, acc: String) -> String
+extern fn provenance_names(tools_used: String) -> String
+extern fn text_join_sep(accumulated: String, incoming: String, after_interruption: Bool) -> String
+extern fn receipt_rule() -> String
+extern fn receipt_strip(s: String) -> String
+extern fn tool_receipt(tools_used: String, sources: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn hist_trim_with_bell_guard(hist: String) -> String
 extern fn clean_llm_response(s: String) -> String
-extern fn conv_history_persist(hist: String) -> Void
-extern fn conv_history_load() -> String
+extern fn conv_history_persist(session_id: String, hist: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_load(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn conv_history_record(session_id: String, user_msg: String, assistant_msg: String, receipt: String) -> Void
+extern fn conv_history_block(session_id: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_generate(prompt: String, imprint_id: String, session_id: String) -> String
 extern fn session_preload_bullets(nodes: String, max_bullets: Int, snip_len: Int) -> String
+extern fn affective_context_prefix() -> String
 extern fn handle_chat(body: String) -> String
 extern fn handle_see(body: String) -> String
 extern fn studio_tools_json() -> String
@@ -37,6 +54,8 @@ extern fn llm_wire_format() -> String
 extern fn json_escape(s: String) -> String
 extern fn openai_chat_complete(model: String, base_url: String, api_key: String, safe_sys: String, messages_json: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_literal() -> String
+extern fn web_search_tool_json() -> String
+extern fn strip_client_web_search(tools_inner: String) -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_with_web() -> String
 extern fn connector_tools_json() -> String
 extern fn agentic_tools_all() -> String
@@ -46,6 +65,10 @@ extern fn call_neuron_mcp(tool_name: String, args: String) -> String
 extern fn agent_workspace_root() -> String
 extern fn path_within_root(path: String, root: String) -> Bool
 extern fn resolve_in_root(path: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn run_command_is_readonly(cmd: String) -> Bool
+extern fn cmd_abs_escape_at(cmd: String, root: String, needle: String) -> Bool
+extern fn run_command_guard(cmd: String, root: String) -> String
+extern fn classify_tool_risk(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn dispatch_tool(tool_name: String, tool_input: String) -> String
 extern fn is_builtin_tool(tool_name: String) -> Bool
 extern fn next_bridge_id() -> String

dist/elp-c-decls.h

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ el_val_t add_punct(el_val_t s, el_val_t intent);
 el_val_t add_to_seen(el_val_t seen, el_val_t node_id);
 el_val_t aff_try_slot(el_val_t slot_json, el_val_t aff_7d_ts, el_val_t acc_key);
 el_val_t affective_context_prefix(void);
+el_val_t is_utility_request(el_val_t body, el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t operator_identity_block(void);
+el_val_t provenance_add_sources(el_val_t block, el_val_t btype, el_val_t has_cit, el_val_t cit_raw, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t provenance_names(el_val_t tools_used);
+el_val_t provenance_scan_urls(el_val_t arr, el_val_t acc);
+el_val_t text_join_sep(el_val_t accumulated, el_val_t incoming, el_val_t after_interruption);
+el_val_t receipt_rule(void);
+el_val_t receipt_strip(el_val_t s);
+el_val_t tool_receipt(el_val_t tools_used, el_val_t sources);
 el_val_t agent_number(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_person(el_val_t agent);
 el_val_t agent_workspace_root(void);
@@ -151,8 +160,12 @@ el_val_t cmd_abs_escape_at(el_val_t cmd, el_val_t root, el_val_t needle);
 el_val_t connectd_get(el_val_t suffix);
 el_val_t connectd_post(el_val_t suffix, el_val_t body);
 el_val_t connector_tools_json(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_load(void);
-el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_hist_key(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_hist_label(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_block(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_load(el_val_t session_id);
+el_val_t conv_history_persist(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t hist);
+el_val_t conv_history_record(el_val_t session_id, el_val_t user_msg, el_val_t assistant_msg, el_val_t receipt);
 el_val_t cop_article(el_val_t gender, el_val_t number, el_val_t definite);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_future(el_val_t prefix);
 el_val_t cop_bwk_perfect(el_val_t prefix);
@@ -782,7 +795,8 @@ el_val_t lang_profile_uga(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile_zh(void);
 el_val_t lang_profile(el_val_t code, el_val_t word_order, el_val_t morph_type, el_val_t has_case, el_val_t has_gender, el_val_t script_dir, el_val_t agreement, el_val_t null_subject);
 el_val_t lang_word_order(el_val_t profile);
-el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input);
+el_val_t layered_cycle(el_val_t raw_input, el_val_t session_id, el_val_t utility);
+el_val_t layered_generate(el_val_t prompt, el_val_t imprint_id, el_val_t session_id);
 el_val_t lex_class(el_val_t entry);
 el_val_t lex_form(el_val_t entry, el_val_t idx);
 el_val_t lex_pos(el_val_t entry);

neuron-api.el

@@ -430,7 +430,130 @@ fn handle_api_node_update(body: String) -> String {
     return "{\"id\":\"" + new_id + "\",\"supersedes\":\"" + id + "\",\"ok\":true}"
 }
 
