3ef4a940629a88a016060063ce06873134d8339e
547 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Neuron
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3ef4a94062 |
spec: thirteen values, and love is the origin — not a member of the set
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 3m51s
Reverts a bad correction and records what it exposed. A previous revision changed thirteen to eight on the basis of neuron-api.el:11-18, which is a WRITE-PROTECTION LIST, not the values. Trusting a hardcoded artifact over the substrate is the exact error this document exists to name. Measured from the graph: thirteen. THE ORIGIN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE SET. The thirteen are not independent principles with biography attached — they are thirteen displacements from one origin, and the origin is love. Every value is grounded in a moment of it given, withheld, failed or found. Love cannot be the fourteenth: a fourteenth would be a point positioned relative to the origin like anything else. It is what the positions are OF. This is structural. GeoDescriptor.global_mean is the centering offset subtracted from every embedding before comparison, and the header records why — the space is anisotropic, every embedding in a narrow cone at mean pairwise cosine ~0.55, and subtracting the global mean restores isotropy 'so the operators discriminate'. Without the origin, nothing in the graph is distinguishable from anything else. It also dissolves the write-protection question instead of answering it. Measured: 29 value nodes exist, each original appearing two or three times from re-seeds, so 21 are writable including a duplicate of every protected value — the gate protects an identifier, not a value. But the category error is the real one: the origin cannot be edited because it is not a thing in the space. A gate over the frame treats the frame as a member, which is the same mistake as looking for grounding as a subsystem, self as a document, or wonder as a manifest. |
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Neuron
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285a7a50b3 |
spec: corrections — eight values not thirteen, eleven consolidators not seven
Three factual errors in this document, all asserted without checking. VALUES: eight, not thirteen. neuron/neuron-api.el:11-18 enumerates constraints-as-freedom, precision-over-brute-force, structure-is-built, honesty-before-comfort, system-must-accumulate, change-is-the-signal, earned-trust, hope-is-a-conclusion, plus a hub. 'Thirteen' was repeated throughout this design and never verified against the code. The argument is unaffected — min over eight is still min — but the count was invented. CONSOLIDATORS: eleven, not seven. The heading said seven while the table listed ten, and the table itself omitted POST /api/reify (server.el:1832) even though 'reify' is on this document's own list of consolidation verbs. route_tick also folds self-reify in (server.el:639-646), so /api/tick and /api/self-reify-beat overlap. A SECOND CENSORSHIP SITE: neuron-api.el:23 returns 403 'identity/values node is write-protected' for the values hub and every value node. Write-refusal on the values frame is not only in the beat — it is enforced at the API. Section 6 applies to it unchanged. Also records what the ticker actually does, now measured: engram-tick.sh:13 calls curl -m10 against a beat that exceeds 10s over 13,634 nodes, so 279 of 448 ticks returned empty; the engram writes to the dead socket and dies of SIGPIPE. 254 restarts since 2026-08-13 at 10m09s-10m12s intervals = StartInterval 600 plus the client timeout. Fixed for survivability in #151; the ticker itself is what must go. |
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Neuron
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6b61bb7224 |
geometry: disagreement belongs on the edge, not averaged into the region
co_registration is corr(hebb strength, semantic proximity) over a region's
internal edges. Whether use and meaning agree is a property of EACH EDGE;
the correlation averages it into one scalar per region, so a region holding
one violently disagreeing edge beside one violently agreeing edge reports
~0. The disagreements cancel and the summary destroys exactly what it was
built to reveal — the mean-versus-min error, in different clothes.
Measured: 375 live neighborhoods, 340 positive, 31 AT ZERO, 4 negative.
Read as a count that says 'four things to be curious about'. Read correctly
it says four were lopsided enough to survive averaging, and the 31 zeros
are where opposing sites cancelled.
The loop computing the aggregate already had both halves per edge — w and
cs — and threw them away. Now:
discord = z(semantic proximity) - z(association strength)
standardized within the region from accumulators already gathered. No
second statistic, no constant, no threshold; |discord| IS the nucleation
strength. >0 near in meaning yet unlinked by use; <0 linked by use yet far
in meaning. Both surprising.
This also removes the reason curiosity looked like a search problem. With a
per-region number the only way to find sites is to enumerate regions — I
wrote exactly that sweep, and it is a supervisor walking the structure,
O(n) per call, fine at 375 and impossible at a million. Nothing in a mind
scans its neighborhoods to find what is surprising; the surprise captures
attention. That sweep is reverted here.
co_registration is deprecated, not deleted: it is embedded in the persisted
GEO1 blob and removing it is a format migration that must not ride along.
Nothing new may read it.
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Neuron
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8d34b33bce |
spec: wonder is the boundary; curiosity is wonder crystallized
Rewrites §5 and §11 around what is already in the substrate, after discovering I had been re-deriving existing design badly. The wonder manifest is residue twice over. First it materializes a property as a stored artifact — the same disease as a grounding subsystem or a self stored as a document. Wonder is where structure ENDS: any structure at all has an edge, necessarily, the moment it exists. Second it enumerates instances of something that has about six, the same six for every person, which never close: what is this, why, who am I, am I alone, what should I do, what happens when it ends. The objects change completely between a child and an astronomer; the wonder does not. Each maps one-to-one onto something already built — graph, grounding, self region, for_whom, the thirteen values, tombstones and decay. "Why" is the first and only one; the others are it asked of particular things. It is recursive, so it never terminates, which is what makes it a drive rather than a task. Wonder and curiosity are not two objects. They are one thing at two phases. Wonder is the field: objectless, invariant, everywhere there is structure. Curiosity is the PRECIPITATE — the same wonder localized against particular material. Crystallization needs a nucleation site, and crystallization is one primitive appearing twice: the self is what identity precipitates into from its neighbourhood; a curiosity is what wonder precipitates into from an anomaly. THE NUCLEATION SITE ALREADY EXISTS AND IS ALREADY NAMED. GeoDescriptor.co_registration — corr(hebb strength, semantic proximity) over internal edges — carries the comment ">0 = geometries agree (reify); <0 = disagree (surprising links / dream cands)." Negative co-registration is a region where association and meaning disagree. It is computed on every descriptor, already labelled dream candidates, and nothing reads it. Likewise already present and unread: GeoEdge.eff_weight = weight*(1+0.5*hebb) already couples grounding-weight and hebbian strength on one edge; GeoMember.dist_centroid + soft membership + radius + per-axis extent is the boundary of a neighbourhood; centrality/salience is what is warm. Correction: engram_boundary_beat is NOT this boundary. It is the VBD decorated-function seam counting _eg_aff_boundary_ops. Two senses of the word, and I was about to build on the wrong one. The drive: boredom is not an absence and not leftover capacity. Low activation is aversive and the system self-activates — it does not wind down to quiet, it gets restless and goes looking. So there is ONE activation process with TWO seed sources, external and curiosity, not two processes negotiating for a resource. The previous draft's "unclaimed capacity" was resource scheduling: a server's frame, not a mind's. No dreamer thread, no idle wait, no depth ladder on a clock. Sequencing now leads with three connections between parts that already exist: seed the six, read co_registration, let a curiosity seed activation. |
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Neuron
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d6b7f5dbdd |
spec: dreaming is ambient, not scheduled — a brain has no cron job
Corrects the section I was most confident in, which is usually the tell. The previous draft had dreaming as "offline replay, decoupled from input, a mode the system enters when it is not acting." That is SLEEP. Daydreaming is dreaming, and it runs all day: the default mode network is anticorrelated with task engagement, activating hundreds of times a day for seconds at a time, doing the same work — recombination, simulation, autobiographical integration. Insight arrives in the shower, not at the desk, because that is abduction completing during ambient recombination. Sleep is the DEEP case, not the case: no input competing, no task claiming capacity, so recombination runs further. Same process, different depth, not a different mode. Consolidation is what happens with the capacity that is not claimed. Two consequences the draft had backwards: The launch-agent fragments are wrong in KIND, not merely in number. 23:55 / 06:00 / 08:30 implements dreaming as a scheduled batch when it should be ambient. A brain has no cron job. A ticker is a supervisor deciding from outside when a thing should happen — the same failure mode as inventing an owner for ownership and a grounder for grounding, wearing a scheduler. THE PRESENCE OF A TICKER IS THE DIAGNOSTIC: every StartInterval, every Hour/Minute, every POST-to-beat marks a place where an intrinsic rhythm was replaced by an external clock. And soul.el's continuous awareness_run() beside the HTTP workers is the CORRECT shape, not the offender. Ambient consolidation in the gaps is exactly daydreaming. It was the only fragment shaped right, running on a broken foundation: shared mutable state with no owner and six other systems dreaming into the same graph. The previous draft condemned the right behaviour because of the substrate under it. So the crash restates once more: not "read paths mutate the index" (mechanism), not "duplicate canonical state" (structure), and not "one system dreamt while awake" — but seven systems dreaming into one graph with no owner for dreaming. Contention was the symptom of the missing owner. Sequencing step 1 inverts accordingly: soul's loop is the shape the others fold INTO, not something to remove. Step 2 becomes "no tickers, no cron." |
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Neuron
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9a24803917 |
spec: grounding is a two-axis gradient, and decisions carry their provenance
Rewrite. The earlier draft got the root right and everything downstream of it wrong. Corrections, in the order they were forced: keystone_write_blocked is not a protection requirement. "Keystone" means load-bearing, not precious: the self anchor is the REFERENCE FRAME every other stance calibrates against. If it calibrates from the measurements it is used to judge, the ruler fits the readings, everything corresponds forever, and drift becomes undetectable from inside. That is circular calibration — the same defect as #147's circular grounding, one level up. The block is the right requirement implemented as a prohibition, which is why it still costs everything §0 says it costs. The fix is provenance separation (evidence not downstream of itself), not a flag. Corruption requires mutation and the engram does not mutate, so four of the five requirements previously decomposed out of "protect the identity region" are satisfied by the substrate: recoverability, governance, evidence quality and rate are all free. Authorization is the only residue and is bounded — an unauthorized writer can propose, never erase. General law: in an immutable substrate, any mechanism that refuses a write is either redundant with immutability or an epistemic constraint misfiled as a protective one. Grounding is two-dimensional. Everything consumed is grounded factually AND relationally, and a claim can be factually grounded but relationally wrong — the evidence holds, the meaning does not. A scalar cannot represent that quadrant, and assert gates on one floor, so a well-evidenced claim is licensed regardless of whether it means the right thing. Live instance: conscience-substrate has the Child's Companion hard bell contacting 911 and CPS — factually defensible, relationally wrong against never-auto-contact. Grounding is a gradient, not a score: direction says what would have to change. Two gradients in one space, and the ANGLE between them is the meaning — factually-true-relationally-wrong becomes measurable instead of requiring a careful reader. It decays on the dynamics already present for memory (base_level, temporal_decay_rate, access ring, BLL), which mechanizes "never leave stale canonicals" so it stops depending on vigilance. Computed continuously, recorded only on SIGNIFICANT movement, old never leaves. Persisting every recomputation would make reads write — the exact eg_vindex_sync defect. Significance is defined by consequence (crossing a floor, flipping factual/relational sign, reversing direction), never by an epsilon. The supersession chain is then the trajectory, a derivative obtained free from immutability, and abduction fires on the trajectory rather than on a reading. What it is all for: for any decision, reconstruct what the grounding was at that moment and what the relationship was between fact and values at that moment. That distinguishes WRONG THEN from WRONG SINCE, which is otherwise impossible, and it is structurally anti-rationalization — the old grounding never leaves and the values frame does not fit to outcomes, so a decision cannot be made to look justified after the fact. Also records: assert returns "still_held": true HARDCODED — a temporal property named in the API and answered without consulting anything, the same shape as magnitude:1 beside a zero vector. And states plainly that #147 is the wrong shape: it fixed a scalar's honesty rather than replacing the scalar. |
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Neuron
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a6611dc19e |
spec: correspondence and censorship — the root beneath the day's defects
Effect: all five cognitive faculties return byte-identical results, differing only in their label. The Ishikawa converges on a root one level above the faculty design: things are permitted to be exempt from correspondence, and exemption is censorship. A region forbidden to learn is forbidden to be grounded, and a region that cannot be grounded cannot be asserted, corrected, OR vindicated. The loss is symmetric — censorship does not preserve a true belief, it makes the belief's truth value permanently unknowable. keystone_write_blocked is therefore not a safety mechanism. Self is a crystallized relational neighbourhood, not a stored document; a region exempt from calibration reintroduces the stored document as a feature. reduction_pct = 0.00 on the identity region is the strongest abduction signal in the system and the current response is to suppress it. The protection it reached for already exists and is better: the beat is supersede-not-mutate, so immutability is what makes learning safe. The faculties are not one operation with parameters. They differ by what each may change: reason changes the estimate (a read), induce changes the parameters (the correspondence-beat, which already exists and measurably works at 28.11% Brier reduction), abduce changes the structure (a WRITE the current signature cannot express, since engram_think returns a GeoGradient). Abduction is not selected by a caller — it is triggered by residual that parameter adjustment cannot absorb, and proposes a candidate hub held as a hypothesis until grounded. Also records the no-exemption invariants generalised from the day's fixes (#141 #142 #143 #146 #147 #148), each of which was a specific correspondence forbidden from occurring, and the application to the crisis surface: a censored safety model cannot tell a real crisis from a false positive, because the feedback is exactly what has been censored. Measured vs inferred is labelled throughout. The claim that the self region's zero grounding is CAUSED by the block is explicitly marked inferred — the comparison node also has zero, and isolating it requires removing the block and observing whether grounding then accrues. |
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 will.anderson
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4a57b4faa8 |
Merge pull request 'docs: the builtin recipe never required a test' (#154) from docs/builtin-recipe-gate into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 3m53s
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will.anderson
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0ee82d9e91 |
Merge pull request 'Grounding is the edge's weight, and the weight is a vector' (#150) from feat/grounding-gradient into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 3m43s
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will.anderson
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9526bda507 |
Merge pull request 'engram: expose the geometry so the frame can be verified' (#156) from fix/geometry-readable into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 4m7s
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Neuron
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0389bf9363 |
engram: expose the geometry so the frame can be verified
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 11m29s
engram_scan_nodes_emb_json has existed as a builtin with NO ROUTE. The embeddings — the actual positions every distance, angle, membership and grounding is computed from — were unreadable from outside the process. That is not a missing convenience. It means every claim about the coordinate frame was unfalsifiable from the API: whether the space is isotropic, where the centering offset sits, what the origin is, whether a node carries geometry at all. You cannot verify a coordinate system you cannot see, and a system whose frame cannot be checked is exactly the shape this codebase spent 2026-08-16 removing everywhere else. GET /api/nodes/emb?limit=&offset=. Read-only, paged, no writes. Measured consequence of having it: the value manifold and the love component manifold were both decomposed, null-controlled against random node sets drawn from the same graph, and several published claims were retracted because the geometry contradicted them. None of that was possible before this route existed. |
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Neuron
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fe820928b0 |
docs: the builtin recipe never required a test
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m55s
lang/AGENTS.md:71-77 gives four steps for adding a C builtin and ends at 'confirm the self-host fixpoint is byte-identical'. No step asks for a test. The only 'verify' in the file is that fixpoint, which proves the COMPILER REPRODUCES ITSELF and says nothing about whether the builtin works — so the recipe reads as complete while having checked nothing about the thing just added. Measured on 2026-08-16: engram_node_set_emb, engram_curiosity_json and dream_set_handler were all added in a single session with zero tests, by an agent following this recipe. Separately a UTF-8 fix was written and tested and THE TEST PASSED ON THE UNPATCHED BUILD — the real defect was elsewhere, and only building the pre-fix binary exposed it. Without a negative control that fix would have merged as verified. Adds step 5 with the two failure shapes actually encountered: a test that never exercises the change (a route default bypassed the code under test), and an induction that loses a race (curl --max-time left BOTH builds alive; only SO_LINGER 0, a real RST, reproduced it). Plus the port-binding check, because a stale instance answering has silently produced false results here more than once and pkill -f does not reliably match argv './engram'. Documentation only. Does not touch the (a) split-the-C / (b) close-the- compiler-gap question, which is a separate decision. |
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will.anderson
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385c18442d |
runtime: a disconnecting client must not kill the server (#151)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 3m53s
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Neuron
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cace6a5ebf |
runtime: a disconnecting client must not kill the server
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 13m45s
There was no SIGPIPE handling anywhere in this runtime: no signal
disposition, no MSG_NOSIGNAL, no SO_NOSIGPIPE, and send() called with bare
flags. The default disposition of SIGPIPE is to TERMINATE THE PROCESS, so
any client that hangs up mid-response takes the whole engram with it.