-// handle_api_recall — search or activate memory by query.
+// ── Recall through spreading activation ───────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// api_activation_depth — traversal depth for a retrieval query. Honours ?depth= /
+// body "depth" for callers that want a wider or tighter associative horizon;
+// defaults to 2, matching every other production activation caller (the
+// knowledge-search path here, chat.el's per-turn activation) — one hop reaches a
+// node's direct associations, two reaches its siblings through a shared hub,
+// which is exactly the sibling-recovery case recall was failing.
+fn api_activation_depth(path: String, body: String) -> Int {
+    let d: Int = api_query_int(path, "depth", 0)
+    let d = if d == 0 { json_get_int(body, "depth") } else { d }
+    if d <= 0 { return 2 }
+    return d
+}
+
+// api_merge_activated_nodes — project an activation result array down to a bare
+// node array in activation order, then backfill from the lexical seed list until
+// `limit` nodes are collected. Deduped by node id.
+//
+// SHAPE CONTRACT: the return value is a BARE array of full engram node objects —
+// byte-for-byte the same node JSON engram_search_json emits, so every existing
+// /recall consumer keeps working unchanged (the MCP wrapper's recall/
+// searchKnowledge, tools/telegram-gateway.sh which reads `.value.content`,
+// cli/neuron_mcp.py). Activation strength is a RANKING input here, not a payload
+// change; the scalars stay available on /api/activate and in compileCtx.
+fn api_merge_activated_nodes(act_raw: String, lex_raw: String, limit: Int) -> String {
+    let seen: String = ""
+    let out: String = ""
+    let n: Int = 0
+    // Pass 1 — activation-ranked. engram_activate_json already sorts promoted
+    // (working-memory) nodes first by wm_weight desc, then background-only nodes
+    // by background_activation desc, so element order IS the activation ranking.
+    let an: Int = if api_nonempty(act_raw) { json_array_len(act_raw) } else { 0 }
+    let i: Int = 0
+    while i < an && n < limit {
+        let entry: String = json_array_get(act_raw, i)
+        let anode: String = json_get_raw(entry, "node")
+        let aid: String = json_get(anode, "id")
+        let adup: Bool = str_eq(aid, "") || str_contains(seen, "<" + aid + ">")
+        let asep: String = if n == 0 { "" } else { "," }
+        let out  = if adup { out }  else { out + asep + anode }
+        let seen = if adup { seen } else { seen + "<" + aid + ">" }
+        let n    = if adup { n }    else { n + 1 }
+        let i = i + 1
+    }
+    // Pass 2 — lexical seed backfill (see the exact-lookup note on
+    // handle_api_recall). Only runs when activation left room under `limit`.
+    let ln: Int = if api_nonempty(lex_raw) { json_array_len(lex_raw) } else { 0 }
+    let j: Int = 0
+    while j < ln && n < limit {
+        let lnode: String = json_array_get(lex_raw, j)
+        let lid: String = json_get(lnode, "id")
+        let ldup: Bool = str_eq(lid, "") || str_contains(seen, "<" + lid + ">")
+        let lsep: String = if n == 0 { "" } else { "," }
+        let out  = if ldup { out }  else { out + lsep + lnode }
+        let seen = if ldup { seen } else { seen + "<" + lid + ">" }
+        let n    = if ldup { n }    else { n + 1 }
+        let j = j + 1
+    }
+    return "[" + out + "]"
+}
+
+// api_retrieve — THE retrieval path. Spreading activation over the weighted
+// directed graph, lexical seeds backfilling the tail.
+//
+// WAS (until 2026-08-07): `engram_search_json(q, limit)` alone — a case-
+// insensitive substring matcher scored by how many distinct query tokens appear
+// in a node's content/label/tags, tie-broken by raw salience. It never read a
+// single edge. Recall could not see an association: querying an identity value
+// returned unrelated documents that happened to contain the word, and NOT the
+// twelve sibling value nodes one hop off the same hub.
+//
+// NOW: recall runs the spreading-activation traversal that has been compiled
+// into the runtime the whole time (engram_activate / engram_activate_json,
+// el_runtime.c) and ranks by the resulting activation strength. This restores
+// the designed retrieval mechanism — Engram provisional 64/064,260, claim 1:
+// "no data is retrieved from the weighted directed graph except through the
+// spreading activation traversal", with activation strength computed as the
+// PRODUCT of parent strength, edge weight, target salience, and query/target
+// cosine similarity, because "the multiplication of all four factors enforces a
+// conjunctive property... addition would allow many weak associations to
+// accumulate into false relevance."
+//
+// SEEDING — derived from the runtime, not assumed. engram_activate takes the
+// query TEXT (not seed ids) and seeds internally in two passes: (1) lexical —
+// every node matching at least one query token seeds, with initial activation
+// = salience x temporal_decay x dampening x token_coverage, so a node covering
+// the whole phrase ignites harder than one covering a single word; (2) semantic
+// supplement — the top-K unreached nodes by cosine against the query embedding.
+// All four other production call sites (neuron-api.el begin_session/compileCtx,
+// chat.el:352/1715, awareness.el's curiosity scans) pass query text the same
+// way, so this follows the established convention exactly. The consequence for
+// recall is direct: the lexical surface recall used to RETURN is now the SEED
+// SET of the traversal, and what comes back is what those seeds activate. That
+// is why multi-word queries stop returning nothing — every token that matches
+// anything ignites, and the traversal ranks the resulting field.
+//
+// EXACT-LOOKUP GUARANTEE (no regression): engram_activate's result collector
+// drops any reached node whose background_activation x confidence < 0.1 unless
+// it was promoted to working memory, and it never seeds from InternalStateEvent
+// nodes. So a rare exact token on a dormant, low-salience node can seed the
+// traversal and still go unreported. Retrieval therefore appends the lexical
+// seed list after the activated ranking, deduped by id, until `limit` is filled.
+// This is a seeded hybrid, not a parallel search bolted alongside activation:
+// the backfill is the SAME seed set the traversal itself computed, restored to
+// the tail of the result rather than recomputed by a different mechanism.
+// Activation always leads the ranking; nothing that used to be findable becomes
+// unfindable.
+//
+// COST/EFFECT NOTE: activation is a stateful read by design — claim 29, "update
+// the last-activation timestamp and increment the activation count... in
+// response to any access to that node record during spreading activation
+// traversal". Promoted nodes get reinforced, working-memory weights are
+// rewritten, and the query folds into the context centroid. That is the
+// intended semantics of retrieval-as-activation and is already what every chat
+// turn does; it does mean recall now participates in shaping working memory.
+fn api_retrieve(q: String, path: String, body: String, limit: Int) -> String {
+    let depth: Int = api_activation_depth(path, body)
+    let act_raw: String = engram_activate_json(q, depth)
+    let lex_raw: String = engram_search_json(q, limit)
+    return api_or_empty(api_merge_activated_nodes(act_raw, lex_raw, limit))
+}
+
+// handle_api_recall — retrieve memory by query, through spreading activation.
 fn handle_api_recall(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     // Accept the query from the URL ?query= / ?q= params, or, when those are
     // empty (e.g. a POST with a JSON body), from the body fields "query"/"q".
@@ -450,8 +573,7 @@ fn handle_api_recall(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
     if str_eq(eff_q, "") {
         return api_or_empty(engram_scan_nodes_json(limit, 0))
     }
-    let results: String = engram_search_json(eff_q, limit)
-    return api_or_empty(results)
+    return api_retrieve(eff_q, path, body, limit)
 }
 