MEASURED, and it is not hypothetical. Production has restarted 254 times
since 2026-08-13T19:37 at a flat ~10 minute cadence:
17:05:18 17:15:29 17:25:38 17:35:50 17:46:00 17:56:10 18:06:22 18:16:30
Intervals of 10m09s-10m12s, not 10m00s. That excess is the whole story:
ai.neuron.engram-tick has StartInterval 600, and engram-tick.sh:13 calls
curl -s -m10 -X POST .../api/tick
The beat does not finish within 10s over 13,634 nodes, so curl waits its
full timeout and closes. The engram then writes the tick response to a dead
socket, takes SIGPIPE, and dies. launchd KeepAlive restarts it, so the
failure presents as a mysterious restart rather than a crash — and
~/.neuron/logs/engram.log records nothing but "[http] listening on" 254
times, with no exit reason. launchctl list confirms the last exit as -13.
Root cause is one level out: consolidation had no owner, so an external
ticker was created to poke it, and the ticker is what kills it. The fix
here does not address that; it makes the process survivable while it is
addressed.
Two layers, because neither alone is portable:
- SO_NOSIGPIPE per accepted socket (Darwin/BSD) and MSG_NOSIGNAL per send
(Linux), so the signal is never raised for socket writes at all.
- A process-wide SIG_IGN backstop, installed once and idempotent, for
platforms and paths with neither. With the signal ignored, send()
returns -1/EPIPE and the existing error path closes the connection.
Also retries send() on EINTR, which the previous loop treated as fatal.
This is an exemption in the sense of lang/spec §8: the write never checked
whether the peer was still there, and the consequence of not checking was
fatal rather than merely wrong.
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Neuron
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7a1501d097 |
Grounding is the edge's weight, and the weight is a vector
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 3m59s
A relation that keeps holding up strengthens; one that stops corresponding
decays. That is not analogous to grounding, it IS grounding — so it belongs on
the edge, not in a subsystem beside it. The graph was already the grounding
structure; this stops modelling it as something else.
Deleted, not refactored:
- cog_ground_edge and the `grounded-by` relation type. A grounded-by edge
models grounding as a relation BETWEEN nodes when it is a property OF a
relation. #147 fixed which endpoints that edge landed on and left the wrong
idea intact. Measured on the live store: the old path scored two nodes with
ZERO edges between them at 0.925237 and wrote an edge for it.
- ground() writing. It was a read that wrote — the eg_vindex_sync defect.
Three identical calls produced three writes to the same edge id.
- keystone_write_blocked. Its measured cost was 0.00% brier reduction over
n_trials 0 on the keystone: the loop never ran, so the self was never
calibrated and never falsifiable. Nothing replaces it — non-circularity of
the reference frame is temporal, not a permission.
- a graph predicate for "evidence downstream of itself", built and then
withdrawn. Reachability from the self region covers 89.2% of the live graph
(10,580 of 11,861 nodes), so any topological predicate marks nearly all
evidence tainted and degenerates into the total block censorship began as.
The vector, carried in a GRD1 block on the edge's own metadata:
factual, relational, associative (the existing hebb), polarity (SIGNED — near
zero is "no support", negative is "actively contradicts"; `inhibitory` is that
distinction crushed to one bit), provenance class, and a timestamp. Confidence,
recency, staleness and volatility are DERIVED at read and never serialized.
Decay is one model, not two: cog_decay_factor is the single implementation and
engram_temporal_decay now delegates to it — proven bit-identical over 24
(age, reinforcement) points.
Values reference: thirteen regions, aggregate MIN, binding value named. Measured
— the 13 have pairwise centroid cosine min 0.1525 / mean 0.5199 / max 0.9278, so
they demonstrably are not one region, and a mean would let agreement with twelve
mask a violation of the thirteenth.
Supersession versions the whole vector jointly, gated by consequence and
salience with no epsilon anywhere: floor crossings and sign changes only.
Polarity flips and provenance-class changes are inherently significant and
bypass the salience gate.
Also fixed: the frame contract. Descriptors are built over L2-normalized member
embeddings; think() and the grounding path were fitting RAW vectors against them.
Measured on the self region, same data, same 106 members:
magnitude 0.00283443 -> 0.536134, spread 18.7565 -> 0.930163.
Every fit score sat three decimal places below the 0.5 floors that gate on them.
assert() gates on both floors and computes still_held instead of returning a
hardcoded `true` — the old build reported still_held for a node that does not
exist.