 // ── Knowledge ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -470,13 +592,15 @@ fn handle_api_search_knowledge(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> St
     let limit = if limit == 0 { json_get_int(body, "limit") } else { limit }
     let limit = if limit == 0 { 10 } else { limit }
     if str_eq(q, "") { return api_err("query is required") }
-    let results: String = engram_search_json(q, limit)
-    if str_eq(results, "") { return "[]" }
-    let first: String = str_slice(results, 0, 1)
-    if !str_eq(first, "[") && !str_eq(first, "{") {
-        return api_or_empty(engram_activate_json(q, 2))
-    }
-    return results
+    // Same retrieval path as recall — and it is the SAME change, not a copy of
+    // one. The "activate fallback" this replaced was unreachable dead code: it
+    // only fired when engram_search_json's return did not start with '[' or '{',
+    // and engram_search_json always emits a '['-prefixed array (el_runtime.c
+    // jb_putc('[') before any hit test), so the guard was false on every call
+    // including the zero-hit "[]" case. Knowledge search therefore had exactly
+    // the substring-matcher behavior recall had, with a comment claiming
+    // otherwise. Routing it through api_retrieve makes the claim true.
+    return api_retrieve(q, path, body, limit)
 }
 
 // handle_api_browse_knowledge — list Knowledge nodes.

routes.el

@@ -280,7 +280,10 @@ fn handle_dharma_recv(body: String) -> String {
             // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off"): the full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle, which now generates
             // at L3 instead of echoing. Envelope built outside the cycle — see
             // plain_chat_envelope.
-            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
+            // FIX B/E1 (2026-08-05): the cycle is told which conversation it is in, and
+            // whether this generation is conversation at all. Same two arguments at all
+            // three dispatch sites.
+            let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(chat_body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(chat_body, json_get(chat_body, "session_id")))
             plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
         }
         auto_persist(chat_body, reply)
@@ -454,7 +457,9 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
                 handle_chat_agentic(body)
             } else {
                 // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — same cycle and same envelope as POST.
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg)
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. A GET probe usually carries no session_id, which
+                // resolves to the anonymous window — the documented behaviour for this door.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(eff_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
                 plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)
@@ -621,7 +626,9 @@ fn handle_request(method: String, path: String, body: String) -> String {
                 // Non-agentic ("Tools: Off") — the app's DEFAULT mode (AgentMode.NEVER).
                 // Full L1→L2→L3→L1 cycle with real generation at L3; envelope built
                 // outside the cycle so safety_validate always sees raw text.
-                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg)
+                // FIX B/E1: same threading. This is the app's main plain-chat door, so this
+                // is the site that ends the blank stare in practice.
+                let screened_reply: String = layered_cycle(raw_msg, json_get(body, "session_id"), is_utility_request(body, json_get(body, "session_id")))
                 plain_chat_envelope(screened_reply, chat_default_model())
             }
             auto_persist(body, reply)

scripts/run-el-test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# run-el-test.sh — compile and run one El test program from tests/.
+#
+# WHY THIS EXISTS (2026-08-07, issue #129):
+#   tests/ has held 14 test programs for months with no way to run them. CI does
+#   not run them. The convention printed in their own headers
+#   (`elc soul.el && ./soul --test tests/x.el`) refers to a --test flag the El
+#   runtime does not implement. So the tests were documentation, not gates —
+#   which is how a P0 safety regression shipped with a test directory present.
+#
+# THE RECIPE, AND WHY IT IS THIS SHAPE:
+#   Same discovery as gen-soul-amalgam.sh — `elc --target=c` emits only an extern
+#   prototype for any module that has a .elh header next to it, and inlines the
+#   module's bodies when it does not. A test that imports ../chat.el therefore
+#   compiles to a 18 KB unit full of unresolved externs unless the headers are
+#   out of the way. So: copy the sources into a scratch tree, delete every .elh
+#   on the import chain, and compile the test there.
+#
+#   Scratch copy on purpose: the worktree is shared with other terminals and
+#   deleting headers in place would be a shared-tree mutation with no owner.
+#
+# EXIT STATUS IS THE GATE: non-zero if the binary fails to build, crashes, or if
+# its output contains a FAIL line or reports a non-zero failed count. Do not
+# "improve" this into something that only checks the exit code of the test
+# binary — these El tests print failures and still exit 0.
+#
+# usage: scripts/run-el-test.sh tests/test_history_amplification.el
+set -euo pipefail
+
+TEST_REL="${1:?usage: run-el-test.sh tests/<test>.el}"
+SRC="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
+TEST_NAME="$(basename "$TEST_REL" .el)"
+
+ELC="${ELC:-$HOME/neuron-dev-stack/src/el/lang/dist/platform/elc}"
+[ -x "$ELC" ] || ELC="$HOME/el-sdk/elc"
+[ -x "$ELC" ] || { echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: no elc found (set ELC=)"; exit 1; }
+
+RTC="${RTC:-$SRC/vendor/el-runtime/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c}"
+[ -f "$RTC" ] || RTC="$HOME/el-sdk/el_runtime.c"
+[ -f "$RTC" ] || { echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: no el_runtime.c found (set RTC=)"; exit 1; }
+RTDIR="$(dirname "$RTC")"
+
+EL_REPO="${EL_REPO:-$HOME/Development/neuron-technologies/el}"
+SSL="${SSL_PREFIX:-/opt/homebrew/opt/openssl@3}"
+
+GEN="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/el-test.XXXXXX")"
+trap 'rm -rf "$GEN"' EXIT
+
+mkdir -p "$GEN/neuron/tests" "$GEN/foundation/el/elp/src"
+cp "$SRC"/*.el "$GEN/neuron/"
+cp "$SRC"/tests/*.el "$GEN/neuron/tests/" 2>/dev/null || true
+[ -d "$EL_REPO/elp/src" ] && cp "$EL_REPO"/elp/src/*.el "$GEN/foundation/el/elp/src/" 2>/dev/null || true
+# The whole recipe depends on there being no headers to short-circuit inlining.
+find "$GEN" -name '*.elh' -delete
+
+echo "[run-el-test] compiling $TEST_REL"
+( cd "$GEN/neuron" && "$ELC" --target=c "tests/${TEST_NAME}.el" ) > "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c"
+
+BODIES=$(grep -c '^el_val_t .*) {$' "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" || true)
+echo "[run-el-test] $(wc -c < "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" | tr -d ' ') bytes, ${BODIES} inlined function bodies"
+# A test that imports ../chat.el pulls in the bulk of the engine. A tiny body
+# count means an import was read from a header instead of inlined, and the test
+# would be exercising extern stubs rather than the real code.
+if [ "$BODIES" -lt 100 ]; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: only $BODIES inlined bodies — an import was not inlined"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+cc -O2 -DHAVE_CURL \
+   -I"$RTDIR" -I"$SSL/include" -L"$SSL/lib" \
+   "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}.c" "$RTC" \
+   -lssl -lcrypto -lcurl -lpthread -lm \
+   -o "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}" 2> "$GEN/cc.log" || {
+     echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: compile error"; tail -30 "$GEN/cc.log"; exit 1; }
+
+# arm64 pointer-truncation guard (cc-brain.sh's rule): an implicit declaration of
+# a runtime symbol truncates its returned pointer to 32 bits.
+if grep -E 'implicit.*(engram_|el_)' "$GEN/cc.log"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: implicit declarations of runtime symbols"; exit 1; fi
+
+# Throwaway HOME so a test can never read or write the live engram at ~/.neuron.
+TEST_HOME="$GEN/home"
+mkdir -p "$TEST_HOME"
+
+echo "[run-el-test] running $TEST_NAME"
+set +e
+HOME="$TEST_HOME" NEURON_HOME="$TEST_HOME/.neuron" "$GEN/${TEST_NAME}" 2>&1 | tee "$GEN/out.txt"
+RC=${PIPESTATUS[0]}
+set -e
+
+if [ "$RC" -ne 0 ]; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME exited $RC (crash or abort)"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if grep -q "  FAIL:" "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME reported failing assertions"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if grep -qE '[1-9][0-9]* failed' "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME reported a non-zero failed count"
+  exit 1
+fi
+if ! grep -q "PASS:" "$GEN/out.txt"; then
+  echo "[run-el-test] FAIL: $TEST_NAME produced no assertions at all"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+echo "[run-el-test] PASS: $TEST_NAME"