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will.anderson
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d41645388a | runtime: make valid UTF-8 the JSON emitter's contract (#148) | ||
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Neuron
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8a307dfd42 |
runtime: make valid UTF-8 the JSON emitter's contract
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m36s
Three nodes in the live graph carry labels truncated to exactly 80 bytes ending in a lone 0xE2 — the first byte of an em-dash, cut mid-sequence. jb_emit_escaped copied every byte >= 0x20 through verbatim, so those three nodes made the ENTIRE /api/nodes/list response undecodable and no strict parser could read the graph at all. production binary 25,929,607 bytes INVALID at byte 89260 this build 26,338,389 bytes VALID, parses to 13,630 nodes The damage was NOT written by this runtime. No 80-byte truncation exists here (the only label truncation is engram_first_n_chars at 60), and the content of those nodes is 2572 and 2746 bytes. Some other producer wrote them. That is exactly why fixing a writer could not have fixed this: the store already holds the damage, and it accepts data from importers, other producers and older binaries. So the fix goes where the promise is made. A serializer that emits JSON owes valid UTF-8 whatever it is handed. jb_emit_escaped now validates each multi-byte sequence before emitting any of it and substitutes U+FFFD for a bad lead byte, a missing or malformed continuation, an overlong encoding, a UTF-16 surrogate, or a codepoint above U+10FFFF. Invalid bytes are REPLACED rather than dropped, so the damage stays visible in the output instead of being silently papered over. Well-formed input is byte-identical to before. Second, preventive and explicitly NOT the cause of the above: engram_first_n_chars truncated by BYTES despite its name, so content with a multi-byte character crossing byte 60 would produce a half codepoint in the label. It now uses el_utf8_safe_len, which returns the largest byte length <= max that does not split a codepoint. Bounded by bytes, not codepoints, so existing labels never grow — they only stop splitting. el_utf8_safe_len lives beside str_count_chars rather than in the engram because the rest of el's string layer is already codepoint-aware (str_count_chars counts codepoints, str_reverse walks codepoint lengths). Byte truncation was the outlier and the concern is a string concern. Note on the investigation: I first "fixed" the truncator and wrote a test that passed on the UNPATCHED build too, because route_create_node passes label = content when no label is supplied, so engram_first_n_chars is never reached over HTTP. The test proved nothing. The real cause was only found by decoding the actual failing bytes out of the live response. |
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will.anderson
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616815b2ab |
Give cross-cutting concerns an owner instead of a convention (#145)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 11m4s
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will.anderson
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1a8a966cb3 |
runtime: transduction is a language concern, so move it into the language (#144)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 11m29s
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will.anderson
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1f70b9fa18 |
runtime: ground the node asked about, and refuse circular support (#147)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 14m46s
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Neuron
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317466e8f7 |
runtime: ground the node asked about, and refuse circular support
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 15m5s
engram_ground_json resolved each seed to a REGION, wrote the grounded-by
edge between the two regions' HUBS, and then echoed those hubs back in the
"claim"/"evidence" fields as if they were the caller's input:
const char* cid = C->hub_id ? C->hub_id : EL_CSTR(claim);
const char* eid = E->hub_id ? E->hub_id : EL_CSTR(evidence);
cog_ground_edge(g_engram_store, cid, eid, grounding, fw);
Three consequences, all measured against a clone of the live store:
1. The edge landed on a node the caller never named. Grounding 3b9ced5d
against 6edf8c79 wrote an edge on the hubs of their regions instead.
2. When both seeds resolve into the same region the support is circular
and scores near 1.0 for structural reasons, not evidential ones. Four
probe nodes written together landed in one region, and every grounding
among them returned 0.93-0.99 as if it were evidence. Two independent
agents hit this and reported 0.885 / 0.909 self-groundings as confident.
3. The echo concealed both: the response was indistinguishable from a
successful grounding of the ids that were passed in.
The region is HOW a claim is evaluated; it is not WHAT the claim is about.
So the edge now attaches to the requested ids, and the resolved hubs are
reported separately as claim_region / evidence_region.
Degeneracy is broader than hub == hub. Three circular shapes, all
previously invisible:
same-region both seeds resolve to one region
claim-region-is-evidence the evidence IS the hub of the claim's own
neighbourhood — measured at 0.98883
evidence-region-is-claim the mirror case
Each sets grounding to 0 and writes no edge. Circular support is not
support, and a grounding that is degenerate by construction must not
enter the graph as though it were evidence.
Verified:
6edf8c79 -> 6edf8c79 degenerate=same-region g=0 written=false
6edf8c79 -> d0406dfd degenerate=same-region g=0 written=false
ebc1413e -> 64cc96ef degenerate=false g=0.774563 written=true
64cc96ef -> ebc1413e degenerate=false g=0.802896 written=true
Legitimate grounding across distinct regions is unchanged and still
writes; only circular support is refused.
This is the same class as #142 and #146 — a value that looked like an
answer with nothing behind it — except here it was also writing that
non-answer into the canonical store.
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will.anderson
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eb3e6d7c1f |
runtime: resume the learned stance in think (#146)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 3m54s
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Neuron
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88e3008735 |
runtime: resume the learned stance in think, instead of discarding it
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 4m16s
engram_think_json built a NEUTRAL stance on every call — cog_stance_init with a NULL id, all axis_gain 1.0, bias_dir NULL, reliability 0.5 — and never loaded the stance the correspondence-beat had been persisting. That mattered because the faculty enters engram_think ONLY through the stance: axis_gain[k] warps the per-axis extents and bias_dir seeds the steering direction. cog_stance_init stores the faculty NAME and nothing reads it. So with a neutral stance, reason/abduce/induce/plan/analogize were byte-identical output under different labels, and confidence was pinned to 0.5 because GeoGradient.confidence IS stance->reliability. The machinery already existed and only this call site ignored it. engram_correspondence_beat_json resumes via cog_stance_from_node and persists via cog_stance_to_node under "stance-<faculty>-<hub>". Every beat's calibration was written and then thrown away on the next read. Same defect as the NULL anchor fixed in #142, one line below: a neutral argument collapsing a capability to a constant. Resume the same id the beat writes, so learning compounds across beats and cold boot. Fall back to neutral only when no stance exists — a genuine uninformed prior rather than a discarded informed one. Also emit stance_resumed, so confidence 0.5 from a learned-but-unreliable stance is distinguishable from confidence 0.5 from "no stance exists". That reporting gap is what let the neutral stance hide. Verified against a clone of the production store (13,627 nodes): before beat, no stance stance_resumed=false confidence=0.5 beat on a NON-keystone brier 0.00458568 -> 0.00329654 reduction 28.11%, n_trials 6000, reliability 0.930726, stance_written=true after beat stance_resumed=true confidence=0.930726 Confidence now equals the learned reliability instead of the uninformed prior. The keystone self-anchor correctly stays at 0.5 — calibration is deliberately refused on protected identity regions, and that refusal is now visible as resumed=true with confidence unchanged, rather than being indistinguishable from the bug. STILL OPEN: with no learned bias_dir the faculties remain identical in direction. What distinguishes abduce from induce geometrically is a design decision about how Neuron thinks, not a plumbing defect, and is deliberately left to Will. |
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bigmerge
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26af149aa1 |
lang: rebuild the bootstrap compiler against merged dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 4m46s
The binary was stamped before dev advanced (vindex publication landed in el_runtime.c and engram_vindex.c). Rebuilt against the merged runtime so the committed compiler matches the runtime it ships beside. Fixpoint re-verified byte-identical; test_compiler 82/82; engram/src/server.el still compiles and still emits its 18 config declarations. |
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bigmerge
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c18abf799c |
engram: declare configuration once instead of at every read site
Migrates engram to the `program` block. 18 configuration variables that each
carried their default inline at the point of use now declare it in one place,
and engram declares itself a singleton.
The read sites lose their defaults entirely: `let v = env("X")` followed by
`if str_eq(v,"") { "default" } else { v }` collapses to `config("X")`. The
guide_env_or(key, dflt) helper is deleted -- its whole job was supplying a
per-site default, which is the thing being removed.
Fixes ENGRAM_DATA_DIR, which was the clearest instance of the defect. It was
read at six sites. Five were dead: `let dir_raw = env("ENGRAM_DATA_DIR")`
immediately shadowed on the next line by `engram_resolve_data_dir()`. The sixth
was live and defaulted to /tmp/engram, contradicting the canonical resolver's
$HOME/.neuron/engram -- and its consumer is the pre-destructive reseed backup,
so with ENGRAM_DATA_DIR unset the safety copy was written to ephemeral storage
while the store it protected lived elsewhere. All six now go through
engram_resolve_data_dir().