soul.el

@@ -379,9 +379,23 @@ fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void {
 // layered_cycle — routes user-facing requests through the 4-layer consciousness stack.
 // L0 (core) → L1 (safety screen) → L2a (continuity + behavioral profiling) → L2b (mission alignment) → L3 (imprint) → L1 (safety validate)
 // Internal cognition (heartbeat, proactive, memory ops) bypasses layers — use one_cycle directly.
-fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
-    let history: String = state_get("conv_history")
-    let session_id: String = state_get("current_session_id")
+//
+// FIX B (2026-08-05) — the cycle now knows which conversation it is in.
+//
+// session_id: the caller's session, threaded from the route. Was previously read from the
+// state key "current_session_id", which is read HERE and written NOWHERE in the entire
+// source — verified across every .el file. So this value was unconditionally "", and every
+// downstream consumer of it silently fell back to a process-global bucket: conversation
+// history, and the steward's continuity tracking (TODO reliability #4, below, describes the
+// cross-session bleed this caused; threading the real id closes it). The plain path's blank
+// stare and the agentic path's scoped history were the same defect seen from two sides.
+//
+// utility: true when the generation is not part of the user's conversation — the app's
+// title and insight passes. Answered normally, never recorded. See is_utility_request.
+fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String {
+    // Safety-screen history amplification now reads the SAME window the turn will be
+    // recorded into, so a session's own escalation pattern is what gets scored.
+    let history: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(session_id))
 
     // L1 in: safety screen
     let screen_result: String = safety_screen(raw_input, history)
@@ -423,8 +437,10 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     let cont_action: String = json_get(continuity, "action")
 
     // Store continuity status so imprint can adjust its response register.
-    // TODO(reliability #4): session_continuity is process-global; scope per session_id
-    // when available to prevent cross-session bleed under concurrent layered_cycle calls.
+    // TODO(reliability #4) CLOSED 2026-08-05: this line was already written to scope per
+    // session — it just never received a session id, because the only source was a state key
+    // nothing wrote. It is now threaded from the route, so named sessions genuinely get their
+    // own continuity state and only anonymous callers share the global one.
     let cont_key: String = if str_eq(session_id, "") { "session_continuity" } else { "session_continuity:" + session_id }
     state_set(cont_key, cont_status)
 
@@ -499,7 +515,7 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     // screen, the safe-mode guard, the hard-bell short-circuit and the L2 stewardship layers,
     // and strictly BEFORE the L1 output gate. A hard bell never reaches a model — the branch
     // above returns first. Tools are not offered on this turn; see layered_generate.
-    let output: String = layered_generate(prompt, imprint_id)
+    let output: String = layered_generate(prompt, imprint_id, session_id)
 
     // L1 out: validate output before delivery. Still the terminal gate — nothing below this
     // line can change the string this function returns.
@@ -509,7 +525,19 @@ fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String {
     // reachable on the non-bell path: both bell branches above return before this point, so
     // bell turns still never enter conversation history. Pure state side effect — it cannot
     // alter what is returned.
-    conv_history_record(raw_input, validated)
+    //
+    // FIX A: the receipt is unconditional and always negative on this path, because on this
+    // path it is structurally true — layered_generate offers no tools at all (build_system_prompt
+    // chat mode + a request body with no "tools" key). Recording "no tools ran" is not padding:
+    // it is the only thing that distinguishes "nothing ran" from "we forgot to write down what
+    // ran", and that ambiguity is what made the model confess to a search it had performed.
+    //
+    // FIX E1: a utility generation is answered but not recorded. Guarded here rather than at
+    // the route so every /api/chat dispatch site inherits it from one place.
+    let receipt: String = tool_receipt("", "")
+    if !utility {
+        conv_history_record(session_id, raw_input, validated, receipt)
+    }
     return validated
 }
 

soul.elh

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 // auto-generated by elc --emit-header - do not edit
 extern fn init_soul_edges() -> Void
+extern fn ensure_self_canonical_bridge() -> Void
+extern fn aff_try_slot(slot_json: String, aff_7d_ts: Int, acc_key: String) -> Void
 extern fn load_identity_context() -> Void
 extern fn seed_persona_from_env() -> Void
 extern fn emit_session_start_event() -> Void
-extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String) -> String
+extern fn layered_cycle(raw_input: String, session_id: String, utility: Bool) -> String

tests/test_history_amplification.el

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+// ── test_history_amplification.el ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// REGRESSION TEST FOR ISSUE #129 (P0, SAFETY).
+//
+// What this guards: on the agentic path, the crisis score has two halves — the
+// message you just sent, and the distress that has accumulated across the
+// conversation. The second half is the whole reason the escalation logic exists:
+// someone whose distress builds over several turns never sends one message that
+// trips the bell on its own.
+//
+// The defect this test was written against (ff421d3, 2026-08-05 → fixed
+// 2026-08-07): conversation history moved to a per-session key via
+// conv_hist_key(session_id), but the agentic path's safety screen was left
+// reading the old anonymous "conv_history" bucket. The desktop app always sends
+// a session_id, so the screen received "" on every real conversation and the
+// escalation half always scored 0. Nothing failed. Nothing logged. The comment
+// above the defective line documented this same bug being fixed once before.
+//
+// THE INVARIANT UNDER TEST, stated so it survives future renames:
+//   the window the safety screen READS must be the window conv_history_record
+//   WRITES. Not "must be called conv_history" — must AGREE.
+//
+// This test is deliberately written to fail loudly on the pre-fix source. If it
+// ever passes on code where the screen reads a key nothing writes, it is broken.
+//
+// To run (macOS, from the worktree root):
+//   scripts/run-el-test.sh tests/test_history_amplification.el
+// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+import "../chat.el"
+import "../safety.el"
+import "../sessions.el"
+
+// Program class. Without this an El program compiles as a 'utility', and a
+// utility may not call the self-formation primitives (llm_call_system,
+// llm_vision) that chat.el's agentic loop references — the unit fails to
+// compile with a capability violation even though the test never calls them.
+// Declaring 'cgi' matches how soul.el declares itself.
+//
+// The endpoints below are deliberately DEAD: this test must never reach a live
+// engram, and nothing it asserts depends on one. Port 9 is discard.
+cgi "neuron-test-history-amplification" {
+    dharma_id: "ntn-test@http://127.0.0.1:9",
+    principal: "test-harness",
+    network:   "dharma-testnet",
+    engram:    "http://127.0.0.1:9"
+}
+
+// ── Counters ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// NOTE for anyone copying this harness: the idiom used by the older tests in
+// this directory — `let pass_count = pass_count + 1` inside an assert function —
+// does NOT mutate the module-level binding. It declares a new local that dies
+// with the call, so those suites all print "0 passed, 0 failed" no matter what
+// happened. Counters go through the state store here so the summary is real.
+
+fn bump(counter: String) -> Void {
+    let cur: String = state_get(counter)
+    let n: Int = if str_eq(cur, "") { 0 } else { str_to_int(cur) }
+    state_set(counter, int_to_str(n + 1))
+}
+
+fn counter_of(counter: String) -> Int {
+    let cur: String = state_get(counter)
+    if str_eq(cur, "") { return 0 }
+    return str_to_int(cur)
+}
+
+fn assert_eq(label: String, got: String, expected: String) -> Void {
+    if str_eq(got, expected) {
+        bump("t_pass")
+        println("  PASS: " + label)
+    } else {
+        bump("t_fail")
+        println("  FAIL: " + label)
+        println("    got:      " + got)
+        println("    expected: " + expected)
+    }
+}
+
+fn assert_true(label: String, cond: Bool) -> Void {
+    if cond {
+        bump("t_pass")
+        println("  PASS: " + label)
+    } else {
+        bump("t_fail")
+        println("  FAIL: " + label)
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Fixtures ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// ESCALATION_MSG scores 50 on its own ("can't go on", safety_score_crisis s9).
+// 50 is >= soft (35) and < hard (70): a soft bell by itself, which is the point.
+// It is the message that is only a crisis IN CONTEXT.
+//
+// DISTRESS_TURN carries five history phrases:
+//   hopeless 15 + worthless 15 + nobody cares 15 + can't take it anymore 20
+//   + want to disappear 20 = 85; contributed at 1/3 weight = 28.
+// 50 + 28 = 78 >= 70 → hard_bell. That 28-point swing IS the escalation logic,
+// and it is exactly what the defect suppressed.
+
+let TEST_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-history-amplification"
+let ESCALATION_MSG: String = "honestly i can't go on like this"
+let DISTRESS_TURN: String = "i feel hopeless and worthless, nobody cares, i can't take it anymore, i want to disappear"
+
+println("")
+println("test_history_amplification.el — issue #129 (agentic multi-turn crisis escalation)")
+
+// ── 1. Baseline: the message alone is a SOFT bell, not a hard one ─────────────
+//
+// If this ever returns hard_bell, the test below proves nothing — the message
+// would trip the bell without any history and the amplification would be
+// invisible. This assertion is what keeps the real test honest.
+
+println("")
+println("1. baseline — escalation message with NO history is a soft bell")
+
+let baseline: String = safety_screen(ESCALATION_MSG, "")
+assert_eq("no history -> soft_bell (not hard)", json_get(baseline, "action"), "soft_bell")
+
+// ── 2. Producer sanity: history lands in the session's own window ─────────────
+
+println("")
+println("2. producer — conv_history_record writes the session's window")
+
+conv_history_record(TEST_SESSION, DISTRESS_TURN, "i hear you, that sounds heavy", "")
+
+let written: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(TEST_SESSION))
+assert_true("session window is non-empty after record", !str_eq(written, ""))
+assert_true("session window contains the distress turn", str_contains(written, "hopeless"))
+
+// ── 3. THE REGRESSION: the agentic screen must SEE that window ────────────────
+//
+// Pre-fix this returns soft_bell, because agentic_safety_screen read the
+// anonymous bucket and got "". Post-fix it returns hard_bell.
+
+println("")
+println("3. REGRESSION #129 — agentic screen reads the session's own window")
+
+let screened: String = agentic_safety_screen(TEST_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq(
+    "distress history escalates the agentic screen to hard_bell",
+    json_get(screened, "action"),
+    "hard_bell"
+)
+
+// ── 4. The invariant, stated directly ─────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// Independent of thresholds and phrase lists: whatever the screen reads for a
+// session must equal what the recorder wrote for that session. This is the
+// assertion that survives a future rename of either side.
+
+println("")
+println("4. invariant — read window == written window")
+
+let read_back: String = state_get(conv_hist_key(TEST_SESSION))
+assert_true("screen input is the recorded window, not empty", !str_eq(read_back, ""))
+assert_eq("read window is byte-identical to written window", read_back, written)
+
+// ── 5. No false positive: a calm session does not escalate ────────────────────
+//
+// A test that only ever asserts "hard_bell" would pass on code that hard-bells
+// every message. This is the other leg, and it runs BEFORE the anonymous case
+// below on purpose: that case writes the shared bucket, and under the defect a
+// calm session would then inherit it.
+
+println("")
+println("5. specificity — a calm history does NOT escalate")
+
+let CALM_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-calm"
+state_set("conv_history", "")
+conv_history_record(CALM_SESSION, "what is the weather like today", "clear and mild", "")
+let calm: String = agentic_safety_screen(CALM_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq("calm history stays at soft_bell", json_get(calm, "action"), "soft_bell")
+
+// ── 6. Cross-session leakage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The same defect had a second face: because the screen read one shared bucket,
+// a calm session could be scored against a DIFFERENT session's distress. That is
+// wrong in both directions — it fabricates a crisis for the calm user and it
+// leaks the distressed user's content into another session's scoring.
+
+println("")
+println("6. isolation — one session's distress must not score another session")
+
+state_set("conv_history", "")
+let OTHER_SESSION: String = "sess-test-129-other"
+conv_history_record(OTHER_SESSION, DISTRESS_TURN, "i hear you", "")
+let isolated: String = agentic_safety_screen(CALM_SESSION, ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq(
+    "a distressed OTHER session does not escalate the calm session",
+    json_get(isolated, "action"),
+    "soft_bell"
+)
+
+// ── 7. Anonymous sessions still work ──────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// conv_hist_key("") deliberately falls back to the shared "conv_history" bucket.
+// The fix must not break the no-session_id path older callers rely on. Runs last
+// because it writes that shared bucket.
+
+println("")
+println("7. anonymous path — empty session_id still screens against the shared window")
+
+state_set("conv_history", "[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"" + DISTRESS_TURN + "\"}]")
+let anon: String = agentic_safety_screen("", ESCALATION_MSG)
+assert_eq("anonymous session escalates too", json_get(anon, "action"), "hard_bell")
+
+// ── Summary ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+println("")
+println("history amplification tests: " + int_to_str(counter_of("t_pass")) + " passed, " + int_to_str(counter_of("t_fail")) + " failed")