ENGRAM_DATA_DIR is deliberately NOT declared in the program block, and the
source says why: engram_resolve_data_dir() already owns it, and a second
declaration would give it two owners that can disagree -- recreating the exact
defect being removed here. A variable belongs in the block when the block would
be its only owner. HOME stays a raw env() read; it is an environment fact, not
configuration.
singleton: "engram" matters more than it looks. Today a second engram whose
bind() fails merely returns from http_serve -- after it has already replayed
the WAL and written boot-time backup files -- and then exits 0, indistinguishable
from a clean run. That is how two instances came to share one data dir. Verified
that the second instance now refuses before any side effect: with instance 1
holding the lock (lsof pid, shell pid, and lock file contents all agreeing at
5946), the second start named that pid, exited 1, and left the data directory
untouched.
Verified by bijection on the generated C: 18 config() reads, 18 declarations,
no read without a declaration and no declaration without a read. Three bad Int
values are reported in a single run rather than costing one restart each.
ENGRAM_API_KEY keeps its permissive empty default, which disables auth -- that
is pre-existing behaviour and changing it is out of scope. The source marks
making it `required` as the obvious hardening follow-up.
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bigmerge
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b305b49f40 |
lang: re-stamp the bootstrap compiler so the tree can compile its own source
server.el declares a `program` block, which the previously committed elc cannot parse. Without this the tree is internally inconsistent: source in the repo that the compiler in the repo rejects. This is the documented re-stamp from BOOTSTRAP.md / AGENTS.md, and its precondition is met -- the self-hosting fixpoint was verified byte-identical (stage3 output == stage2 output) both before installing and again with the installed binary. tests/native/test_compiler.el passes 82/82 against it. Two pre-existing failures are unchanged and are NOT from this work, confirmed by rebuilding them against the original runtime: test_env's "state_keys returns JSON array" fails identically before and after, and test_json/test_state fail to link on symbols (json_build_array, state_has) that were never prototyped -- the same class of gap as config(), which this branch fixed because it blocked the build. |
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bigmerge
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8ae163e8e5 |
lang: give cross-cutting concerns an owner instead of a convention
El's units of encapsulation are the function and the module. Neither can hold
a concern that belongs to the process, so each one had been expressed the only
way it could be -- as a convention: call this at every site. Conventions of
that shape do not hold. Measured here: zero process-identity guards at any
layer, 20 environment variables each with its default written inline at the
read site, 62 persist call sites, 10 per-route auth checks. One absence, four
times.
Step 0 first, because the premise was wrong. El was believed to have no
middleware or effect mechanism. It has one, and it is already load-bearing:
codegen injects engram_boundary_beat at the entry of every @manager/@accessor
fn, decorators take arguments and stack, dharma_emit from a non-@manager fn is
a #error, and the cgi block injects el_cgi_init at the head of main(). So the
correct move was not to invent a mechanism but to generalize the seam that
already existed. The real gap is narrower and is now recorded: the seam is
prologue-only and its callee is a fixed builtin.
Adds a `program` block -- the third program-level declarative block. cgi and
service declare what a program may do; program declares what it is.
program "engram" {
singleton: "engram"
env ENGRAM_BIND: String = ":8742"
env GUIDE_PORT: Int = "8771"
}
singleton takes an exclusive flock before any user statement runs and refuses a
second start, reporting the holder's pid. It is a lock rather than a pidfile so
the kernel releases it on death including SIGKILL -- no stale state, and so no
"delete the lock file to get unstuck" ritual, which would itself be a
convention. It reports the pid because "already running" is not actionable; a
pid is. That is the direct answer to a stale process surviving a pkill and
going on answering probes.
env entries resolve once at startup -- environment wins, declaration supplies
the fallback -- and validate as a whole, reporting every problem at once rather
than costing one restart per variable. config("X") for an undeclared X is
fatal, because an advisory schema is just another convention. Programs without
a program block are unaffected, so migration is per-program.
Only one keyword is added. `config` and `env` could not become keywords -- both
are real identifiers in the tree -- so the block's fields are read as
identifier token values by its own parse loop and stay usable everywhere else.
The init function is emitted at the block site and called from main() rather
than inlined into main(). The live backend is codegen_streaming, which emits in
source order and cannot hold the entry list alive until main(); this way only a
single bool has to survive.
Also fixes: config() was defined in el_runtime.c but never prototyped in
el_runtime.h, so any el program calling it failed to compile under C99.
Spec: section 18 documents what shipped. Section 9 is corrected -- it claimed
decorators had no structural meaning, which has not been true for some time.
Section 19 designs durability-as-an-epilogue-effect and route authorization
and states plainly why neither is implemented here: both land in files under
concurrent modification, and the prerequisite for both is lifting the seam
from prologue-only to prologue/epilogue.
Self-hosting fixpoint verified byte-identical.
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bigmerge
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3fcc36c2f1 |
runtime: transduction is a language concern, so move it into the language
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 14m58s
#141 let signal enter as geometry and it worked, but it was placed at the CONSUMER and said so in its own commit message. This is the correction. Three defects, all of them placement: 1. It sat in the engram. Ingest is a LANGUAGE concern — every el program touching any modality needs it, and the engram is merely one el program that happens to hold a graph. The geometry surface is now defined in el_runtime.c immediately ABOVE the engram section and depends on nothing inside it. Delete the entire engram and geometry still enters el. 2. It marshalled the vector as a hex STRING, because el had no first-class geometry value — which reintroduced text as the TRANSPORT medium one layer below the problem being fixed. Geometry is now an el value: a magic-tagged heap object carried in el_val_t, same discipline as List/Map. Hex survives only as an adapter at the edge, which is all an encoding should ever be. 3. It needed an arbitrary `dim <= 8192` bound purely to size an allocation from a caller's CLAIM about a string's length. A value carries its own width, so the width is derived and never asserted. The bound is gone, not raised — there is nothing left to validate. Language surface, none of it engram-prefixed: geometry_new / _dim / _is / _get / _set / _norm / _free, geometry_from_f32le_hex + geometry_to_f32le_hex as the wire adapters, realizer_register(modality, fn_name), realizer_has, and transduce(signal, modality) -> Geometry. REALIZERS ARE DECLARABLE IN EL. This is the part that makes the move real rather than nominal: registration resolves a name with dlsym against the running binary, the identical mechanism http_set_handler already relies on, because every el `fn name(...)