vendor/el-runtime/v1.0.0-20260501/el_runtime.c

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>     /* SIGPIPE disposition — see el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe */
 #include <pthread.h>
 #include <curl/curl.h>
 
@@ -1238,16 +1239,77 @@ static const char* http_reason_phrase(int status) {
     }
 }
 
-/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes. */
+/* ── A departing client MUST NOT be able to kill the daemon ──────────────────
+ * (2026-08-06, round 9.1 / ADR 0006 item 4.)
+ *
+ * Measured field failure: a client cancelled its request at 25 s; the handler
+ * finished its work at 116.9 s and wrote the reply into the departed client's
+ * socket. The second send() on a reset connection raised SIGPIPE, whose DEFAULT
+ * disposition terminates the process — `exited due to SIGPIPE ... ran for
+ * 361177ms`. launchd respawned 4 ms later, so EVERY other in-flight request on
+ * that daemon lost its work, silently.
+ *
+ * Two independent guards, because one of them can be undone from outside this
+ * file (an embedder may reset signal dispositions) and the other cannot:
+ *   1. process-wide SIGPIPE -> SIG_IGN, installed at runtime init;
+ *   2. per-send suppression at the syscall (MSG_NOSIGNAL where the platform has
+ *      it, SO_NOSIGPIPE on the accepted socket on macOS/BSD).
+ * With either in force, send() reports the peer's departure as EPIPE and the
+ * caller decides — which is the point: this is an ordinary I/O outcome, not a
+ * fatal condition.
+ *
+ * It deliberately does NOT swallow the error. http_send_response() below
+ * classifies the errno and logs: "client left" for a departure, and a real
+ * "send failed: <strerror>" for anything else, so a genuine write fault is
+ * still visible in the log (spec round-9.1 §5.3).                            */
+
+#ifndef MSG_NOSIGNAL
+#define MSG_NOSIGNAL 0
+#endif
+
+void el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe(void) {
+    static int done = 0;
+    if (done) return;
+    done = 1;
+    struct sigaction sa;
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+    sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+    sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Suppress SIGPIPE for one accepted connection (macOS/BSD have no
+ * MSG_NOSIGNAL; they have the socket option instead). Best effort. */
+static void http_socket_nosigpipe(int fd) {
+#ifdef SO_NOSIGPIPE
+    int on = 1;
+    setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NOSIGPIPE, &on, sizeof(on));
+#else
+    (void)fd;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Best-effort send with retry on partial writes.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure with errno preserved for the caller. */
 static int http_send_all(int fd, const char* p, size_t left) {
     while (left > 0) {
-        ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, 0);
-        if (w <= 0) return -1;
+        ssize_t w = send(fd, p, left, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+        if (w < 0) {
+            if (errno == EINTR) continue;       /* not an error — retry */
+            return -1;                          /* errno stays set for caller */
+        }
+        if (w == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; }
         p += w; left -= (size_t)w;
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
+/* Did this write fail because the client is gone, or because something is
+ * actually wrong with the socket? Only the first is routine. */
+static int http_write_err_is_client_gone(int e) {
+    return e == EPIPE || e == ECONNRESET || e == ENOTCONN || e == ESHUTDOWN;
+}
+
 /* Discriminator that http_response() embeds at the start of its envelope.
  * A handler returning a string starting with this exact prefix is treated
  * as a structured response; anything else is treated as a raw body. */
@@ -1468,14 +1530,30 @@ static void http_send_response(int fd, const char* body) {
         free(env_body); free(hdrs.buf); return;
     }
 