` compiles to a global C symbol with that exact name. So an ordinary el function IS a realizer and a new modality needs no runtime patch. Verified end to end in lang/examples/transduce.el: an el-defined tone_realizer is registered by name, transduce dispatches to it, and the signal demonstrably reaches it (distinct signals produce distinct geometry). A modality with no realizer transduces to NOTHING. There is deliberately no built-in realizer, not even for text — silently embedding a description of a signal and calling that perception is the exact defect this ends. engram/src/server.el is migrated: POST /api/nodes decodes "emb" hex exactly once, at the edge, into a Geometry, and everything below that line moves geometry. The wire is unchanged because production clients speak it. "dim" is now an ASSERTION about the vector, not the source of its width; disagreement is a rejected ingest, not a silent reinterpretation. #141's engram_node_set_emb becomes a DEPRECATED WRAPPER over geometry_from_f32le_hex + node_attach_geometry — kept only because the runtime ships as an SDK asset and a downstream binary may link the symbol. Its exact contract, negative cases included, is preserved and re-verified. ingest.el's `fn transduce` is renamed transduce_manifold. Mechanically it had to yield the name (duplicate C symbol, a hard compile error, measured). But it was never signal->geometry: it chunks already-extracted content into a node+edge manifold, one layer up, and had taken the name belonging to the primitive underneath it. Behaviour unchanged. PROPERTIES FROM #141 PRESERVED, each re-measured on a scratch engram (:8971, never prod :8742): - off-dimension vectors stored but NOT indexed — the HNSW build loop still filters on n->emb_dim == dim at four sites, so a 64-dim voice vector is durable and addressable without perturbing the 768-dim canonical index - geometry makes a node ineligible for embed_backfill: after backfill the 64-dim voice node was still 64-dim while the text control acquired 768 - the create response reports whether geometry landed, and the node document always emits emb_dim and embedded Read-back with control and negatives, all verified against a PID-confirmed fresh binary: geometry node emb_dim=64 embedded=true / emb_set=1; text-only control emb_dim=0 embedded=false / emb_set=0; malformed hex, ragged length, and dim-disagreement each emb_set=0. Two compiler landmines found by reading the generated C rather than trusting a successful build, both documented at their sites: elc lowers `a == b` to str_eq unless both operand NAMES are in the per-function int-name set (which does NOT propagate into nested if-expression blocks — the first cut would have strcmp'd two integers as pointers on the first geometry-bearing request), and `+` lowers to string concat when either operand is a user-defined call. |
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will.anderson
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a6cef4b983 |
runtime: publish the vector index instead of guarding it (#143)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 10m29s
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Neuron
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8e9d88fc01 |
runtime: publish the vector index instead of guarding it
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m59s
The crash (SIGTRAP in engram_activate -> eg_vindex_sync -> vindex_insert -> _realloc) had three read paths mutating five process-global statics. engram_activate, eg_knn_for_node (whose own comment says "No writes.") and engram_geo_reify_run_json all called eg_vindex_sync, which frees the index, reallocs the seen-map and inserts — on a read. Three moves, in decreasing order of how much they dissolve: 1. Misfiled scratch is not shared state. visited/visit_epoch/visited_cap were never owned by the index; they are one traversal's local, hoisted into struct VIndex as an allocation optimisation. They want neither a lock nor a capability nor a pool — just to go back in the call frame. Two concurrent READS stomped each other purely because of this. 2. const IS the capability. Once the scratch leaves the struct, search reads and nothing else, so vindex_search takes a const VIndex*. That is exactly what a capability-pointer ABI would have bought — a read path physically cannot call vindex_insert, enforced by the compiler on every future caller — for one qualifier instead of an ABI swept across hundreds of builtins. 3. What survives is publication, not ownership. HNSW insert is NOT an append: it rewires the neighbour links of already-existing elements and reallocs elems[], so the store's append-only property does not transfer to the index derived from it. eg_vindex_sync therefore splits into eg_vindex_maintain (exclusive, sole mutator) and eg_vindex_view (shared, returns const VIndex*). A read path may demand that a current snapshot exist — a request to the owner, not a mutation by the reader. Write-side owner: eg_vindex_note_embedded hooks the embedding-ASSIGNMENT sites rather than the append sites, because a node with no embedding cannot be in a vector index — embedding assignment is the event that owns index membership. One O(log n) insert, no O(node_count) presence scan. This also retires the "STALENESS (honest tradeoff)" note where a lazily-embedded older node stayed invisible to route_nearest/autoconnect until a full rebuild (the embed-gap #20 shape). Evidence. The existing harness conflated two hazards, which is why fixing half of it read as failure. Split into four: single (3000 vec, ASan+UBSan) clean -> clean readers (4 readers, no writer, TSan) RACE -> clean unsynchronized (writer+reader, bare) race -> race, expected forever published (owner + 4 readers) n/a -> clean, 3000/3000 landed RESULT: PASS. recall@10 = 0.9365 at ef_search=128 (gate >= 0.90); determinism byte-identical across two independent builds. The unsynchronized half is now permanently expected to race, deliberately: it is the executable proof that the boundary must live above the data structure, not inside it. fb32d15's guard is KEPT, correcting this design's own section 5. Measured, it guards TWO structures and only one was converted here: g->nodes/g->edges are realloc'd in place (el_runtime.c:7618,7629) and engram_activate_inner's embed-backfill writes n->emb through exactly such a borrowed pointer. Deleting the guard reintroduces a measured 11171->9579 edge loss. Its comment is narrowed to the RAM graph and the deletion precondition named. That corrects the ordering claim too: the residual is not one ABI that dissolves everything at once, it is a PROPERTY applied per structure. Residues evaporate in the order the property is applied, and a residue whose structure has not been converted must be left standing. |
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bigmerge
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e99a4640e2 |
test: regression harness for the vindex concurrency crash
Promotes the two throwaway sanitizer harnesses used to diagnose the
2026-08-16 soul crash into engram/test/ so the bug cannot silently regress.
The harness has two halves and the PAIR is the point — it is what localises
the defect to concurrency rather than to HNSW logic:
single 3000 clustered vectors, one thread, ASan+UBSan. The CONTROL.
Must always be clean. During diagnosis this cleared all 13,820
real dim-768 vectors from the live store, which DISPROVED an
inspection-derived hypothesis about an out-of-bounds
reverse-link write at engram_vindex.c:340.
concurrent writer + reader on one shared index, TSan. Currently reports a
race at engram_vindex.c:195 (visited_reset) reached from both
vindex_search and vindex_insert, because VIndex still owns its
visited[]/visit_epoch scratch — so even two concurrent READS
corrupt each other's traversal.
Verified: half 1 passes, half 2 reproduces the race.
Gated on EXPECT_RACE, default 1, so the concurrent half documents the known
defect without failing the suite today. When the visited set moves to a
per-query checkout pool (hnswlib VisitedListPool style — NOT thread_local,
since http_worker is a thread per connection and a __thread buffer would leak
~55KB per connection), flip EXPECT_RACE=0 and it becomes a real gate.
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bigmerge
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bdc1f99fb9 |
runtime: guard engram activation against the unsynchronized awareness thread
The soul daemon had two engram callers and only one of them locked.
soul.el:729 starts the HTTP server via http_serve_async (spawning
http_worker threads); soul.el:731 then runs awareness_run() on the MAIN
thread. awareness.el's perceive() -> engram_activate_json() ->
engram_activate() -> eg_vindex_sync() -> vindex_insert() mutates the same
g->nodes/g->edges and the process-global _eg_vindex HNSW index that the
workers touch. g_engram_req_lock existed to serialize exactly this, but it
was only ever taken inside http_worker: engram_req_lock/engram_req_unlock
appear in ZERO .el sources, so the awareness loop ran lock-free beside the
workers on every tick (SOUL_TICK_MS=1000).
Result was a crash-loop under launchd KeepAlive: five crashes in ~4 minutes
on 2026-08-16 with varying faulting frames -- search_layer<-vindex_insert
<-eg_vindex_sync, engram_activate, abort, and one inside xzm_realloc's own
freelist. Varying sites plus a fault in allocator metadata means heap
corruption. The SIGSEGV address 0x65646f4e6d617267 is little-endian ASCII
"gramNode": string bytes dereferenced as an Elem vector pointer.
Diagnosed by bisection rather than inspection:
- Replaying all 13,820 real dim-768 vectors harvested from the live store
through the index single-threaded under ASan is 100% clean, which rules
out an HNSW logic/bounds bug.
- Two threads on one index trip ThreadSanitizer immediately at
engram_vindex.c:195 (visited_reset), reached from both vindex_search and
vindex_insert. VIndex keeps a SHARED visited-epoch scratch buffer, so
even two concurrent READS corrupt each other's traversal and walk bogus
element indices.
So this is purely a concurrency defect, not an HNSW logic error. (An
inspection-derived hypothesis about an out-of-bounds reverse-link write at
engram_vindex.c:340 was disproved by the single-threaded run.)
Fix: a thread-local ownership depth (_eg_req_depth) lets engram entry points
self-guard. engram_activate() becomes a wrapper over engram_activate_inner()
that acquires g_engram_req_lock when called with depth 0 (the awareness
thread) and passes through when depth > 0 (nested inside an http_worker that
already holds it), so the non-recursive mutex cannot self-deadlock. The depth
is a plain counter, never a recursive-mutex count, preserving
engram_self_reify_beat_json's contract of genuinely releasing the lock
mid-beat.
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will.anderson
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44b621e551 |
runtime: anchor the think read, so Neuron can think at all (#142)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 13m0s
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Neuron
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ded6ca546f |
runtime: anchor the think read, so Neuron can think at all
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 13m24s
engram_think_json passed NULL as the anchor. NULL is not "no opinion":
engram_think re-origins at `anchor ? anchor : region->centroid`, so NULL
means "read from the centroid" — and the centroid is the one point where
the gradient is zero by construction. r = x - centroid = 0, so every axis
projection is 0, grad is 0, and direction takes the "at rest" branch at
engram_cognition.c:137.
Measured consequence: EVERY faculty returned an identical null result,
differing only in its label —
{"direction":[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0],"spread":0,"magnitude":1,"confidence":0.5}
magnitude 1 is membership evaluated at the centroid, spread 0 is its
distance to itself, confidence 0.5 is the stance fallback. The geometry was
never at fault: /api/drift computes real values (centroid_sep 0.104,
core_disp 0.045) over the very same 87 members. Neuron could not think
because the read was always taken from the region's own centre.
The seeds choose WHICH region; they must also supply the VANTAGE. Anchor at
the first resolvable embedded seed — the same seed eg_geo_build_desc infers
dim from, so the two can never disagree. One seed still yields a real
gradient because the descriptor expands to that seed's neighbourhood, so
the seed's position is distinct from the neighbourhood centroid.
The vector is COPIED, never borrowed: g->nodes is realloc'd in place on
append, so a borrowed EngramNode* dangles across any concurrent write.
Verified against a clone of the production store (13,616 nodes / 37,865
edges):
self anchor n_support 87 magnitude 0.00282 spread 18.79
values hub n_support 28 magnitude 0.00318 spread 17.72
with distinct unit direction vectors. Previously both returned the zero
vector with magnitude 1 and spread 0.
STILL OPEN, now isolated by this fix: all five faculties return identical
numbers and confidence stays 0.5, because cog_stance_init is passed NULL
for the stance and the faculty enters the computation only through the
stance's axis_gain[] and bias_dir. The faculty label is inert until a
stance is loaded — which is what learn()'s correspondence-beat calibrates.
Same shape as this bug: a neutral parameter collapsing a capability to a
constant.
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will.anderson
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b5b96c05ed |
runtime: let signal enter as geometry, not as prose about signal (#141)
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 10m36s
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Neuron
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c79033b749 |
runtime: let signal enter as geometry, not as prose about signal
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 10m55s
No ingest path could carry a vector. engram_node/_full/_layered take text only, and a node acquired an embedding solely via engram_embed_backfill DERIVING one from n->content. That made text the mandatory entry medium: any non-text modality had to be described in prose first, so the geometry we then reasoned over was the geometry OF THE DESCRIPTION, not of the signal. Measured: POST /api/nodes accepted an "emb" field, returned 200 with a fresh id, and stored nothing — emb_dim=None, embedded=false. engram_node_set_emb attaches a vector to an existing node. Off-dimension vectors are stored but not indexed (the HNSW build loop already filters on emb_dim), so modality geometry is durable and addressable without perturbing the canonical index. Setting emb also makes the node ineligible for embed_backfill, so a realizer's vector is never overwritten by a text-derived one. Two reporting fixes ride along, because both are how the drop stayed invisible: the create response now reports emb_set instead of being success-shaped regardless, and the node document now always emits emb_dim and embedded — without which a genuine ingest drop and a mere reporting gap are indistinguishable. Verified live: voice node emb_dim=64 embedded=true; text control emb_dim=0 embedded=false; malformed hex, length mismatch and dim<=0 all reject. KNOWN PLACEMENT DEFECT: this is at the consumer. Ingest is a language concern, not an engram feature — every el program touching any modality needs it. The vector also marshals as a hex STRING because el has no first-class geometry value, which reintroduces text as the transport medium one layer below the problem being fixed. The durable shape is geometry as an el value plus declarable realizers, after which the engram stops having an ingest concept at all. Landing this as the verified probe that proves the path. |
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will.anderson
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1119295238 |
Merge pull request 'runtime: state_get leaked its value on every call' (#140) from fix/state-get-leak into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 14m5s
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bigmerge
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9c07970943 |
runtime: state_get leaked its value on every call
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 14m26s
char* result = el_strdup_persist(e ? e->value : ""); // never freed
pthread_mutex_unlock(&_state_mu);
char* copy = el_strdup(result); // arena-tracked
return el_wrap_str(copy);
Two copies were made. `result` existed only as the source for `copy` — never
returned, never freed — and el_strdup_persist bypasses the arena BY DESIGN
("state_set, engram internals"), so arena-pop could never reclaim it. Every
state_get leaked its full value string, permanently.
MEASURED: 200,000 state_get calls against a 64-byte value.
before 15 MB peak RSS growth (~75 bytes/call — the value plus overhead)
after 0 MB
IMPACT. The soul's awareness loop has 68 state_get call sites and ticks every
200ms. Live measurement before the fix: RSS climbing 112 MB per 20s, about
19 GB/hour, in awareness_run -> one_cycle -> perceive, while node_count stayed
flat at ~13,479 — growth with no data behind it. It drove the host from 20 GB
free to 4.3 GB in roughly an hour.
WHY NOW, since the code is old: the soul used to restart constantly (no
write-through, divergent graph, 2.11 GB). Stabilising it (neuron #162) let it
stay up long enough to accumulate. The fix did not cause this leak; it removed
the crashes that were hiding it. Same pattern as the test framework surfacing
math_log — the defect was always there, something finally made it visible.
Found by Ishikawa rather than by reading the nearest code: method (arena
push/pop IS correctly paired per tick), material (node count flat, so not data
growth), environment (19 GB/hr / 18,000 ticks = ~1.1 MB per tick, so per-tick
not one-shot), machine (an allocator that bypasses the arena) — which is where
the evidence pointed.
el_strdup tracks into the thread-local arena, which touches no shared state, so
taking the single copy under _state_mu is safe and removes the temporary
entirely.
Verified: self-hosting fixpoint byte-identical; state round-trip correct for
hit, miss, and overwrite.
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will.anderson
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0832865952 |
Merge pull request 'test framework phase 3/4: black_box barrier + three-signal complexity gate, armed' (#139) from wt/soul-runtime-reconcile into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 11m32s
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Neuron
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e0b2c0ea54 |
bench: arm the Phase 4 gate -- proven to pass clean AND fire on a quadratic
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 12m7s
Adds tests/native/test_lexer_scaling.el, the regression gate for el #132. Both directions are proven on LIVE workloads, not synthetic series: healthy per-character scan 1821 3251 6007 10422 us -> O(n) PASS rescan-from-zero (the #132 shape) 922 3667 13524 44792 -> O(n^2) FAIL A gate only proven to pass is decoration. The quadratic specimen exists so the gate is proven to FIRE. Also fixes elb_spread_ok to judge the ASYMPTOTIC TAIL (last three ratios) rather than the whole sweep. Measured on a genuinely linear scan the ratios ran 3.37 2.92 1.76 1.65 -- the head looks quadratic because it is cold cache, the tail is the truth. Whole-sweep spread rejected correct data. A complexity bound is an asymptotic claim and must be judged asymptotically. That fix came from the classifier refusing to rubber-stamp my own bad measurement: it reported INDETERMINATE on an unwarmed sweep rather than passing it. Warmup is now taken and discarded at every sweep point. Reverts the == workarounds in test_elbench.el now that el #137 has landed; the natural form generates no str_eq and all 13 fitter tests stay green. The workaround remains -- the Plus arm is still open. |
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bigmerge
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cf060adbfd | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev' into wt/soul-runtime-reconcile | ||
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will.anderson
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63fe8a766d |
Merge pull request 'codegen: Bool is int-like, so Bool comparisons stop lowering to str_eq' (#138) from fix/bool-is-int-like into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 4m28s
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bigmerge
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b5a0a729e6 |
codegen: Bool is int-like, so Bool comparisons stop lowering to str_eq
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 14m49s
fn check(label: String, cond: Bool, want: Bool) -> Void {
if cond == want { ... } -> if (str_eq(cond, want)) SIGSEGV
}
Bool has always been an integer in the value model — type_to_c maps Bool to
"int", and el_runtime.h states "Bool -> el_val_t (0 = false, nonzero = true)".