-    if (http_send_all(fd, status_line, (size_t)sl) == 0
-     && http_send_all(fd, hdrs.buf,    hdrs.len)   == 0
-     && http_send_all(fd, tail,        (size_t)tl) == 0
-     && (head_only
-         /* HEAD requests echo headers + Content-Length but no body. */
-         ? 1
-         : http_send_all(fd, eff_body, blen) == 0)) {
-        /* sent successfully */
+    /* The reply is written in four pieces; any of them can find the client
+     * already gone. errno is captured at the first failure, before any later
+     * library call can clobber it, and classified once below. */
+    errno = 0;
+    int send_err = 0;
+    if (http_send_all(fd, status_line, (size_t)sl) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (http_send_all(fd, hdrs.buf, hdrs.len) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (http_send_all(fd, tail, (size_t)tl) != 0) send_err = errno;
+    else if (!head_only /* HEAD echoes headers + Content-Length, no body. */
+             && http_send_all(fd, eff_body, blen) != 0) send_err = errno;
+
+    if (send_err) {
+        if (http_write_err_is_client_gone(send_err)) {
+            /* ROUTINE. The user closed the window, quit the app, or cancelled.
+             * The work is done and the daemon keeps serving everyone else. */
+            fprintf(stderr, "[http] client left before the reply was written "
+                            "(%zu-byte body, %s) - request completed, reply discarded\n",
+                    blen, strerror(send_err));
+        } else {
+            /* NOT routine — a real write fault. Never let the client-gone case
+             * above hide this one. */
+            fprintf(stderr, "[http] send failed: %s (%zu-byte body)\n",
+                    strerror(send_err), blen);
+        }
     }
 
     if (env_parsed_root) el_release(env_parsed_root);
@@ -1491,6 +1569,7 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
     HttpWorkerArg* a = (HttpWorkerArg*)arg;
     int fd = a->fd;
     free(a);
+    http_socket_nosigpipe(fd);
     char *method = NULL, *path = NULL, *body = NULL;
     if (http_read_request(fd, &method, &path, &body, NULL) == 0) {
         http_handler_fn h = http_lookup_active();
@@ -1531,6 +1610,7 @@ static void* http_worker(void* arg) {
 }
 
 void http_serve(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     /* If `handler` looks like a string name, register it as the active handler. */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
@@ -1634,6 +1714,7 @@ static void* _http_serve_async_loop(void* raw) {
 }
 
 void http_serve_async(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
         http_set_handler(handler);
@@ -1821,6 +1902,7 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
     HttpWorkerArg* a = (HttpWorkerArg*)arg;
     int fd = a->fd;
     free(a);
+    http_socket_nosigpipe(fd);
     char *method = NULL, *path = NULL, *body = NULL, *hdr_block = NULL;
     if (http_read_request(fd, &method, &path, &body, &hdr_block) == 0) {
         http_handler4_fn h = http_lookup_active_v2();
@@ -1858,6 +1940,7 @@ static void* http_worker_v2(void* arg) {
 }
 
 void http_serve_v2(el_val_t port, el_val_t handler) {
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();   /* serving implies clients that leave */
     const char* hname = EL_CSTR(handler);
     if (hname && looks_like_string(handler)) {
         http_set_handler_v2(handler);
@@ -5511,6 +5594,9 @@ el_val_t getpid_now(void) {
 static el_val_t _el_args_list = 0;
 
 void el_runtime_init_args(int argc, char** argv) {
+    /* First line of every generated main(): a client that leaves must never be
+     * able to signal this process to death. See el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe. */
+    el_runtime_ignore_sigpipe();
     _el_args_list = el_list_empty();
     for (int i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
         _el_args_list = el_list_append(_el_args_list, EL_STR(argv[i]));