But Bool names were registered NOWHERE: build_int_names_for_params tracked Int
and Float params, and the `let` path tracked Int and Float bindings. Neither
knew about Bool.
So comparing two Bools fell through to str_eq, which dereferenced 0 or 1 as a
char* and segfaulted immediately.
This is the third instance of one family found tonight, after el #137 (a call
on either side of == poisoned the operator) and el #136 (a missing import
compiled clean). All three are the same shape: something the compiler could not
type, silently handled as a string.
Found while writing #137's own test harness — the first version of that harness
crashed on exactly this, on both the old and new compiler, which is how it
surfaced. A test harness that cannot compare two Bools is a good way to notice.
VERIFIED:
- the harness that segfaulted on every prior compiler (exit 139, no output)
now runs clean: 14 passed, 0 failed
- self-hosting fixpoint byte-identical
- the compiler's own generated C differs by 8 lines — only the intended
registration
- neuron's full soul amalgam regenerates in 424ms, exit 0, BYTE-IDENTICAL
- test_math 13/13, test_string 27/27, test_core 10/10, test_text 12/12
Adds tests/runtime/operator_typing_test.el, the 15-case suite from #137, so
this family is covered going forward rather than rediscovered.
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will.anderson
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b26dd47aef |
Merge pull request 'codegen: either side Int is enough for == and !=, not both' (#137) from fix/eq-operand-inference into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 12m0s
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bigmerge
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b55e6bfd53 |
codegen: either side Int is enough for == and !=, not both
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 12m20s
let a: Int = 5
getint(5) == a -> str_eq(getint(5), a) SIGSEGV
getint(5) == 5 -> getint(5) == 5 fine
A function call whose return type codegen cannot infer poisoned the operator,
and a declared Int on the other side did not save it. str_eq then read an
integer as a char* and segfaulted. Only an integer LITERAL on one side forced
the numeric form, which is why the bug stayed invisible: the common case
happened to be safe.
The check required BOTH operands to be provably Int:
if is_int_expr(left) { if is_int_expr(right) { numeric } }
Loosening to OR is strictly safer, not a trade:
- when one side is a known Int, str_eq is ALWAYS wrong — it dereferences
that integer — while numeric comparison is at worst a wrong answer on a
program that was already ill-typed;
- when neither side is Int nothing changes at all, so string comparison is
untouched.
Found by the test-framework agent while building the benchmark harness; it
correctly declined to fix it mid-phase since it is a codegen semantics change.
VERIFIED, because a semantics change earns more than an assertion:
- 15/15 on a dedicated operator suite covering string literals, string vars,
string-returning calls, mixed var/call, and != in every combination. The
pre-change compiler scores 0/15 on the same file: it segfaults before
printing anything.
- self-hosting fixpoint byte-identical
- the ONLY difference in the compiler's own generated C is the intended one:
a nested if becoming two sequential ifs, in EqEq and NotEq. Nothing else
moved.
- neuron's full soul amalgam regenerates in 400ms, exit 0, output
BYTE-IDENTICAL at 1,270,212 bytes
- test_math 13/13, test_string 27/27, test_core 10/10, test_text 12/12 —
62 tests, 190 assertions, zero failures
NOT fixed here, same family, flagged for a decision: Bool PARAMETERS are not
tracked as int-like, so `cond == want` between two Bool params still lowers to
str_eq and segfaults. Found while writing this commit's own test harness — the
first version of it crashed on exactly that, on both the old and new compiler.
It needs the same treatment, and it wants its own change.
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will.anderson
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dbb06f6ee4 |
Merge pull request 'compiler: a missing import is an error, not an empty string' (#136) from fix/missing-import-is-an-error into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 11m0s
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bigmerge
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906c664a65 |
compiler: a missing import is an error, not an empty string
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (pull_request) Failing after 11m23s
import "../../NOPE/does_not_exist.el"
compiled CLEANLY — exit 0, empty stderr, and a program silently missing
everything it imported.
resolve_imports did `fs_read(src_path)` and used the result without checking.
fs_read returns "" both for "file is empty" and "file does not exist", so a
typo, a moved file, or a relative path resolved from the wrong working
directory all produced a successful build of nothing.
It caused a real wrong conclusion during test-framework work: a bisection run
from a subdirectory where ../../runtime/ did not resolve produced ELEVEN
consecutive "successful" compiles that had included no runtime at all, and the
results were believed before anyone noticed.
Missing dependency, confident success — the same shape as a test suite
reporting pass for tests that never ran, and as a benchmark reporting 0us
because the optimiser deleted the loop.
fs_exists separates the two cases, so a legitimately empty file still resolves
to "" and is fine. A path that does not exist now prints the resolved path and
exits 1, which is what build scripts check.
Verified:
- bad import: exit 1 (was 0), message names the resolved path
- elc-cli.el still compiles, self-hosting fixpoint byte-identical
- neuron's full soul amalgam regeneration: exit 0, 405ms, output
byte-identical at 1,270,212 bytes
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Neuron
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6a6b589ba0 |
bench: real black_box barrier + three-signal growth-curve gate
Adds el_black_box (inline asm, +r constraint, memory clobber) and runtime/elbench.el: a growth-curve classifier that gates time AND allocation-count AND allocation-bytes, failing if any exceeds its declared curve. Refusal is a first-class verdict. The classifier REFUSES rather than classifying when the largest measurement is below the floor, or when a series is hard-flat across an 8x input range -- the shape produced when the optimiser deletes the work. Reporting O(1) there would be a confident answer with nothing behind it. Disagreeing ratios report INDETERMINATE rather than a guess. Deviation from DESIGN.md 6.2, stated in the source: uses consecutive ratios on a mandated geometric sweep rather than least-squares over candidate curves. Ratios are directly interpretable on a doubling sweep and need no floating point; the cost is weaker O(n) vs O(n log n) separation, reported as an ambiguous band rather than guessed. Documents the counter scope limit: engram_*.c and libcurl malloc are NOT tracked, so a flat curve over engram/HTTP-dominated work is not evidence of anything. 13 tests prove the classifier against real measured series from fitprobe.el -- including that an accumulator's allocation COUNT is linear while its bytes are quadratic, and that el #132's pure-CPU shape reads FLAT on both allocation signals and is caught only by time. |
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bigmerge
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b5d1e53902 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/dev' into wt/soul-runtime-reconcile | ||
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will.anderson
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9e96d74f6a |
Merge pull request 'runtime: count container allocations too, not just strings' (#135) from feat/alloc-accounting-containers into dev
El SDK CI - dev / build-and-test (push) Failing after 11m49s
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